Corruption and entrepreneurship: How formal and informal institutions shape small firm behavior in transition and mature market economies

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Volumn 34, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 803-831

  Tonoyan, Vartuhí ^a,b   Strohmeyer, Robert ^a,b   Habib, Mohsin ^a,b   Perlitz, Manfred ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956407985     PISSN: 10422587     EISSN: 15406520     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00394.x     Document Type: Article

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