TURKEY-EU RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF ISLAM ON EUROPE

Yearbook of Muslims in Europe

Volumn 1, Issue , 2009, Pages 377-402

  Kaya, Ayhan ^a  

^a ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

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EID: 77957311045     PISSN: 18771432     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. 2 For further information see Yýlmaz, Hakan, “Euroscepticism as a type of political conservatism”, paper presented at the Third Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics of the European Consortium for Political Research, the Standing Group on the European Union, Istanbul, Turkey (21–23 September, 2006).
2. 3 Several graduate and undergraduate EU programmes have recently been established in Turkey. For example, a BA programme in European Union Relations aims to train experts needed for the negotiation process. EU Institutes at Marmara University and Istanbul Bilgi University also host specialized graduate programmes on the Union, and several other universities have graduate programmes and research and documentation centres.
3. 4 For further information see Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat, Euro-Turks: A Bridge, or a Breach between Turkey and the EU (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005);
4. Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat, Belgian-Turks: A Bridge, or a Breach between Turkey and the EU (Brussels: King Baudouin Foundation, 2007).
5. 5 Habermas, Jürgen, “February 15, or, what binds Europeans together: Plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in core Europe”, in J. Habermas and J. Derrida (eds), Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe (London: Verso, 2005).
6. 6 On her latest visit to Ankara (10 June 2006), the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dora Bakoyani, expressed her wish to see Turkey and Greece take the same path as France and Germany had once taken towards peace and stability (see http://www.basinkonseyi.org.tr/lang_tr/news_detail.asp?newID=62 (accessed 11 May 2009).
7. 7 During a theological lecture at the University of Regensburg (12 September 2006), in Bavaria, Pope Benedict XVI criticised the idea of jihad, quoting Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos, who said, “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” For the text of the Pope’s lecture, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_09_06_pope.pdf (accessed 11 May 2009).
8. 8 Popham, Peter, “Pope ends Turkey trip with visit to mosque”, http://news.independent.co.uk/europe/article2029284.ece (accessed 11 May 2009). Pope Benedict XVI, then Cardinal Ratzinger, had in 2004 already expressed his willingness to see Europe reasserting its “Christian roots”. In the same speech, the Cardinal also stated that Turkey should seek partners elswhere because its Muslim faith was in “permanent contrast” to Europe’s Christian legacy. His call for the Christianisation of Europe was even affirmed by secularist politicians. For an elaborate discussion on this issue see Silvestri, Sara, “Does Islam challenge European identity?”, in L. Faltin and M. Wright (eds), The Religious Roots of Contemporary European Identity (London and New York: Continuum, 2007), pp. 14–28 (15).
9. 9 Roy, Olivier, Secularism Confronts Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. xii; and Silvestri, “Does Islam challenge European identity?”
10. 10 Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf.
11. 11 Kubicek, Paul, “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and opportunities”, World Affairs, vol. 168, no. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 67–78.
12. 12 For a detailed account of the Turkey-sceptic discourses see Aydin-Düzgit, Senemn, “Discursive Construction of European Identity in the EU’s Relations with Turkey”, unpublished PhD dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2008. Aydýn-Düzgit elaborately discusses the forms of Turkey-scepticism displayed by various members of the European Union Commission and the Parliament as well as the EU representatives of the four major countries, Germany, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom.
13. 13 Established with the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts Law No. 3984 of 20 April 1994, RTÜK is a public institution responsible for the supervision of all broadcasting in Turkey.
14. 14 Established after the military coup of 1980, YÖK is is a fully autonomous national board of trustees without any political or governmental affiliation. The Council is a 22-member corporate public body responsible for the planning, coordination and supervision of higher education within the provisions set out in the Higher Education Law.
15. 15 DGMs were established in 1973 and enshrined in law in 1982 in order to control Turkish political life. However, the revised Turkish Penal Code (TCK) included a new version of the former article 159, prohibiting the “public degrading” of ‘Turkishness,’ the Republic, the armed forces, and other institutions of state on pain of six months’ to three years’ imprisonment. A prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, was sentenced to six months’ inprisonment for “insulting Turkishness”. (On the assassination of Dink, see below.) See Article 301 of the new Türk Ceza Kanunu, available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html (accessed 11 May 2009).
16. 16 Hitherto, there have been nine series of harmonisation reforms based on the Copenhagen political criteria, on 19 February 2002, 9 April 2002, 3 August 2002, 11 January 2003, 23 January 2003, July 2003, and August 2003, and two reforms dated 10 December 2003. For a detailed description of the reforms see Özbudun, Ergun and Yazýcý, Serap, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (Ýstanbul: TESEV Publications, 2004);
17. Akagül, Deniz and Vaner, Semih, L’Europe avec ou sans la Turquie (Paris: Editions d’Organisation, 2005), pp. 130–136;
18. Benhabib, Seyla and Iþýksel, Türküler, “Ancient battles, new prejudices, and future perspectives”, Constellations, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006);
19. Aydýn-Düzgit, Senem and Carkoglu, Ali, “Turkey: Reforms for a consolidated democracy”, in Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino, International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law:Anchoring Democracy? (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 121–154.
20. Özbudun and Yazýcý rightly state that “of the eight constitutional amendments, the one with the most far reaching effects on the fundamental rights and liberties was that of 2001”. However, one should note that harmonisation reforms actually date back to the 1993 constitutional amendment, which abolished the state monopoly on radio and TV broadcasting. Another wave of harmonisation took place in 1995, when the ban on political activities by NGOs was also lifted. Eventually, in 1999, State Security Courts were placed under civilian control, and the privatisation of public enterprises was recognised (Özbudun and Yazýcý, Democratization Reforms in Turkey, p. 15).
21. 17 IMF policies have never before received such strong public support in Turkey. It is claimed that the main reason for this is the way the economic reforms have been presented by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) elite, who publicly announced that the reforms were required by the EU harmonisation process. This political tactic has sucessfully softened the reception of historically disputed IMF regulations in the country (see, Çoban, Güney, “Yeni sosyal politikalar: Neoliberal paradigmadan avrupa paradigmasýna (New social policies: From neoliberal paradigm towards a European paradigm)”, Centre for European Studies Bulletin, available at http://www.bilgi.edu.tr/+OtherSites/docs/CESBulletin6.pdf, no. 6, February 2006.
22. 18 For a detailed overview of the German ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ (coming to terms with the past) see Nolte, Ernst, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will”, Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986;
23. Habermas, Jürgen, “Eine Art Schadensabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung”, Die Zeit, 11 July 1986, and Habermas, Jürgen, “Vom öffentlichen Gebrauch der Historie”, Die Zeit, 7 November 1986.
24. 19 As regards the independence of the judiciary, the European Commission has criticised the inadequate separation between the judiciary and the executive in Turkey, pointing out the supervision of judges and prosecuters by the Ministry of Justice, which is charged with their appointment, promotion and discipline. Despite all the changes mentioned above, the judiciary remains the only branch of government that is still very much devoted to the principles of the Republic, aiming at the protection of the state against the individual.
25. 20 For a detailed account of the Eurosceptics see, Güneș-Ayata, Ayșe, “From Euroscepticism to Turkey-scepticism: Changing political attitudes on the European Union in Turkey”, Journal of South Europe and the Balkans, vol. 5, no. 2 (August 2003), pp. 205–222;
26. Bilgin, Pinar, “Turkey’s changing security discourses: The challenge of globalization”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 44, no. 1 (2005), pp. 175–201.
27. 21 The Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) was the peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Allies at the end of World War I. The Treaty was designed to colonise the remaining boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. In the end, the Treaty was not implemented, but always remained as a tool to be used by Turkish nationalists obsessed by the fear of the partition of the country and the nation.
28. 22 The Human Rights Commission appointed by the Office of the Turkish Prime Minister was composed of prominent Turkish scholars, led by İbrahim Kaboğlu, a professor of Law, and gave a critical view of the contemporary human rights record of Turkey. The Commission resigned on 7 February 2005. Ibrahim Kaboglu stated at a press conference: “We weren’t pushed out for neglecting our work, we were pushed out for performing our work properly. Some circles reacted negatively when we made a certain decision or became angry when we proposed something they did not like.” Turkish Daily News, 8 February 2005.
29. 23 See http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/17/614827.asp (accessed 20 August 2008).
30. 24 Similarly another flag campaign was widely organised in June 1996, after a young man of Kurdish origin climbed a pole from which the Turkish flag was flying to untie it and pull it down. The scene took place during a public meeting organised in Diyarbakýr of the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), a political party founded by Kurdish intellectuals and activists. For further information, see Navaro-Yashin, Yael, Faces of the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 127–130.
31. 25 “The reproduction of the nation-state depends upon a dialectic of collective remembering and forgetting, and on imagination and unimaginative repetition. The unwaved flag, which is so forgettable, is at least as important as the memorable moments of flag waving” (Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995, p. 10).
32. 26 The fundamental rules for the Turkish flag were laid down by Turkish Flag Law No. 2994 of 29 May 1936. Popular flag campaigns mostly disregard the law, which lays down the size of the flag and the places that can be covered by flags.
33. 27 Aksu, Abdulkadir, “Keynote speech on migration and Turkey”, in Proceedings of the International Migration Symposium (8–11 December 2005), Zeytinburnu Municipality Culture Press, Istanbul (2006): 387–389.
34. 28 For further details, see http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/396867.asp (accessed 11 May 2009).
35. 29 Sabetaists are the followers of a self-proclaimed Jewish Messiah, Sabetai Sevi. His popularity alarmed the Ottoman authorities who arrested him and condemned him to death in 1666. In order to save his life, Sabetai Sevi converted to Islam.
36. 30 While the social tension created by the flag burning incident in Mersin was still going on, on 6 April 2005 four representatives of the leftist journal Labour and Justice were threatened with lynching in Trabzon city centre while delivering a declaration entitled, “There is death in isolation” prepared by TAYAD (Association for Solidarity with the Relatives of Arrested and Sentenced People) (Radikal, 7 April 2005).
37. 31 Non-Muslims were attacked in Turkey’s three major cities (Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara) on 6–7 September 1955, and the attacks compelled thousands of Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin, particularly Greeks, to leave their native areas.
38. 32 See Grillo, Ralph, “Cultural essentialism and cultural anxiety”, Anthropological Theory, vol. 3, no. 2 (2003), pp. 157–173;
39. Gilroy, Paul, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1987).
40. 33 See Appadurai, Arjun, Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
41. 34 Radikal, 11 November 2008, translation mine.
42. 35 “Yilmaz: Road to EU passes through Diyarbakir”, Turkish Daily News, 17 December 1999.
43. 36 “Interview with Ismail Cem”, CNN-Turkey, 12 December 1999.
44. 37 Cited in Bilgin, “Turkey’s changing security discourses”, p. 191.
45. 38 “Turkey launches TV station in once-banned Kurdish language,” http://www.dw-world.de/dw/function/0,,12215_cid_3915390,00.html (accessed 11 May 2009).
46. 39 See, “Turkey plans to start Kurdish language education in universities” available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10685024.asp?gid=244 (accessed 11 May 2009).
47. 40 For further information on this initiative see the Turkish Daily News webpapge, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=80103&contact=1, accessed 10 December 2007.
48. 41 See the Judgement Decision in Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?sessionid=23448506&skin=hudoc-cc-en (accessed 11 May 2009).
49. 42 For a detailed analysis of the headscarf debate see the Turkish Daily News web-page, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=95065, accessed 8 January 2008.
50. 43 For further information on the decision of the Constitutional Court banning the headscarf in public institutions, see http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/06/turkey19050.htm (accessed 11 May 2009).
51. 44 For further details, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7533414.stm (accessed 11 May 2009).
52. 45 Ergil, Doğu, “Turkey’s Crisis and Future”, The Audit of Conventional Visdom 08, No. 11, (available at) http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_08_08_Ergil.pdf August 2008, accessed 7 January 2009.
53. 46 See Jenkins, Gareth, “Alleged surveillance of senior judges raises questions about politicization of Turkish police”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20 May 2008.
54. 47 See Rubin, Michael, “Erdogan, Ergenekon, and the struggle for Turkey”, Mideast Monitor, 8 August 2008), available at http://www.meforum.org/article/1968 (accessed 11 May 2009).
55. 48 Robert Tait, “Turkish coup plot awakens fear of violent nationalism,” The Observer (6 July 2008), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/06/turkey.
56. 49 For further dabate on this issue see Kaya, Ayhan and Ferhat Kentel, Euro-Turks, Brussels: CEPS Publications, 2005; and Kaya, Ayhan and Ferhat Kentel, Belgian-Turks, Brussels: King Baudouin Foundation, 2007.
57. 50 Ruiz Jiménez, Antonia M. and Torreblanca Payá, Ignacio, European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession (Brussels: European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), 2007).