The Lifecycle of Public Policy: An Event History Analysis of Repeals to Landmark Legislative Enactments, 1951-2006

American Politics Research

Volumn 38, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1015-1051

  Ragusa, Jordan Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

Congress; divided government; event history analysis; legislative enactments; polarization; public policy; repeals

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957285414     PISSN: 1532673X     EISSN: 15523373     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1532673X10374170     Document Type: Article

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