Collaboration networks among local elected officials: Information, commitment, and risk aversion

Urban Affairs Review

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 241-262

  Feiock, Richard C ^a   Lee, In Won ^b   Park, Hyung Jun ^c   Lee, Keon Hyung ^a  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Dankook University   (South Korea)

^c Sungkyunkwan University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

coordination and cooperation; Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM); Institutional Collective Action (ICA); network embeddedness; political risks

Indexed keywords

COLLECTIVE ACTION; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; FRAGMENTATION; METROPOLITAN AREA; SELF ORGANIZATION;

EID: 77958491336     PISSN: 10780874     EISSN: 15528332     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1078087409360509     Document Type: Article

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