The ayatollah's praetorians: The islamic revolutionary guard corps and the 2009 election crisis

Middle East Journal

Volumn 64, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 543-558

  Safshekan, Roozbeh ^a   Sabet, Farzan ^b  

^a Howard Hughes Medical Institute   (United States)

^b Graduate Institute of International   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CULTURAL INFLUENCE; CULTURAL LANDSCAPE; ELECTION; ETHNOPOLITICS; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; ISLAMISM; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL POWER; POWER RELATIONS;

IRAN;

EID: 78149489461     PISSN: 00263141     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3751/64.4.12     Document Type: Article

References (83)

1. "First Charter of the IRGC," Fars News Agency, October 14, 2008, http://www.farsnews.net/ newstext.php?nn=8707220459.
2. The Basij Popular Mobilization Force is one of the five branches of the IRGC, alongside their Ground Force, Air Force, Navy, and the Quds Force. The Basij is the IRGC's popular paramilitary reserve force. During the Iran-Iraq war the Basij mobilized war volunteers, who were not professional soldiers, to the front.
3. After the war, the Basij became the IRGC's popular base in society, performing a variety of tasks including security and intelligence-gathering in workplaces, schools, etc., and riot suppression, among other functions.
4. Frederic Wehrey, Jerrold D. Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, and S.R. Bohandy, The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, 2009, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG821.pdf. The 2009 report by the RAND Corporation is a case in point. While it is comprehensive, and by and large accurate, it fails to provide a simple and accurate framework for understanding the contemporary IRGC.
5. For example, it maintains that the IRGC is an "institution over which the various ideological factions may compete for control and influence" (p. 14). While this observation is not wholly incorrect, we will show that since at least since 2003 a group from within the IRGC has taken effective control of the organization and brought it into domestic politics as a faction.
6. Unlike past studies, we also have the election crisis to guide us in the direction the IRGC and Iranian factional politics may take.
7. The group we have identified as "Neo-Principalist," based around the government of President Mahmud Ahmadinejad and the leadership of the IRGC, do not actually refer to themselves by this name. Rather, this is a name we have applied to them for two reasons.
8. First, it identifies their origins in the Principalist [usulgarayan] faction who make up the politically-authoritarian, socially-conservative, and economically-laissez-faire right wing of the regime. Second, the term "Neo" underlines the ways in which they are different from the Principalists, including their social base and political and economic ideology. The term "Neo-Principalist" has no Farsi equivalent, but can be translated as no-usulgarayan.
9. Ervand Abrahamian, "The Crowd in the Iranian Revolution," Radical History Review, No. 105 (2009), pp. 13-38.
10. Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002). This book provides an accurate framework for understanding factional politics in Iran before the Neo-Principalists.
11. The bazaar-clergy alliance has been at the forefront of social movements in modern Iran, including the Tobacco Revolt of 1892, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906, and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Arang Keshavarzian, Bazaar and State in Iran (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
12. Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, pp. 55-60.
13. Although President Hashemi-Rafsanjani was strongly allied with this faction during Khamenei's presidency, he has been much more of a bridging figure between left and right, often being labeled a "pragmatist" by the Western media. He and his faction constitute the political middle ground between left and right in the IRI, although given the attacks against him from the right he has been increasingly pushed toward the left.
14. Bonyads are semi-governmental religious charities that are, in reality, major holding companies, acting as a covert source of wealth for the regime on one hand and providing limited social welfare functions on the other.
15. Combatant Clergy Association, http://www.rohaniatmobarez.com. This group was founded in 1978 as a Shi'ite clerical group opposing the Pahlavi regime. With the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the internal divisions within the Islamists led by Khomeini manifested themselves, and this group was no exception. While the Islamic Right clergy remained in the Combatant Clergy Association, the Islamic Left clergy renamed themselves the Association of Combatant Clergymen.
16. "Morteza Nabavi's Word of Caution to Principalists," Farda News, August 18, 2010, http://www.fardanews.com/fa/pages/?cid=58209. "In the beginning of the 1997 elections, we witnessed name changes, with the left current becoming known as the Second of Khordad Movement or Reformists and on the other hand the right current as Principalists, and this division persists to this day."
17. The Line of the Imam is a term originally applied to the radical Islamic students who seized the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979, and thereafter was used by the Islamic Left. The term Line of the Imam and Leader did not appear until after the ascension of Khamenei to Velayat-e Faqih, specifically during the 7th Majlis (2004). The Principalist faction in the Majlis used it to emphasize their special relationship with and loyalty to Khamenei.
18. The Neo-Principalists differ from the Principalists in three notable ways. First, their anti-clericalism entails animosity primarily toward independent and influential clergymen, such as Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Sadeq Larijani, and Nateq-Nouri, outside of their power. They have undermined the power of the clergy in the state by replacing independent clergymen and their supporters with IRGC loyalists, redefining the relationship between Shi'ite Islam and the state, and engaging in a sustained smear campaign.
19. Second, the Neo-Principalists are highly nationalistic, a shift from the emphasis on political Islam. Finally, they seek to transform the economy by concentrating economic power in their hands and rationalizing the system in such a manner as to increase profit maximization (for example, by weakening labor legislation and slowing the growth of wages) and competitiveness on the global stage. In the past five years, the groups have been represented by the presidency and its partisans on one hand (Neo-Principalists) and the Majlis and Judiciary on the other (Principalists).
20. See Ali Alfoneh, "Indoctrination of the Revolutionary Guards," AEI Middle Eastern Outlook, February 2009, http://www.aei.org/docLib/02-23906%20MEO%20Alfoneh-g.pdf
21. "Palizdar Lawyer to Appeal Verdict," Press TV, July 6, 2009, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/99931.html
22. "MP Criticizes Vice President for Misleading Remarks," Tehran Times, August 7, 2010, http://www.tehrantimes.com/index_View.asp?code=224323.
23. "Historic Cyrus Cylinder Called 'A Stranger In Its Own Home,'" Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 14, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Historic_Cyrus_Cylinder_Called_A_Stranger_I n_Its_Own_Home/2157345.html?page=1&x=1#relatedInfoContainer.
24. Association of Combatant Clerics, http://rouhanioon.com/.
25. Akbar Montajabi, "Unspoken Words about the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: An Interview between Shahrvand Emrooz and Mohsen Rafiqdoost," Shahrvand Emrooz, January 26, 2008, http://shahrvandemroz.blogfa.com/post-490.aspx.
26. Mohsen S. Sazegara, "The Revolutionary Guard and the Three Diversions," Mohsen Sazegara's Personal Website, July 25, 2006, http://www.sazegara.net/persian/archives/2006/07/060723_154435.html.
27. "The Philosophy of the Formation of the Basij," Basij Information Website, http://www.basij.ir/new/1002.asp.
28. "The Target of US Sanctions; IRGC's Khatam al-Anbia Headquarter," BBC Persian, October 26, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2007/10/071026_ka-mb-us-iran-san ction-khatam.shtml.
29. "The Break between the Majlis and the Presidency in Iran," Deutsche Welle, October 8, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,4775638,00.html.
30. Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of the Interior, First and Second Round of the 2003 City and Village Council Elections, http://www.moi.ir/Portal/File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=e3ee8d84-d04a-404fa8f8-c7 0ed934b7a5.
31. Amassing economic power has been conducted mainly (but not exclusively) through four methods. First, Neo-Principalists within the government have simply given the IRGC large state contracts for a variety of projects. Second, it has effectively employed its insider knowledge of the Iranian government's privatization program and the Tehran Stock Exchange to "acquire" major companies directly (through IRGC fronts) or indirectly (by empowering IRGC veterans in line with the Neo-Principalist agenda).
32. Third, the IRGC has benefited from its role in border security and its ability to evade customs control (on the grounds of "national security") by operating a very large and extensive smuggling network, allowing it to control several commodities by importing them cheaply. Finally, in cases where none of the above methods could be applied, it has intervened directly through the use of force.
33. Their social activities, however, have been less well understood and documented. The Basij, the IRGC's branch in Iranian society, as previously mentioned, was created to mobilize ordinary Iranians (most from a lower-to lower-middle-class background) to the front during the Iran-Iraq war, and was largely a non-professional military force. At the end of the war, the regime channelled returning Basij veterans into units embedded in key institutions in society including universities, factories, government offices, mosques, etc.
34. While resuming their normal lives, Basij members also became organic elements of a comprehensive security, intelligence, and propaganda network. Basij membership (open to the public) entails a wide range of benefits including jobs, preferential loans, a quota in universities, access to facilities (health clinics, sports clubs, etc.), paramilitary training, and much more, thus improving living standards and facilitating social mobility.
35. While spreading the values of the Islamic Revolution, Basij members also keep a watchful eye on family members, neighbors, classmates, and co-workers, mobilize to support the regime in public demonstrations, and violently suppress open acts of dissent.
36. They are the IRGC's paramilitary reserve force and a key constituency of the regime. Ali Alfoneh, "How Intertwined are the Revolutionary Guard's in Iran's Economy?," AEI Middle Eastern Outlook, October 2007, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20071022_MEno3g.pdf.
37. Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, and Bohandy, The Rise of the Pasdaran (for the role in the economy, see Chapter 5, pp. 55-70. For role of the Basij see Chapter 3, pp. 25-29).
38. Nahid Siamdoust, "Meet Iran's New Islamic Right-Neo-Cons Take Tehran," Time Magazine, March 5, 2004, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,598263,00.html.
39. This article (about the Islamic Developers of Iran's victory in that year's Majlis elections) is very instructive about the true characteristics of the Neo-Principalists. Although they sometimes present a hard-line façade (mainly for the benefit of their Principalist allies), they are self-described "professional experts" (technocrats) and "pragmatists."
40. This is the essence of the Qom-Najaf divide in Shi'ite political Islam. The Shi'ite clergy who believed in clerical involvement in politics shifted their center of gravity to Qom to distance themselves from the Quietists in Najaf, who advocate a form of separation of religion and politics.
41. "The Biography of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri," Official Website of Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, March 2010, http://www.amontazeri.com/farsi/frame1.asp.
42. Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, "Velayat-e Faqih and the Assembly of Experts," Official website of Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, March 15, 2006, http://mesbahyazdi.org/farsi/?speeches/lectures/lectures21.htm.
43. Parisa Hafezi, "Iran Candidate Says Prisoners Tortured to Death," Reuters, August 13, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSHAF23304820090813.
44. Ahmadinejad famously launched these salvos during the pre-election televised debate between himself and Mir-Hossein Moussavi on June 3, 2009, and with Mehdi Karrubi on June 6, 2009. "Full Ahmadinejad-Mousavi Debate," IRIB 3, June 3, 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9DNmR15Lui8
45. "Full Ahmadinejad - Karroubi Debate," IRIB 3, June 6, 2009, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JsvgMiOVnWM.
46. Morteza Mirdar, The Memoirs of Hojjat-ol Islam Nateq-Nouri, (Tehran: Islamic Revolution Document Center).
47. "Taeb: Retirement of the First Generation of the Revolution in the Fourth Decade," Farda News, August 28, 2009, http://www.fardanews.com/fa/pages/?cid=88443.
48. "Stop 'Mahdi' Talk, Iran Scholars Tell Ahmadinejad," Al-Arabiya News Channel, May 7, 2008, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/05/07/49515.html.
49. Mashaei was removed from his new appointment as First Vice Minister for his comments. However, this only happened after significant pressure from Ahmadinejad's non-Neo-Principalist allies and the intervention of the Supreme Leader himself. It is important to note that Ahmadinejad only removed him after writing a terse letter to the Supreme Leader and removing two non-Neo-Principalist ministers from his Cabinet, reappointing Mashaei as the head of his own office.
50. "Mahmoud & Esfandiar's Excellent Adventure," Monthly Review, August 13, 2009, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/iran130809.html.
51. "Suggested Ministers for the Cabinet of the Tenth Government," Presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran, August 21, 2009, http://www.president.ir/fa/?ArtID=17552.
52. ETKA (edarey-e tadarokat-e kadr-e artesh, or Military Personnel Services Office) is a provider of goods and services to Iranian military personnel and is part of the military establishment.
53. Rachel Ehrenfeld, "Ahmadinejad - the Economic Reformer," The Huffington Post, September 3, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-rachel-ehrenfeld/ahmadinejad-the-econom_b_276364.html.
54. "Purposes and Origins of the Justice Shares Plan," Justice Shares Information Website, http://www.vase.ir/index.aspx?siteid=81&pageid=372.
55. Mohammad Maljoo, "Worker Protest in the Age of Ahmadinejad," Middle East Report, No. 241 (Winter 2006), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer241/maljoo.html.
56. Iason Athanasiadis, "Power Struggle Hits Iran Intelligence Agency," Washington Times, August 6, 2009. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/06/power-clash-at-iran-agen cy/?page=2.
57. Purges in the MoIS is only the most visible example of a trend that will likely accelerate as the Neo-Principalists consolidate their hold on power.
58. "Iran Oil Minister Replaced, Caretaker Picked," Reuters, August 12, 2007, http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:GuiE7afH3c0J:www.re uters.com/article/idUSBLA26719820070812+Ahmadinejad+%2B+oil+mafia&cd =5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ca.
59. Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, and Bohandy, The Rise of the Pasdaran, pp. 55-70.
60. "The Revolutionary Guard's Economic Power," RFI - Radio France Internationale, November 19, 2008, http://www.rfi.fr/actufa/articles/107/article_4366.asp.
61. Shayerah Ilias, "Iran's Economic Conditions: U.S. Policy Issues," Congressional Research Service, June 15, 2009, http://italy.usembassy.gov/pdf/other/RL34525.pdf
62. Azadeh Moaveni, "Iran's Rich Revolutionary Guard," Time Magazine, September 5, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1659039,00.html.
63. "Iran's Revolutionary Guard Establishes Bank," BBC Persian, September 23, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/business/2009/09/090923_ka_bankansar_sepah. shtml.
64. Jamshid Barzegar, "The IRGC and Oil: Increase of the Miliary's Presence in the Economy and Politics," BBC Persian, June 6, 2006, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2006/06/060608_jb_revolutionary- gurads-gas.shtml.
65. Alfoneh, "How Intertwined are the Revolutionary Guard's in Iran's Economy?"
66. Wehrey, Green, Nichiporuk, Nader, Hansell, and Bohandy, The Rise of the Pasdaran. 45.
67. "The Revolutionary Guard Buys Shares in Iran Telecom," Deutsche Welle, August 28, 2009, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,4604020,00.html.
68. "Iran Risks Crash with Record Stock Market Boom, Say Economists," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, September 2, 2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Iran_Risks_Crash_With_Record_Stock_Market_B oom_Say_Economists/2146481.html
69. "The Revolutionary Guard in the Stock Market," Deutsche Welle, September 2, 2010, http://www.radiofarda.com/content/F6_Iran_Sepah_Markets_CommunicationCom pany/1810688.html
70. "The Largest Deal in Iran's Stock Market History has been Concluded," Deutsche Welle, September 2, 2010, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,4728169,00.html.
71. Jahangir Amuzegar, "Islamic Social Justice, Iranian Style," Middle East Policy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2007), pp. 60-78.
72. "Justice Shares," Talar-e Bourse, September 3, 2010, http://www.talarebourse.com/forum/showthread.php/20606-
73. "Justice Shares to be Given to IRGC Members," Aftab News, November 21, 2008, http://www.aftabnews.ir/vdcipzaq.t1ayr2bcct.html.
74. "Arian Steel: Bankruptcy or Transfer to the IRGC?," Deutsche Welle, September 3, 2010, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,5969305,00.html.
75. Daniel Berman and Thomas Rintoul in Ali Ansari, ed., Preliminary Analysis of the Voting Figures in Iran's 2009 Presidential Election, June 21, 2009, http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14234_iranelection0609.pdf
76. Walter R Mebane, "Note on the Presidential Election in Iran, June 2009," June 19, 2009, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~wmebane/note18jun2009.pdf.
77. "Mousavi Representative: Confirmed Number of the Dead has Reached 72," BBC Persian, September 3, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/09/090902_si_violence_election.sh tml.
78. "IRGC: 'For Two Months We Controlled the Country's Security,'" BBC Persian, October 4, 2009, http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/10/091004_ka_sepah_basij_iraqi.sh tml.
79. The veil of electoral political legitimacy that the Neo-Principalists had operated under in the early years of the Ahmadinejad administration has been lifted and few are under any illusions about Iran's move towards an authoritarian national security state with the IRGC complex at its core. The relative quiescence this year, especially after the celebration of 22 Bahman, has been a result of the impotence of the opposition Green Movement's (Reformist) leadership and the vast coordinated effort by the Neo-Principalists to crush all dissent.
80. Iranians, boxed in by harsh economic realities, shrinking political representation, and a restrictive social atmosphere have, despite simmering resentment, retreated to their pre-election apathy toward the regime and are simply trying to make the best of their lives. Note: 22 Bahman (February 8th) marks the day of the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and is symbolically one of the regime's most important holidays. On February 8, 2010, the regime made every effort to make sure the opposition would not be able to "hijack" this day.
81. "Larijani Criticizes Guardian Council, IRIB," Press TV, June 21, 2009, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/98645.htm?sectionid=351020101
82. "In Iran, Speaker Calls for End to Disputes," Press TV, September 8, 2009, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=105636§ionid=351020101.
83. "Objections to the Presence of Anti-Revolutionary Forces in Mir-Hossein Mousavi's Camp," Kayhan, August 18, 2009, http://www.kayhannews.ir/880529/2.htm#other204.