Strong representationalism and centered content

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 151, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 373-392

  Brogaard, Berit ^a,b  

^a AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

Centered content; Centered properties; Centered worlds; Perceptual content; Phenomenal character; Strong representationalism; The content of perception; The dual looks problem; The duplication problem; Viewpoint dependent property; Viewpoint independent property

Indexed keywords

EID: 78249282305     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9437-z     Document Type: Article

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