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Games and Economic Behavior
Volumn 70, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 62-70
Simplified mechanisms with an application to sponsored-search auctions
Author keywords

Generalized second price auctions; Mechanism design; Sponsored search
Indexed keywords

EID: 77955559705     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.12.003     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (68)
References (17)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.