In defence of gullibility: The epistemology of testimony and the psychology of deception detection

Synthese

Volumn 176, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 399-427

  Michaelian, Kourken ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

Deception; Epistemology; Monitoring; Testimony

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956338731     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9573-1     Document Type: Article

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