Examining economic organization through the lens of contract

Industrial and Corporate Change

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 917-942

  Williamson, Oliver E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE; ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0042926907     PISSN: 09606491     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/icc/12.4.917     Document Type: Article

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