Revisiting westphalia, discovering post-westphalia

Journal of Ethics

Volumn 6, Issue 4, 2002, Pages 311-352

  Falk, Richard ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cosmopolitan democracy; Global empire; Globalization; Humane global governance; International law; Megaterrorism; Nation; Regionalism; Sovereignty; World government; World order

Indexed keywords

EID: 25844464038     PISSN: 13824554     EISSN: 15728609     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1021222318112     Document Type: Article

References (77)

1. For illuminating interpretations of Westphalian multi-dimensionality, see Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia: Building World Order in the New Millennium (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002);
2. G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
3. On the emergence of the sovereign state and states system as the dominant form of political organization, see Hedrick Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994: for an assessment of its prospects under conditions of intensifying interdependence and declining capacity,
4. see Joseph A Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1992).
5. For a severe critiques of the role of the UN in the Balkans and Rwanda during the height of peacekeeping diplomacy in the 1990s see David Rieff, Slaughterhouse (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995);
6. L.R. Malvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (London: Zed, 2000). As Malvern makes particularly clear, the UN must be understood as an agent of the main Western states, especially the US.
7. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1995);
8. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
9. For influential formulations; a more recent distinguished addition to this literature of statist endorsement is Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
10. See Jan Lodal, The Price of Dominance (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 2001).
11. For an analysis along these lines, see Richard Falk, "The critical realist tradition and the demystiflcation of interstate power," in Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman (eds.), Innovation and Transformation in International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 39-55.
12. Perhaps most clearly articulated in Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society," in Herbert Butterfleld and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), pp. 51-73;
13. also see Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1966);
14. Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
15. For the most rigorous argument to this effect, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979).
16. Prominent partial and non-utopian advocates of a global peace system include Czar Alexander, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and more recently Olaf Palme, Mikhail Gorbachev, and Nelson Mandela. Wilson can be regarded as "Utopian" in the important sense of proposing a mechanism that lacked the capability to achieve the proclaimed goal, that is, the League of Nations as constituted did not have the authority or the capacity to supplant a balance of power approach by institutionalizing collective security.
17. For Bull's views on Hobbes, see his essay, "Hobbes and the International Anarchy," reprinted in Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds.), Hedley Bull on International Society (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 188-205.
18. In the William Jefferson Clinton presidency of the United States, this idea was form-alized as the doctrine of "enlargement," seeking to expand the domain of constitutional democracy as a strategy for extending "peace" to the peoples of the world. In the Clinton formulations, "constitutional democracy" was understood as implying the existence of "a market economy."
19. Of course, there is also the US of Jesse Helms and George W. Bush, which prides itself on anti-internationalism, isolationism, and an affirmation of strong sovereign rights, while still insisting upon its moral exceptionalism in world politics. Increasingly, others regard these claims with suspicion in the period since the end of the cold war, viewing the US as a typical arrogant, domineering, and self-seeking dominant state whose unilateralism undermines respect for international law and the UN.
20. For an influential interpretation that argues against the alleged Wilsonian legacy of moralism, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 218-245, 762-835.
21. On Wilson's views on world peace and related diplomacy after World War I, see Thomas J. Knock, To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
22. The contrast here is with "exclusive forms" that emphasize special access to truth and salvation, and regard those without such access as evil or as infidels. This distinction, and its relation to contemporary patterns of world order is the main theme of Richard Falk, Religion and Humane Global Governace (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
23. For mainly skeptical assessments of supranationalizing claims, see Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
24. The controversy about the proper limits of the right of self-determination in the postcolonial era is far from resolved. It has flared up in concrete circumstances of bloody encounter in such diverse settings as Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Palestine. For views expressive of the range of claims see Y. N. Kly and D. Kly (eds.), The Right to Self-Determination: Collected Papers & Proceedings of the First International Conference on the Right to Self-Determination & the United Nations, Geneva, 2000 (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2001).
25. For a more cautious set of views about the scope of the right of self-determination see Wolfgang Danspreckgruber with Arthur Watts (eds.), Self-Dermination and Self-Administration: A Sourcebook (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997).
26. Ken Booth has vividly conceptualized this critique of the Westphalian impact on human well-being in Ken Booth, "Human Wrongs and International Relations," Journal of International Affairs 71 (1995), pp. 103-126;
27. for a series of essays exploring the relevance of this critique by Booth, see Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
28. Unconditional territorial sovereignty never did except as an "ideal type." See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
29. See also Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.), State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International Relations (University Park: Penn State University Press, 1997).
30. It is for this reason that I have elsewher referred to this period of hybridity and transition as "a Grotian moment" in which the old order persists, yet is increasingly challenged by an emergent new order; it was a truly great achievement of Grotius to provide a synthesis that created conceptual and political space for the new without requiring a repudiation of the old. For my assessment, see Richard Falk, Law in an Emerging Global Village (Ardsley: Transnational, 1999), pp. 3-31.
31. Although statist views predominated in international relations, there has been a macro-historical tradition that regarded civilizational units as the basic constitutive force in world affairs. Leading examples of this tradition include Oswald Spengler, Decline of the West (New York: Knopf, 1926-1928);
32. Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 12 vols., 1934-1961);
33. Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980);
34. William H. McNeill, The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963).
35. A recent example of this genre is the fine study of Jacques Barzun, From Dawn to Decadence: 1500 to the Present (New York: HarperCollins, 2000).
36. Important as a corrective to the Western preoccupations of this macro-historical work is Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993).
37. A perceptive overview of the civilizational approach as it relates to international relations is Jacinta O'Hagen, "Conflict, Convergence or Co-existence? The Relevance of Culture in Reframing World Order," Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 9 (2000), pp. 537-567.
38. These awkward words are used here to get away from such heavily freighted alternatives as "globalization" and "regionalism."
39. This provocative interpretation of international relations is set forth fully in Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996). Huntington's geopolitical approach distracted commentators from the innovative side of his assessment of the future of international relations centering upon a shift in the main axes of significance from statism to civilizationalism. In this respect, Huntington's outlook can be understood as one type of post-Westphalian scenario.
40. For overview, see Sylvester John Hemleben, Plans for Peace through Six Centuries (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1943);
41. for more recent visionary thinking, see Wesley T. Wooley, Alternatives to Anarchy: American Supranationalism Since World War II (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968).
42. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, World Peace through World Law, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966);
43. for a recent proposal along similar lines see James A. Yunker, World Union on the Horizon (Lanham: University Press of America, 1993).
44. Saul H. Mendlovitz (ed.), On the Creation of a Just World Order (New York: Free Press, 1975) provides a summary of the diverse models of preferred futures for the 1990s.
45. Take note of cynicism in the face of genocide: Khmer Rouge exempted for geopolitical reasons associated with "China card," while Rhodesia was "overlooked" because the country was seen as without strategic concern. See Glenda Cooper, "U.S. Memos Reveal Delay on Rwanda," Washington Post, August 8, 2001, p. A20;
46. see also Malvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide, note 3.
47. See several fine books on these themes Gary Bass, To Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000);
48. Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Boston: Beacon, 1998);
49. Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (New York: Norton, 2000).
50. A coherent presentation along these lines can be found in Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future (Boston: Beacon, 1989).
51. My initial reliance on this distinction can be found in Richard Falk, "The Making of Global Citizenship," in Jeremy Brecher, John Brown Childs, and Jill Cutler (eds.), Global Visions: Beyond the New World Order (Boston: South End Press, 1993), pp. 418-431.
52. This theme is developed in Richard Falk, "State of Seige: Will Globalization Win Out?" International Affairs 73 (1997), pp. 123-136.
53. See Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures, and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
54. This is counter-intuitive because previous thinking on global reform had consistently regarded states and sovereignty as obstacles to the establishment of more humane world this counter-intuitive because global reform thought had previously order.
55. or elaboration, see Mendlovitz, On the Creation of a Just World Order, note 25.
56. See Mehdi Mozaffari, "Mega Civilization: Global Capital and New Standard of Civilization," Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark, 1999, for critique
57. see David Korten, When Corporations Rule the World (West Hartford: Kumerian Press & Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 1995);
58. Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
59. See Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York: Knopf, 1982);
60. see also references cited in note 24.
61. For the most comprehensive account, see Manuel Castels, The Rise of the Network Society, 3 vols. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996-1998);
62. Mark Dery, Escape Velocity: Cyberculture at the End of the Century (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1996);
63. Kevin A. Hall and John E. Hughes, Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefleld, 1998);
64. Gregory S. Paul & Earl D. Cox, Beyond Humanity: CyberEvolution and Future Minds (Rockland: Charles River Media, 1996);
65. Douglas S. Robertson, The New Renaissance: Computers and the Next Level of Civilization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
66. The more normatively, less technocratically, grounded image of "global neighbor-hood" seems similarly out of touch with the predatory elements of the main currents of globalization in lethal interaction with neoliberal ideas and hegemonic geopolitics. See report of the Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighborhood (New York: Oxford, 1995);
67. Richard Falk, Predatory Globalization: A Critique (Cambridge: Polity, 1999). I have preferred the terminology of "humane global governance" as goal and ideal, as well as potentiality, but without the implication that such a phrase is descriptive of current world order or the most probable future.
68. There are some complexities present, as "strong states" are needed to resist the predatory aspects of globalization, and the transformation of the state would involve its greater responsiveness to normative demands, including the effort to commit a higher proportion of the national budget to the financing of global public goods. See generally Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern (eds.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
69. See Daniele Archibugi and David Held (eds.), Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 1995);
70. Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Köhler (eds.), Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).
71. See references in note 27.
72. Guidelines for national courts to proceed with the indictment and prosecution of individuals accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, and other serious crimes of state are contained in "The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction," brochure published by Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University, 2001. The Princeton Principles are the product of discussion and analysis by a group of international law specialists and practitioners.
73. The case for a Global Peoples Assembly is elaborated by Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, "On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty," Stanford Journal of International Law 36 (2000), pp. 191-219;
74. Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, "Toward Global Parliament," Foreign Affairs 80 (2001), pp. 212-220.
75. For elaboration of this point see Richard Falk, "Meeting the Challenge of Multilateralism," in Thomas H. Henriksen (ed.), Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-first Century: Alternative Perspectives (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2001), pp. 33-47.
76. On "legalization," see Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "Legalization and World Poltics," International Organization 54 (2000), pp. 385-389.
77. My thinking here is influenced by Björn Hettne, especially "Globalization and the New Regionalism: The Second Great Transformation," in Björn Hettne, András Inotai and Osvaldo Sunkel (eds.), Globalism and the New Regionalism (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 1-24.