On the (mis)use of wealth as a proxy for risk aversion

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 92, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 273-282

  Bellemare, Marc F ^a   Brown, Zachary S ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

contract theory; empirical tests; principal agent models; risk aversion; risk sharing

Indexed keywords

ECONOMETRICS; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; NUMERICAL MODEL; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK FACTOR;

EID: 77956579600     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: 14678276     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aap006     Document Type: Article

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