Underinvestment, capital structure and strategic debt restructuring

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 16, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 679-702

  Pawlina, Grzegorz ^a  

^a LANCASTER UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Capital structure; Renegotiation; Underinvestment

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957902041     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.06.010     Document Type: Article

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