Can the trade-off theory explain debt structure?

Review of Financial Studies

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 2007, Pages 1389-1428

  Hackbarth, Dirk ^a,c   Hennessy, Christopher A ^b   Leland, Hayne E ^b  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST LOUIS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34548538310     PISSN: 08939454     EISSN: 14657368     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/revfin/hhl047     Document Type: Article

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