Learning from incidents: From normal accidents to high reliability

System Dynamics Review

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 213-239

  Cooke, David L ^a   Rohleder, Thomas R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ACCIDENT; DISASTER MANAGEMENT; LEARNING; RELIABILITY ANALYSIS; SAFETY; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS;

EID: 33845327850     PISSN: 08837066     EISSN: 10991727     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/sdr.338     Document Type: Article

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