Sorting, incentives and risk preferences: Evidence from a field experiment

Economics Letters

Volumn 108, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 345-348

  Bellemare, Charles ^a   Shearer, Bruce ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

Author keywords

Field experiments; Incentive contracts; Risk aversion; Sorting

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955595608     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.06.010     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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