Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers

Contributions to Economic Analysis

Volumn 282, Issue , 2007, Pages 369-381

  Froeb, Luke ^a   Tschantz, Steven ^b   Werden, Gregory J ^c  

^a VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c United States Department of Justice   (United States)

Author keywords

Mergers; Pass through; Retailing; Vertical restraints

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957698376     PISSN: 05738555     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82014-6     Document Type: Review

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