Who Knew?: Responsibility Without Awareness

Who Knew?: Responsibility Without Awareness

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-208

  Sher, George ^a  

^a RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Awareness; Blame; Consciousness; First person; Knowledge; Negligence; Responsibility; Third person

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955477384     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389197.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (161)

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66. Neil Levy, "Restoring Control: Comments on George Sher," Philosophia 36 (June 2008), 216.
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68. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis, IN:Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), part I, ch. XIV, 79.
69. A. J. Ayer, "Freedom and Necessity," in Derk Pereboom, ed., Free Will (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 110-18.
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90. Korsgaard, 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends,' 196.
91. Korsgaard, 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends,' 198.
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93. H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 136-57.
94. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 3rd edition (New York: Lexis Publishing, 2001), 131-33 and 238-39.
95. Michael J. Zimmerman, "Moral Responsibility and Ignorance," Ethics 107 [April 1997], 411.
96. Gideon Rosen, "Culpability and Ignorance," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2003), 61-83.
97. Holly Smith, "Culpable Ignorance," The Philosophical Review, 92 (October 1983), 547;
98. Jonathan Jacobs, Choosing Character: Responsibility for Virtue and Vice (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001);
99. Gregory Trianosky, "Natural Affection and Responsibility for Character: A Critique of Kantian Views of the Virtues," in Owen Flanagan and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, eds., Identity, Character, and Morality (Cambridge, MA: Bradford, 1990), 93-109
100. Gary Watson, "Skepticism About Weakness of Will," in his Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 33-58.
101. Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 139-44.
102. Gregory Kavka, "Some Paradoxes of Deterrence," The Journal of Philosophy 75 (June 1978), 285-302.
103. Manuel Vargas, "The Trouble With Tracing," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005), 269-91;
104. Angela Smith, "Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life," Ethics 115 (January 2005), 236-71;
105. Michael McKenna, "Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Studies 139, 29-37.
106. Michele M. Moody-Adams, 'Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance,' Ethics 104 (January 1994), 291-309;
107. Gideon Rosen, 'Culpability and Ignorance,' Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (September 2002), 61-84;
108. Neil Levy, 'Cultural Membership and Moral Responsibility,' The Monist 86 (2003), 145-63.
109. Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 3rd edition (New York: Lexis Publishing, 2001), 132.
110. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 132.
111. Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law, 132.
112. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1963)
113. lecture III, and Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1978), 49.
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116. Mayo Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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121. A. P. Herbert, Uncommon Law (London: Methuen, 1935
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123. George P. Fletcher, 'A Theory of Criminal Negligence: A Comparative Analysis,' The University of Pennsylvania Law Review 119 (January 1971), 401-38
124. John Doris, Lack of Character [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002], 138.
125. Michael Smith, 'Rational Capacities,' in his Ethics and the A Priori (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2004), 126.
126. Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
127. Tyler Burge, "Individualism and the Mental," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1979), 73-122
128. Andy Clark and David Chalmers, "The Extended Mind," Analysis, 58 (1998), 10-23.
129. Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998], 282.
130. Neil Levy, "The Good, the Bad, and the Blameworthy," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (June 2005), 2.
131. "Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life," Ethics 115 (January 2005), 236-71
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139. Smith, "Responsibility for Attitudes," 244.
140. Gary Watson, "Free Agency," The Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 205-20
141. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), lecture 3.
142. John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chapter 7
143. Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
144. Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, "Praise, Blame, and the Whole Self," Philosophical Studies 93 (1999), 161-88
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152. "The Logical Form of Action Sentences," in Nicholas Rescher, ed., The Logic of Decision and Action (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967).
153. Alvin H. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall, 1970).
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