Multiple institutions for multiple outcomes

Sustainable Resource Use: Institutional Dynamics and Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 23-50

  Ostrom, Elinor ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957163242     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9781849772785     Document Type: Chapter

References (97)

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