Public economics after neoliberalism: A theoretical-historical perspective

European Journal of the History of Economic Thought

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1079-1106

  Madra, Yahya M ^a   Adaman, Fikret ^b  

^a GETTYSBURG COLLEGE   (United States)

^b BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

Austrian economics; Chicago Economics; Economic performativity; Michel Foucault; Neoclassical economics; Neoliberalism; Public economics

Indexed keywords

EID: 78049279837     PISSN: 09672567     EISSN: 14695936     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09672567.2010.482997     Document Type: Article

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