Computational models: A modest role for content

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 253-259

  Egan, Frances ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cognitive capacities; Computation; Explanation; Representational content

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957166818     PISSN: 00393681     EISSN: 18792510     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2010.07.009     Document Type: Article

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