Presentism: A critique

Real Metaphysics

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 196-211

  Oaklander, L Nathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN FLINT   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85069179240     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203164297-16     Document Type: Chapter

References (41)

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