Temporal reality

Time and Identity

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 27-48

  Baker, Lynne Rudder ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

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EID: 78649723881     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (25)

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2. Baker, L. R. 1972. Linguistic and Ontological Aspects of Temporal Becoming. Dissertation, Vanderbilt University.
3. Baker, L. R. 1974-75. Temporal Becoming: The Argument from Physics. Philosophical Forum 6: 218-236.
4. Baker, L. R. 1979. On the Mind-Dependence of Temporal Becoming. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39: 341-357.
5. Baker, L. R. 1982. Underprivileged Access. Noûs 16: 227-241.
6. Broad, C. D. 1923. Scientifi c Thought. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
7. Craig, W. L. 2000a. The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critique. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
8. Craig, W. L. 2000b. The Tenseless Theory of Time: A Critique. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
9. Crisp, T. 2004. Defi ning Presentism. In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, ed. D. Zimmerman. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
10. Gale, R. 1968. The Language of Time. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
11. Grünbaum, A. 1963. Philosophical Problems of Space and Time. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
12. Grünbaum, A. 1968. The Status of Temporal Becoming. In Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes. London: George Allen & Unwin.
13. Kaplan, D. 1989. Demonstratives. In Themes from Kaplan, ed. J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein. New York: Oxford University Press.
14. Markosian, N. 2004. In Defense of Presentism. In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, ed. D. Zimmerman. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
15. Matthews, G. B. 1971. Dualism and Solecism. Philosophical Review 80: 85-95.
16. Matthews, G. B. 1972. Senses and Kinds. Journal of Philosophy 69: 149-157.
17. McTaggart, J. M. E. 1927/ 1968. Time. In The Philosophy of Time, ed. R. Gale. London: Macmillan.
18. Mellor, H. 1999. The Time of Our Lives. Lecture to the Royal Institute of Philosophy, London. Delivered 22 October 1999. Accessible at: www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/ bitstream/1810/753/1/TimeLives.html.
19. Oaklander, L. N. 2003. Presentism: A Critique. In Real Metaphysics, ed. H. Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez-Pereya. London: Routledge.
20. Perry, J. 1979. The Problem of the Essential Indexical. Noûs 13: 3-21.
21. Rea, M. C. 2003. Four-Dimensionalism. In The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, ed. M. Loux and D. Zimmerman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
22. Sider, T. 2001. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
23. Smart, J. J. C. 1963. Philosophy and Scientifi c Realism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
24. Tooley, M. 1997. Time, Tense, and Causation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
25. van Inwagen, P. 2002. The Number of Things. In Philosophical Issues 12: Realism and Relativism, ed. E. Sosa. Oxford: Blackwell.