Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression

Journal of Retailing

Volumn 86, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 215-226

  Williamson, Oliver E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Governance; Transaction cost economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 78149280567     PISSN: 00224359     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jretai.2010.07.005     Document Type: Article

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