Bad stars or guiding lights? Learning from disasters to improve patient safety

Quality and Safety in Health Care

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 332-336

  Hughes, C ^a   Travaglia, J F ^b   Braithwaite, J ^a  

^a Clinical Excellence Commission   (Australia)

^b Faculty of Medicine   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; DISASTER; DISASTER PLANNING; EMERGENCY TREATMENT; HEALTH CARE DELIVERY; HUMAN; INDUSTRY; LEARNING; MEDICAL ERROR; PATIENT SAFETY; STANDARD;

DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE; DISASTER PLANNING; DISASTERS; EMERGENCY TREATMENT; HUMANS; INDUSTRY; LEARNING; MEDICAL ERRORS; PATIENT SAFETY;

EID: 77956104087     PISSN: 14753898     EISSN: 14753901     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1136/qshc.2008.030148     Document Type: Article

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