Moral responsibility and ignorance

Ethics

Volumn 107, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 410-426

  Zimmerman, Michael J ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0000135084     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233742     Document Type: Article

References (42)

1. See Robert M. Adams, "Involuntary Sins," Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 3-31; and Eugene Schlossberger, Moral Responsibility and Persons (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). Their views are discussed in my "Responsibility regarding the Unthinkable," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1995): 204-23, sec. 2.4.
2. See Robert M. Adams, "Involuntary Sins," Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 3-31; and Eugene Schlossberger, Moral Responsibility and Persons (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). Their views are discussed in my "Responsibility regarding the Unthinkable," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1995): 204-23, sec. 2.4.
3. See Robert M. Adams, "Involuntary Sins," Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 3-31; and Eugene Schlossberger, Moral Responsibility and Persons (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992). Their views are discussed in my "Responsibility regarding the Unthinkable," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1995): 204-23, sec. 2.4.
4. What follows builds on remarks given in my "Negligence and Moral Responsibility," Noûs 20 (1986): 199-218, and An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), secs. 4.1 and 4.2. It also constitutes a reply to criticisms made in Steven Sverdlik, "Pure Negligence," American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 137-49, sec. 2.
5. What follows builds on remarks given in my "Negligence and Moral Responsibility," Noûs 20 (1986): 199-218, and An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), secs. 4.1 and 4.2. It also constitutes a reply to criticisms made in Steven Sverdlik, "Pure Negligence," American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 137-49, sec. 2.
6. What follows builds on remarks given in my "Negligence and Moral Responsibility," Noûs 20 (1986): 199-218, and An Essay on Moral Responsibility (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988), secs. 4.1 and 4.2. It also constitutes a reply to criticisms made in Steven Sverdlik, "Pure Negligence," American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 137-49, sec. 2.
7. In saying that one cannot be to blame for what is unavoidable, I mean, more precisely, that this is so except in Frankfurt-type situations; and such situations are not at issue here. (See Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy 66 [1969]: 829-39). Moreover, the claim that responsibility requires freedom applies even to such situations. (It is the claim that freedom requires avoidability that is to be rejected.) See my An Essay on Moral Responsibility, sec. 4.10.
8. In saying that one cannot be to blame for what is unavoidable, I mean, more precisely, that this is so except in Frankfurt-type situations; and such situations are not at issue here. (See Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy 66 [1969]: 829-39). Moreover, the claim that responsibility requires freedom applies even to such situations. (It is the claim that freedom requires avoidability that is to be rejected.) See my An Essay on Moral Responsibility, sec. 4.10.
9. 'Ought-to-be' and 'ought-to-do' are terms used by, among others, C. D. Broad, Ethics (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 225 ff.; Hector-Neri Castaneda, Thinking and Doing (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), chap. 7; Roderick M. Chisholm, "Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement," in Practical Reason, ed. Stephan Körner (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 11 ff.; and Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), chap. 8.
10. 'Ought-to-be' and 'ought-to-do' are terms used by, among others, C. D. Broad, Ethics (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 225 ff.; Hector-Neri Castaneda, Thinking and Doing (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), chap. 7; Roderick M. Chisholm, "Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement," in Practical Reason, ed. Stephan Körner (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 11 ff.; and Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), chap. 8.
11. 'Ought-to-be' and 'ought-to-do' are terms used by, among others, C. D. Broad, Ethics (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 225 ff.; Hector-Neri Castaneda, Thinking and Doing (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), chap. 7; Roderick M. Chisholm, "Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement," in Practical Reason, ed. Stephan Körner (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 11 ff.; and Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), chap. 8.
12. 'Ought-to-be' and 'ought-to-do' are terms used by, among others, C. D. Broad, Ethics (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985), pp. 225 ff.; Hector-Neri Castaneda, Thinking and Doing (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), chap. 7; Roderick M. Chisholm, "Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement," in Practical Reason, ed. Stephan Körner (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 11 ff.; and Fred Feldman, Doing the Best We Can (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), chap. 8.
13. "Did" is to be construed broadly. Perhaps all that Perry "did" was an omission: he omitted to act as he ought to have acted, and his ignorance is attributable to this omission.
14. This is controversial, of course. It is defended in my The Concept of Moral Obligation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), sec. 3.1.
15. But see my "Responsibility regarding the Unthinkable," and An Essay on Moral Responsibility, where some defense is attempted.
16. This will, I think, be granted by all. Even James Montmarquet, who argues that we can sometimes bear direct responsibility for certain doxastic states (such as whether we exhibit care when forming and retaining beliefs) in part because (he claims) we can be directly free with respect to being in such states, acknowledges that we can only be indirectly free with respect to the presence or absence of particular beliefs. See James Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), pp. 45-46, and "Culpable Ignorance and Excuses," Philosophical Studies 80 (1995): 41-49, esp. pp. 42-43.
17. This will, I think, be granted by all. Even James Montmarquet, who argues that we can sometimes bear direct responsibility for certain doxastic states (such as whether we exhibit care when forming and retaining beliefs) in part because (he claims) we can be directly free with respect to being in such states, acknowledges that we can only be indirectly free with respect to the presence or absence of particular beliefs. See James Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1993), pp. 45-46, and "Culpable Ignorance and Excuses," Philosophical Studies 80 (1995): 41-49, esp. pp. 42-43.
18. Regarding my reservations, see my "The Range of Options," American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1990): 345-55, esp. sec. 5.
19. I shall leave open just what the relation is between Perry's being inattentive and his being careless or inconsiderate.
20. Compare: if I am now directly in control of, say, paying attention to what I am now writing, then yesterday I was indirectly in control of this; for my present attentiveness is itself a consequence of certain things I did yesterday. Had I gone on vacation yesterday, I would not be writing these words today.
21. This conclusion is missed even by Holly Smith, who is perhaps closer to accepting it than anyone other than myself who has written on the topic. While in "Culpable Ignorance," Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 543-71, she gives an account of culpable ignorance according to which all responsibility for such ignorance is rooted in something else (which she calls a "benighting act") for which one is culpable, she fails to acknowledge that culpability requires, at bottom, a belief concerning wrongdoing (pp. 547-48, 556). This failure is repeated in Smith's "Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit," Ethics 101 (1991): 279-303, esp. pp. 279-80.
22. This conclusion is missed even by Holly Smith, who is perhaps closer to accepting it than anyone other than myself who has written on the topic. While in "Culpable Ignorance," Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 543-71, she gives an account of culpable ignorance according to which all responsibility for such ignorance is rooted in something else (which she calls a "benighting act") for which one is culpable, she fails to acknowledge that culpability requires, at bottom, a belief concerning wrongdoing (pp. 547-48, 556). This failure is repeated in Smith's "Varieties of Moral Worth and Moral Credit," Ethics 101 (1991): 279-303, esp. pp. 279-80.
23. Compare Smith on what she calls the 'Liberal View' in "Culpable Ignorance."
24. Donald Davidson uses the phrase "up to nature" in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), p. 59.
25. For a less compact version of the argument, see my An Essay on Moral Responsi-bility, secs. 3.3 and 4.11.
26. Unless she happens also to be directly free with respect to such a consequence. Compare n. 11 above.
27. Note that, while it cannot of course be that Perry both is to-blame and is not to-blame for his attempt to rescue Doris, it can be that he both is to-blame and is not-to-blame for this. Indeed, he might even be both culpable and laudable for it. This is because, while he may be culpable for it by virtue of being directly culpable for his decision to skip his first aid session, he may also be laudable for it by virtue of his being directly laudable for his decision to risk his life for the sake of another. Such "conflicting" multiple evaluations are perfectly consistent with one another. While we must not ignore the bad intentions involved in the earlier decision to skip class, we must likewise not ignore the good intentions involved in the later decision to rescue. See my An Essay on Moral Responsibility, pp. 59-60, and "A Plea for Ambivalence," Metaphilosophy 24 (1993): 382-89.
28. Note that, while it cannot of course be that Perry both is to-blame and is not to-blame for his attempt to rescue Doris, it can be that he both is to-blame and is not-to-blame for this. Indeed, he might even be both culpable and laudable for it. This is because, while he may be culpable for it by virtue of being directly culpable for his decision to skip his first aid session, he may also be laudable for it by virtue of his being directly laudable for his decision to risk his life for the sake of another. Such "conflicting" multiple evaluations are perfectly consistent with one another. While we must not ignore the bad intentions involved in the earlier decision to skip class, we must likewise not ignore the good intentions involved in the later decision to rescue. See my An Essay on Moral Responsibility, pp. 59-60, and "A Plea for Ambivalence," Metaphilosophy 24 (1993): 382-89.
29. Unless, of course, he is indirectly culpable for this decision by way of being directly culpable for some yet earlier event.
30. The locus classicus: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics bk. 3, chaps. 1 and 5. See Lloyd Fields, "Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness," Philosophy 69 (1994): 397-415, for a recent defense of this claim. This issue is put to one side in Sverdlik, p. 139.
31. The locus classicus: Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics bk. 3, chaps. 1 and 5. See Lloyd Fields, "Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness," Philosophy 69 (1994): 397-415, for a recent defense of this claim. This issue is put to one side in Sverdlik, p. 139.
32. Compare Aristotle bk. 3, chap. 1.
33. Indeed, the foregoing considerations imply that (2) would be true even if it were modified as follows: one is culpable for doing some act either from ignorance of the fact that one ought not to do it or merely while ignorant of the fact that one ought not to do it, only if one is culpable for being ignorant of this fact. But in fact there is some reason to think that this modification of (2) should be rejected. For if someone acts merely while ignorant of the wrongness of his (or her) action, this is an indication that he would have acted in the same way even if he had not been so ignorant. If such ignorance plays no role in the explanation of his action, why excuse him? There may be something to this. It may be that such a person should be said to be culpable in some way, even if he is not culpable for his ignorance. If so, this would be an exception to the claim that lack of ignorance is a root requirement of responsibility. See the discussion of what I have called 'situational culpability' in an Essay on Moral Responsibility, pp. 135 ff. (What is said there itself needs elaboration.) Such culpability, if it exists, would also cast doubt on the claim that freedom is a root requirement of responsibility. It is not clear to me that we should accept the possibility of such culpability. Accepting it requires accepting not just that certain counterfactual statements about people's motives and behavior make sense and may be true but also that whether or not someone is actually culpable can be a function of such counterfactual considerations.
34. For example, Sverdlik, p. 141; Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, p. 3, and "Culpable Ignorance and Excuses," pp. 44-45.
35. For example, Sverdlik, p. 141; Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, p. 3, and "Culpable Ignorance and Excuses," pp. 44-45.
36. Compare the discussion in Fred E. Katz, Ordinary People and Extraordinary Evil (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993).
37. For example, William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 202-6; Carl Elliott, "Beliefs and Responsibility," Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (1991): 233-48, esp. p. 239; Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, pp. 1 ff.
38. For example, William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 202-6; Carl Elliott, "Beliefs and Responsibility," Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (1991): 233-48, esp. p. 239; Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, pp. 1 ff.
39. For example, William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 202-6; Carl Elliott, "Beliefs and Responsibility," Journal of Value Inquiry 25 (1991): 233-48, esp. p. 239; Montmarquet, Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility, pp. 1 ff.
40. For example, Larry May, "Insensitivity and Moral Responsibility," Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (1992): 7-22, esp. pp. 19-20.
41. For example, Michele Moody-Adams, "Culture, Responsibility, and Affected Ignorance," Ethics 104 (1994): 291-309, esp. pp. 296 ff.
42. See my An Essay on Moral Responsibility, sec. 4.9, and "A Plea for Ambivalence" for further discussion of this point.