Multilayered governance in international financial regulation and supervision

Journal of International Economic Law

Volumn 13, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 683-704

  Weber, Rolf H ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78649846365     PISSN: 13693034     EISSN: 14643758     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jiel/jgq033     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. For a more extensive discussion of the effects of financial globalization on sovereignty see Goodhart and Lastra, in this issue at 705-718.
2. See also Joel P. Trachtman, in this issue at 719-742.
3. Rolf H. Weber, 'Mapping and Structuring International Financial Regulation - A Theoretical Approach', 20 (5) European Banking Law Review 651 (2009), at 652.
4. Jan H. Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on International Commercial, Financial and Trade Law (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004) 908.
5. Peter Nobel, 'Zur Regulierungsarchitektur im Finanzmarktbereich', in Hans Caspar von der Crone et al. (eds), Fragen des Bank-und Finanzmarktrechts (Zurich: Schulthess, 2004), 105-29 at 106, 125.
6. Weber, above n 3, at 653.
7. Roy C. Smith and Ingo Walter, Global Banking (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 336-7.
8. Rolf H. Weber and Douglas Arner, 'Toward a New Design for International Financial Regulation', 29 (2) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 391 (2007), at 416-17.
9. Thomas Cottier, 'Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and Moral Conflict', 16 (2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 647 (2009), at 648.
10. Thomas Cottier, 'Multilayered Governance, Pluralism, and Moral Conflict', 16 (2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 647 (2009), at 648., Ibid, at 648-50.
11. Samantha Besson, The Morality of Conflict: Reasonable Disagreement and the Law (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005) 534-5.
12. Rainer Nickel, 'Participatory Transnational Governance', in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006), 157-198 at 157, 162.
13. See Weber, above n 3, at 682.
14. See Weber and Arner, above n 8, at 393-404.
15. Martti Koskenniemi, 'Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law', United Nations Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, A-CN.4/L682, 13 April 2006, at 11-12.
16. Myriam Senn, 'Decentralisation of Economic Law - An Oxymoron?', 35 (2) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 427 (2005), at 442.
17. See Koskenniemi, above n 15, at 30-4;
18. see also Rolf H. Weber, 'New Rule-Making Elements for Financial Architecture's Reform', 10 Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 512 (2010), at 515.
19. Peter N. Grabosky, 'Using Non-Governmental Resources to Foster Regulatory Compliance', 8 (4) Governance 527 (1995), at 545.
20. John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends', 29 (3) International Organization 557 (1975), at 562.
21. John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends', 29 (3) International Organization 557 (1975), at 562., Ibid, at 570.
22. John Gerard Ruggie, 'International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends', 29 (3) International Organization 557 (1975), at 562., Ibid, at 559.
23. See also Rolf H. Weber, Shaping Internet Governance: Regulatory Challenges (Zurich: Schulthess, 2009) 92-3.
24. See Koskenniemi, above n 15, at 30-67 and 99-101.
25. See Nickel, above n 12, at 167;
26. see also Rolf H. Weber, 'New Sovereignty Concepts in the Age of Internet?', 14 (2) Journal of Internet Law 12 (2010), at 16-18.
27. Kal R. Raustiala, 'The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law', 43 (1) Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (2002), at 17-26.
28. Kal R. Raustiala, 'The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law', 43 (1) Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (2002), at 17-26., Ibid, at 26-51.
29. Kal R. Raustiala, 'The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law', 43 (1) Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (2002), at 17-26., Ibid, at 11.
30. Kal R. Raustiala, 'The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law', 43 (1) Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (2002), at 17-26., Ibid, at 26-51., Ibid, at 23-4 and 55-6.
31. Kal R. Raustiala, 'The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law', 43 (1) Virginia Journal of International Law 1 (2002), at 17-26., Ibid, at 26-51., Ibid, at 76-83.
32. Raustiala, above n 25, does not address the democratic elements of a liberal state; however, allocation of power is important as the subsequent considerations explain in more detail.
33. Kenneth Anderson, 'Book Review: Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance through Global Government Network', 118 (4) Harvard Law Review 1255 (2005), at 1257;
34. see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004) 14.
35. Anderson, ibid, at 1257.
36. See Slaughter, above n 31, at 12-13.
37. See Slaughter, above n 31, at 12-13., Ibid, at 263.
38. For a general overview see Cottier, above n 9, at 655-73;
39. Fritz W. Scharpf, 'Introduction: The Problem-Solving Capacity of Multi-Level Governance', 4 (4) Journal of European Public Policy 520 (1997).
40. See Cottier, above n 9, at 656.
41. See Cottier, above n 9, at 656., Ibid, at 656-7.
42. See Cottier, above n 9, at 656., Ibid, at 657.
43. for a discussion of rights-based constitutionalism see also Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 'Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO Requires Multilevel Constitutionalism', in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006), 5-58, at 5.
44. See Cottier, above n 9, at 659-60.
45. See Cottier, above n 9, at 659-60., Ibid, at 660;
46. see also Joseph H. H. Weiler, 'Democratic or Technocratic Governance?', Jean Monnet Working Paper No 6/01 (2001), at 5-6.
47. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), at 3.
48. See Weber, above n 3, at 682.
49. Julia Black, 'Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes', 2 (2) Regulation & Governance 137 (2008), at 139-41.
50. Rolf H. Weber and Thomas Schneider, Internet Governance and Switzerland's Particular Role in its Processes (Zurich: Schulthess, 2009) 17, 29.
51. See Weber, above n 22, at 88-9.
52. See Weber, above n 3, at 682.
53. N. Brian Winchester, 'Emerging Global Environmental Governance', 16 (1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 7 (2009), at 22.
54. For a further discussion see Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur, The UN and Global Governance: An Idea and Its Prospects (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).
55. Richard Falk, 'Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia', 6 (4) Journal of Ethics 311 (2002), at 345.
56. See Timothy William Waters, "'The Momentous Gravity of the State of Things Now Obtaining": Annoying Westphalian Objections to the Idea of Global Governance', 16 (1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 25 (2009), at 33.
57. For further details see Maria Ludovica Murazzani, 'NGOs, Global Governance and the UN: NGOs as "Guardians of the Reform of the International System"', 16 (2) Transition Studies Review 501 (2009);
58. see also Waters, above n 50, at 40-1.
59. See Peter Newell, 'Civil Society, Corporate Accountability and the Politics of Climate Change', 8 (3) Global Environmental Politics (2008), 122-153, at 122.
60. Cottier, above n 9, at 650.
61. Cottier, above n 9, at 650., Ibid, at 673.
62. See Rolf H. Weber, 'Financial Stability - Structural Framework and Development Issues', 6 (4) International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 1 (2008), at 8;
63. Garry Schinasi, Safeguarding Financial Stability: Theory and Practice (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2006) 100;
64. Douglas W. Arner, Financial Stability, Economic Growth, and the Role of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 136.
65. See, for example, Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor, 'Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability', IMF Working Paper, WP/02/46, 2002, at 8.
66. See Garry J. Schinasi, 'Defining Financial Stability', IMF Working Paper, WP/04/187, 2004, at 3.
67. See Weber, above n 3, at 669.
68. See Arner, above n 55, at 181-2;
69. Weber, above n 3, at 670-1.
70. See Patrizia Nanz, 'Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutionalisation of Transnational Trade Governance: A View from Political Theory', in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2006), 59-82, at 59, 67.
71. See Joshua Cohen, 'Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy', in Seyla Benhabib (ed), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) 95-119, at 95.
72. See Nanz, above n 60, at 70.
73. For an overview, see Weber and Arner, above n 8, at 401-27.
74. See Rosa Maria Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Monetary Stability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 138.
75. Available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf.
76. George Alexander Walker, European Banking Law, Vol. 6 (London: Walker, 2007), 314-324.
77. See Weber, above n 3, at 674.
78. See above Section IV:B.
79. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework', June 2004, at 1.
80. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'International Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring', Consultative Document, December 2009.
81. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Report and Recommendations of the Cross-border Bank Resolution Group', March 2010;
82. International Monetary Fund, 'Resolution of Cross-Border Banks - A Proposed Framework for Enhanced Coordination', 11 June 2010.
83. See Weber, above n 3, at 665.
84. Financial Stability Board, 'What are Standards?', webpage about the Compendium of Standards, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/cos/standards. htm (visited 13 June 2010).
85. See Weber, above n 3, 661.
86. Vera Schreiber, 'What Are International Standards?', in Peter Nobel (ed), International Standards and the Law (Bern: Stämpfli, 2005), 1-15, at 10.
87. See Brummer, in this issue at 623-643.
88. See Schreiber, above n 75, at 10.
89. For the relationship between soft and hard law see Lastra, above n 64, at 473-4; unfortunately, the enforcement issue cannot be addressed in more detail in this article but deserves further examination.
90. See Rosa Maria Lastra, Central Banking and Banking Regulation (London: Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics, 1996) 108-10;
91. Lastra, above n 64, at 84-9.
92. See, e.g. Charles A. E. Goodhart and Dirk Schoenmaker, 'Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision be Separated?', 47 Oxford University Papers 539 (1995);
93. see also Lastra, above n 64, at 90-2.
94. See Lastra, above n 64, at 96.
95. See, e.g. Karel Lannoo, 'Challenges to the Structure of Financial Supervision in the EU', in George G. Kaufmann (ed), Bank Fragility and Regulation: Evidence from Different Countries (New York: Elsevier, 2000) 121-160, at 130, for an overview of Member States' supervisory arrangements.
96. For example, both the UK and German governments have proposed to (re-) integrate the monetary and supervisory functions under the roof of their Central Banks.
97. Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, 'Macro-prudential Supervision in Europe', The Economist's 2nd City Lecture, London, 11 December 2009, http://www.bis.org/ review/r091218b.pdf? noframes=1 (visited 13 June 2010).
98. Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, 'Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision', October 2006.
99. Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, 'Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision', October 2006., Ibid, para 7.
100. Financial Stability Forum, 'Principles for Cross-border Cooperation on Crisis Management', 2 April 2009. The Financial Stability Forum is the successor to the FSB.
101. 'Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the Financial Supervisory Authorities, Central Banks and Finance Ministries of the European Union on Cross-Border Financial Stability', 1 June 2008.
102. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Good Practice Principles on Supervisory Colleges - Consultative Document', March 2010, at 1, footnote 1.
103. G-20, 'Washington Action Plan', Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy, Washington, DC, 15 November 2008, para 35.
104. See BCBS, above n 89.