The Will of the people? Pollsters, elites, and other difficulties

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 78, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1191-1206

  Forbath, William E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78149319852     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (114)

1. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
2. Id. at 376.
3. See id. at 12-14.
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 380.
6. Id. at 376.
7. See id. at 375.
8. Id. at 385.
9. See id. at 375.
10. Friedman has written a number of fine articles chronicling the history of the countermajoritarian difficulty, on which The Will of the People draws. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998);
11. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction's Political Court, 91 GEO. L.J. 1 (2002);
12. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001);
13. Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 (2000);
14. Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) [hereinafter Friedman, Part Five].
15. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 349-50.
16. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAUSM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
17. See William E. Forbath, Popular Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century: Reflections on the Dark Side, the Progressive Constitutional Imagination, and the Enduring Role of Judicial Finality in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967, 990 (2006).
18. See id. at 988.
19. See id. at 990.
20. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 371.
21. See generally Forbath, supra note 12.
22. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 383.
23. See, e.g., id. at 221-22 (discussing the Court's role as protector of the civil liberties of unpopular and politically weak groups and individuals).
24. See id. at 377-78.
25. See id. at 17-18.
26. The classic works remain WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (The Free Press 1965) (1922)
27. JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence trans., The MIT Press 1989) (1962).
28. See generally ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984);
29. JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC (2001);
30. RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA 1740-1790 (1982);
31. DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980);
32. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUC 1776-1787 (1969);
33. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (First Vintage Books 1993) (1992).
34. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 12-13.
35. See generally STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM (1993);
36. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM (1969);
37. SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: JEFFERSON TO LINCOLN (2005);
38. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815 (2009).
39. See GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 98 (2002).
40. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 51, 96-104, 113-18.
41. See id. at 51.
42. See generally TRISH LOUGHRAN, THE REPUBUC IN PRINT: PRINT CULTURE IN THE AGE OF U.S. NATION BUILDING, 1770-1870 (2007);
43. JEFFREY L. PASLEY, THE TYRANNY OF PRINTERS: NEWSPAPER POLITICS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2001);
44. HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA (1990).
45. See generally, e.g., 1 JOHN ASHWORTH, SLAVERY, CAPITALISM, AND POLITICS IN THE ANTEBELLUM REPUBLIC (1995);
46. DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848 (2007);
47. LOUGHRAN, supra note 27;
48. MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 (2003);
49. ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR., AMERICAN POPUUSM: A SOCIAL HISTORY 1877-1898 (1993);
50. William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1999).
51. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 167-73;
52. see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 117-71 (2000).
53. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 285-92 (1982).
54. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 182-87.
55. See, e.g., JANE ADDAMS, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS 222-24 (Anne Frror Scott ed., 1964) (1907);
56. HERBERT CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY 123-24 (1915);
57. KEVIN MATTSON, CREATING A DEMOCRATIC PUBLIC THE STRUGGLE FOR URBAN PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY DURING THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 8-9 (1998);
58. Forbath, supra note 12, at 974-75;
59. Jerome M. Mileur, The Legacy of Reform: Progressive Government, Regressive Politics, in PROORESSIVISM AND THE NEW DEMOCRACY 259, 271-74 (Sidney M. Milkis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 1999).
60. The following discussion draws substantially from Forbath, supra note 12.
61. Id. at 976.
62. See MATTSON, supra note 32, at 84.
63. Forbath, supra note 12, at 976.
64. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293,297-99;
65. Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 436 (1998);
66. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1513-14 (1990).
67. Forbath, supra note 12, at 980.
68. See generally ADDAMS, supra note 32;
69. CROLY, supra note 32.
70. Forbath, supra note 12, at 980;
71. see also Sidney M. Milkis, Introduction: Progressivism, Then and Now, in PROORESSIVISM AND THE NEW DEMOCRACY, supra note 32, at 1, 4-6.
72. Forbath, supra note 12, at 980-81.
73. See MATTSON, supra note 32, at 40, 60.
74. Forbath, supra note 12, at 982.
75. See LIPPMAN, supra note 21, at 30-31.
76. Forbath, supra note 12, at 982-83.
77. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 212-16.
78. See id. at 205-12.
79. See id. at 168-70.
80. See Forbath, supra note 12, at 983.
81. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 286, 382 (discussing the interplay between Court decisions and social trends on the issues of capital punishment and abortion);
82. id. at 353-55 (noting that the Rehnquist Court tended to follow social trends in its decisionmaking).
83. Id. at 383.
84. See id at 286, 361 (discussing the public opinion's influence in affirmative action and death penalty cases).
85. See id. at 237 (implausibly suggesting that Anthony Lewis "understood that the Court did what it did because the public supported these outcomes [in cases on school desegregation and the rights of criminal suspects] and no other organ of government would provide them").
86. Id. at 383.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 377-78 (discussing the Roberts Court's probusiness cases).
89. See Cindy Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1569-79 (2002);
90. Ernest A. Young, Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 869, 871-81 (2008).
91. See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR (2008);
92. Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION 249 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007).
93. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 153-54 (1991) (highlighting frustration with and objection to some of the Court's probusiness decisions during the Lochner era).
94. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 434 (1946) ("Congress may exercise [this power] alone ... or in conjunction with coordinated action by the states.").
95. MCGARITY, supra note 56, at 46-47;
96. see also Estlund, supra note 56, at 1592 (noting that courts had "at least secondary responsibility for the ossified state of labor law").
97. Jonathan R. Macey, State and Federal Regulation of Corporate Takeovers: A View from the Demand Side, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 383, 400 (1991) (explaining that Congress acts under probusiness interest-group pressure for political survival).
98. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 378.
99. See id at 379-81.
100. Id. at 378.
101. See, e.g., Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Obama's Big Deal; The 2009 Federal Stimulus; Labor and Employment Law at the Crossroads, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 1-2 (2009), http://www.lawrecord.com/files/rubinstein-l.pdf http://www.lawrecord. com/files/rubinstein-l.pdf (noting the similarities between Presidenet Obama's response to the current economic situation and President Roosevelt's response to the Great Depression).
102. Campaign finance is, of course, an important, but indirect, exception. Not a domain of economic reform, it arguably affects corporate power to shape or stymie such reform. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (holding portions of campaign finance law unconstitutional as to corporations).
103. See Forbath, supra note 28, at 3-4;
104. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 166 (2001) [hereinafter Forbath, The New Deal];
105. William E. Forbath, Social and Economic Rights in the American Grain: Reclaiming Constitutional Political Economy, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 55, 55-56 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009) [hereinafter Forbath, Social and Economic Rights].
106. See FORBATH, supra note 57, at 150-52. The foes of Lochnerism mobilized against all these interlocking elements of judge-made law.
107. See id at 153-56.
108. See generally David Cole, "Strategies of the Weak": Thinking Globally and Acting Locally Toward a Progressive Constitutional Vision, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 66, at 297 (discussing the future progressive constitutional vision);
109. Forbath, Social and Economic Rights, supra note 66 (discussing the travails of liberals and progressives in offering an account of constitutional political economy to rival the conservatives' and suggesting such an account).
110. See Friedman, Part Five, supra note 10, at 201.
111. See id.
112. See Forbath, The New Deal, supra note 66, at 177-78, 181-82.
113. See Friedman, Part Five, supra note 10, at 259.
114. See Forbath, supra note 28, at 1-2.