Free speech and the myth of the internet as an unintermediated experience

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 78, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 697-773

  Yoo, Christopher S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955382724     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (715)

1. The classic statement is Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L. J. 1805, 1834-38 (1995).
2. For other similar observations, see, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1083, 1130-31 (1999);
3. Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1653, 1670-73 (1998);
4. Eli M. Noam, Media Concentration in the United States: Industry Trends and Regulatory Responses (1996), http://www.vii.org/papers/medconc.htm.
5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U. S. 844 (1997).
6. Id. at 870.
7. See, e.g., Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE L. J. 1619, 1628-29, 1636-37 (1995).
8. The initial debate focused on multiple internet service provider ("ISP") access to cable modem systems. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 925 (2001). More recently, the debate has been framed in terms of network neutrality.
9. See Network Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science & Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Professor Lawrence Lessig), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/lessig-020706.df;
10. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. on Telecomm. & High Tech. L. 141 (2003).
11. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F. C. C. R. 13028 (2008), vacated sub nom. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, No. 08-1291, 2010 WL 1286658 (D. C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2010).
12. See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1161-79 (2008);
13. Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right to Reach an Audience: An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2007);
14. Niva Elkin-Koren, Let the Crawlers Crawl: On Virtual Gatekeepers and the Right to Exclude Indexing, 26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 179 (2001).
15. See Jack M. Balkin, Media Access: A Question of Design, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 933, 936-37 (2008);
16. Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 996-1002 (2008).
17. See Reed Abelson, F. C. C. Looking into Rejection of Google App for iPhone, N. Y. Times, Aug. 1, 2009, at B5.
18. See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J. L. & TECH. 6 (2003), http://www.vjolt.net/vol8/issue2/v8i2-a06-Birnhack-Elkin-Koren.df;
19. Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006);
20. Felix Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity (on file with author) (paper presented at 2009 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, Aug. 7, 2009).
21. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, F. C. C. Vote Sets Precedent on Unfettered Web Usage, N. Y. Times, Aug. 2, 2008, at C1;
22. Joe Nocera, Stuck in Google's Doghouse, N. Y. Times, Sept. 13, 2008, at C1;
23. Jeffrey Rosen, Google's Gatekeepers, N. Y. TIMES MAG., NOV. 30, 2008, at 50;
24. Jenna Wortham, Even Google is Blocked with Apps for iPhone, N. Y. TIMES, July 29, 2009, at B1.
25. See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 192-93, 260-61 (2002).
26. See, e.g., Dawn C. NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM: NET NEUTRALITY AND FREE SPEECH IN THE INTERNET AGE (2009);
27. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 427, 428-33 (2009);
28. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1188-1201;
29. Bill D. Herman, Opening Bottlenecks: On Behalf of Mandated Network Neutrality, 59 FED. COMM. L. J. 103, 112-19 (2006);
30. Randolph J. May, Net Neutrality Mandates: Neutering the First Amendment in the Digital Age, 3 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 197, 202-10 (2007);
31. Hannibal Travis, Of Blogs, eBooks, and Broadband: Access to Digital Media as a First Amendment Right, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1519, 1564-81 (2007);
32. Moran Yemini, Mandated Network Neutrality and the First Amendment: Lessons from Turner and a New Approach, 13 VA. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2008), http://www.vjolt.net/voll3/issuel/vl3il-al-Yemini.df.
33. See NUNZIATO, supra note 13, at 35-39;
34. Balkin, supra note 13, at 429-30.
35. For the seminal statement of this position, see Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967).
36. See also Owen M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED 15-18 (1996);
37. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 44-45 (paperback ed. 1995).
38. For proposals to apply this reasoning to the Internet, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 164-68 (1999);
39. NUNZIATO, supra note 13, at 41-69;
40. Herman, supra note 13, at 112.
41. See Pub. Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U. S. 451, 462 (1952) (holding that the fact that a street railway operated under the supervision of a public utility commission was sufficient state action to subject the railway's decision to play radio programming to First Amendment scrutiny).
42. In a subsequent decision, the Court split 4-2 on whether broadcasters were state actors. Compare CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Coram., 412 U. S. 94, 115-21 (1973) (plurality opinion) (concluding that broadcasters are not state actors), and id. at 133-41
43. (Stewart, J., concurring in part) (same), and id. at 150
44. (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment) (same), with id. at 172-81 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). Three Justices declined to reach the issue.
45. See id. at 146-47
46. (White, J., concurring in part);
47. id. at 148
48. (Blackmun, J., joined by Powell, J., concurring in part).
49. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U. S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (holding that rendering utility services is not sufficient to constitute state action).
50. See generally Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L. J. 245, 334 (2003). For decisions holding that ISPs are not state actors
51. see Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003);
52. Howard v. Am. Online, Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2000);
53. Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (E. D. Va. 2003);
54. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 443-44 (E. D. Pa. 1996).
55. For decisions holding that search engines are not state actors, see Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631-32 (D. Del. 2007).
56. For a decision holding that Yahoo! e-mail groups are not state actors, see Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp. 2d 577, 588 (S. D. N. Y. 2007).
57. Another court notes: "Because these Internet providers are not state actors, they are free to impose content-based restrictions on access to the Internet without implicating the First Amendment." Sanger v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 151, 163 (E. D. N. Y. 1997).
58. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1200;
59. Herman, supra note 13, at 113;
60. Travis, supra note 13, at 1577;
61. Ex parte Letter from Timothy Wu, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law, and Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law Sch., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC 9-10 (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ ecfs/document/view?id=6514683884 (Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities
62. Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F. C. C. R. 4798 (2002), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or- pdf=pdf&id-document=6514683884.
63. For commentary employing this logic to conclude that telephony does not implicate the First Amendment, see, e.g., HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW § 2. (A) (3), at 185-89 (1999);
64. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1, 42 n. 144 (1976);
65. Daniel Brenner, Telephone Company Entry into Video Services: A First Amendment Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 97, 125 (1991).
66. See infra Part II. D.
67. See Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 188, 195-96 (2006), http://www.yjolt.org/ files/goldman-8-YJOLT-188.df;
68. James Grimmelmann, The Google Dilemma, 53 N. Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 939, 941 (2008-2009).
69. See Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 629-30 (search engine);
70. Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 693-94 (S. D. Fla. 2000) (cable modem provider).
71. See Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy and Free Speech: The First Amendment at War with Itself, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. 1211, 1220-23 (2007);
72. Kreimer, supra note 10, at 17;
73. Amit M. Schejter & Moran Yemini, "Justice, and Only Justice, You Shall Pursue": Network Neutrality, the First Amendment and John Rawls's Theory of Justice, 14 MCICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 137, 167 (2007);
74. Neil Weinstock Netanel, New Media in Old Bottles? Barron's Contextual First Amendment and Copyright in the Digital Age, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 968-69 (2008);
75. Yemeni, supra note 13, at 17-20.
76. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC {Turner II), 520 U. S. 180, 226-27 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
77. See infra notes 106, 166, 249, 260, 262, 265 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 107, 124, 279 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 96, 99-102, 108, 112, 125, 146-49, 168, 261 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U. S. 94, 124-26 (1973);
81. THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 327 (1994).
82. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U. S. 844, 877 (1997);
83. see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U. S. 656, 667 (2004) (offering a more recent reaffirmation of the edge-based vision of filtering).
84. See, e.g., Berman & Weitzner, supra note 4, at 1632-35;
85. Developments in the Law-The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1641 (1999);
86. PICS, Censorship, & Intellectual Freedom FAQ (Paul Resnick, ed.), http://www.w3.org/PICS/PICS-FAQ-980126.html (last modified Aug. 4, 1999).
87. On edge-based filtering's consistency with the end-to-end argument, see, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629, 660 (1998).
88. On edge-based filtering's consistency with a layered architecture, see, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 815, 892-94 (2004).
89. See, e.g., J. M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip, and the Foundations of Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L. J. 1131, 1145-47, 1152-53 (1996);
90. Lessig, supra note 31, at 652-70;
91. Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal and Technical Model, 98 MICH. L. REV. 395, 424-26 (1999);
92. Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on Government Regulation to Preserve the Internet's Unregulated Character, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 215 (2000);
93. R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755 (1999);
94. Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 453 (1997);
95. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., FAULTY FILTERS: HOW CONTENT FILTERS BLOCK ACCESS TO KID-FRIENDLY INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET (1997), http://epic.org/ reports/filter-report.html.
96. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1227 (1998);
97. Tim Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty?-The Internet and the International System, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 647, 654 (1997);
98. Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B. C. L. REV. 653, 688 (2003).
99. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 172-74 (2001);
100. JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET (AND HOW TO STOP IT) 36-61, 101-26 (2008).
101. See Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition?: A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. oN TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, (2004);
102. see also Marjory S. Blumenthal & David D. Clark, Rethinking the Design of the Internet: The End-to-End Arguments vs. the Brave New World, 1 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECH. 70, 74 (2001), reprinted in COMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE INTERNET AND BEYOND 91, 95-96 (Benjamin M. Compaine & Shane Greenstein eds., 2001).
103. See David D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-to-End Argument and Application Design: The Role of Trust 5, 24 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the 35th Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2007/748/ End%202%20end%20and%20trust%2010%20final%20TPRC.df.
104. Id. at 16.
105. Id. at 16-17.
106. See, e.g., Jon M. Peha, The Benefits and Risks of Mandating Network Neutrality, and the Quest for a Balanced Policy, 1 INT'L J. COMM. 644, 659 (2007), http://ijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/view/154/90.
107. John Markoff, A New Internet?, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at A9.
108. See Global Environment for Network Innovations, http://www.geni.net (last visited Mar. 31, 2010);
109. National Science Foundation, NeTS FIND Initiative, http://www.nets-find. net (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
110. See 100x100 Clean Slate Project, Mission, http://100x100network.org/ mission.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010);
111. Northwestern University Information Technology, iCAIR: International Center for Advanced Internet Research, http://www.icair.org (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
112. Justin Hughes, Copyright Enforcement on the Internet-in Three Acts 41, 45-47, 62 (Univ. of Hokkaido Workshop Working Paper, 2009), available at http://www.juris.hokudai.ac.jp/gcoe/article/hughes-4Mar2009.df.
113. See Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1327, 1334-37 (2008).
114. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1167-71;
115. Chandler, supra note 7, at 1105;
116. Elkin-Koren, supra note 7, at 187-91.
117. See Goldman, supra note 21, at 195-98;
118. Ellen P. Goodman, No Time for Equal Time: A Comment on Professor Magarian's Substantive Media Regulation in Three Dimensions, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 897, 910-12 (2008).
119. See James Grimmelmann, Don't Censor Search, 117 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 48 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/ylj-online/intellectual-property/582-dont- censor-search.
120. See, e.g., Ed Felten, Verizon Violates Net Neutrality with DNS Deviations, posting to Freedom to Tinker (Nov. 12, 2007, 11:02 AM), http://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/verizonviolates-net-neutrality-dns- deviations.
121. Indeed, attempts by industry players to expand into adjacent markets may represent the best available form of rivalry on the Internet. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 282-85.
122. See Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet's Architecture that Challenge the Status Quo, 8 J. on TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 80, 85-90, 95-99 (2010).
123. See Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 9-10, 29-33, 48-53 (2005).
124. For a nontechnical overview of the economic roles played by intermediaries, see Daniel F. Spulber, Market Microstructure and Intermediation, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1996, at 135.
125. See also Thomas F. Cotter, Some Observations on the Law and Economics of Intermediaries, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 69-74 (2006).
126. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 46-48 (1965).
127. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 105-09 (1962).
128. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-07 (1972).
129. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293 (1996).
130. For the classic analyses, see generally GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS (1989);
131. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
132. The literature on bargaining in the face of informational asymmetry is vast. For a brief overview, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 361-88 (1988).
133. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 31-35 (1975).
134. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation, 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 332 (1994).
135. See Peter C. Cramton, Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty, 51 REV. ECON. STUD. 579, 581 (1984).
136. For a useful illustration, see DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 280-91 (1990).
137. The literature on mechanism design is vast. The seminal contribution is Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (1983).
138. For a survey, see DREW FUDENBURO & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 243-318 (1991).
139. For an accessible description appearing in the legal literature, see Eric L. Talley, Note, Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1220-24 (1994).
140. For surveys of the literature on two-sided markets, see Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report, 37 RAND J. ECON. 645 (2006);
141. Roberto Roson, Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey, 4 REV. NETWORK ECON. 142 (2005), http//www.bepress.com/rne/vol4/iss2/3.
142. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
143. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality, Consumers, and Innovation, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, 223 n. 139 (collecting sources).
144. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L. J. 1847, 1889 n. 200 (2006).
145. See id. at 1889-92;
146. Yoo, supra note 12, at 278-82.
147. See Mark Armstrong, Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 37 RAND J. ECON. 668, 668 (2006);
148. Roson, supra note 64, at 142, 144.
149. See Armstrong, supra note 69, at 668;
150. David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE. J. ON REG. 325, 327-28 (2003). Although the value may increase given an increase in the number of members of the other class, the value may decrease given an increase in the number of members of the same class, which would intensify competition.
151. For the seminal analysis, see generally William F. Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives, 26 J. L. & ECON. 541 (1983) (describing the incentive structure of credit card market participants).
152. See also Jean-Charles Rochet, The Theory of Interchange Fees: A Synthesis of Recent Contributions, 2 REV. NETWORK ECON. 97 (2003), http://www.bepress. com/rne/vol2/iss2/4.
153. Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality After Comcast Toward a Case-by-Case Approach to Network Management, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 558, 723-74 (Randolph J. May ed., 2009).
154. See Bernard Caillaud & Bruno Jullien, Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers, 34 RAND J. ECON. 309, 310-11, 322-23 (2003);
155. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 990, 990, 1013, 1018 (2003).
156. See David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 151, 155 (2007);
157. Rochet & Tirole, supra note 73, at 1013-17.
158. See Evans, supra note 70, at 327.
159. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 73, at 1013-14.
160. See Wilko Bolt & Alexander F. Tieman, Social Welfare and Cost Recovery in Two-Sided Markets, 5 REV. NETWORK ECON. 103, 115 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/rne/vol5/issl/7/;
161. Roson, supra note 64, at 148;
162. Bruno Jullien, Two-Sided Markets and Electronic Intermediaries 12-13 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1345, 2004), available at http://SSRN.com/abstract= 634212;
163. see also Victor P. Goldberg & Richard A. Epstein, Introductory Remarks: Some Reflections on Two-Sided Markets and Pricing, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 509, 510 (arguing that price discrimination will likely emerge).
164. Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at 659.
165. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 74, at 152;
166. Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at 658-60, 665;
167. Jullien, supra note 77, at 8.
168. Caillaud & Jullien, supra note 73, at 310, 314, 324;
169. Goldberg & Epstein, supra note 77, at 510;
170. Roson, supra note 64, at 147-48.
171. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 73-74.
172. Id. at 74.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 71-76;
177. Yoo, supra note 66, at 222-27.
178. See Peyman Faratin et al., The Growing Complexity of Internet Interconnection, 72 COMM. & STRATEGIES 51, 58-61 (2008).
179. For other analyses applying the economics of two-sided markets to the Internet, see Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael L. Katz, The Economics of Product-Line Restrictions with an Application to the Network Neutrality Debate, 19 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 215 (2007);
180. John Musacchio et al., A Two-Sided Market Analysis of Provider Investment Incentive with an Application to the Net-Neutrality Issue, 8 REV. NETWORK ECON. 22 (2009), http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1168&context= rne;
181. J. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 349, 361-62 (2006);
182. and ANDREA RENDA, CTR. FOR EUR. POL'Y STUD., I Own the Pipes, You Call the Tune: The Net Neutrality Debate and its (IR) Relevance for Europe 11-15 (2008), available at http://www.ceps.be/ceps/download/1579.
183. See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 69, at 668;
184. Rochet & Tirole, supra note 64, at 645.
185. See Daniel F. Spulber, Firms and Networks in Two-Sided Markets, in 1 HANDBOOKS IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS: ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 137, 141-48, 152 (Terrence Hendershott ed., 2006).
186. See RENDA, supra note 87, at 11.
187. See DANIEL F. SPULBER, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: INTERMEDIARIES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 345-47 (1999).
188. See Cotter, supra note 52, at 73-74.
189. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. (CBS v. DNQ, 412 U. S. 94 (1973).
190. Id. at 117 (plurality opinion).
191. Id. at 145
192. (Stewart, J., concurring).
193. Id. at 124-25 (plurality opinion).
194. Id. at 150-51
195. (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
196. Id. at 151-52.
197. Id. at 152-53.
198. Id. at 153.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 155;
201. accord id. t 165 ("The Government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government.... Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.");
202. Yale Broad. Co. v. FCC, 414 U. S. 914, 916-17 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing "the inevitable danger resulting from placing [censorship] powers in governmental hands").
203. CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. at 182 n. 12
204. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
205. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974).
206. Id. at 258.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 249, 251, 253.
209. Id. at 250.
210. Id. at 256.
211. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 560-61 (1976).
212. Tornillo, 418 U. S. at 259
213. (White, J., concurring) (citation and footnote omitted)
214. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 375 (1927)
215. (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
216. Id. at 260.
217. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U. S. 376 (1973).
218. Id. at 391.
219. Id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
220. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364 (1984).
221. Id. at 377.
222. Id. at 380.
223. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC {Turner I), 512 U. S. 622 (1994).
224. Id. at 653.
225. Id. (quoting Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 258 (1974)).
226. Id. at 656.
227. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U. S. 666 (1998).
228. Id. at 673.
229. Id. at 673-74 (citation omitted)
230. (quoting CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. 94, 124, 125 (1973)).
231. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 377 (1984).
232. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 259 (1974).
233. See Forbes, 523 U. S. at 673-74;
234. Tornillo, 418 U. S. at 249-51, 253, 256;
235. id. at 260
236. (White, J., concurring);
237. CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. at 124-25;
238. id. at 152-53, 155
239. (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
240. CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. at 121.
241. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162
242. (codified at 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a)).
243. CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. at 105.
244. Id.
245. Id. (citing H. R. REP. No. 69-404, at 18 (1927) (minority report);
246. CONO. REC. 5483, 5484 (1926) (statement of Rep. Davis)).
247. Id. at 105-06.
248. Id. at 106 (quoting 67 CONG. REC. 12, 502 (1926) (statement of Sen. Dill)).
249. Id. at 106-07 (citing 67 CONG. REC. 12, 504 (1926) (statement of Sen. Dill)).
250. Id. at 107 (citing Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170
251. (codified at 47 U. S. C. § 315 (a)).
252. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064
253. (codified at 47 U. S. C. § 153).
254. CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. at 107-08 & n. 4
255. (citing Hearings on S. 2910 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1934)).
256. Id. (citing H. R. Rep. No. 73-1918, at 49 (1934) (Conf. Rep.)).
257. Id. at 108-09
258. (quoting Communications Act of 1934, § 3 (h), 48 Stat, at 1066
259. (codified at 47 U. S. C. § 153 (10)).
260. Id. at 110
261. (citing 47 U. S. C. § 326).
262. Id. at 113 (citations omitted).
263. Id. at 109-10.
264. Id. at 111.
265. Id. at 104
266. (quoting Hearings on H. R. 7357 Before the H. Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1924)).
267. Id. at 105.
268. Id. at 124.
269. Id. at 124-25.
270. Id. at 116 (plurality opinion).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 120-21.
274. Id. at 140 n. 9
275. (Stewart, J., concurring).
276. Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730.
277. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 378-80 (1984).
278. Id. at 378
279. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367, 395 (1981)).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 382 (citation omitted).
282. Id. at 402.
283. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U. S. 622, 651 (1994).
284. Ark. Educ. Television Coram'n v. Forbes, 523 U. S. 666, 669 (1998).
285. Id. at 674.
286. Id. at 673.
287. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. 94, 105, 110 (1973)).
288. Id. at 674.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 673-74 (quoting CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. at 124, 125).
291. Id. at 674.
292. See Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969) (upholding FCC rules imposing right-of-reply requirements on broadcasters that were remarkably similar to the rules later struck down in Tornillo);
293. see also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367 (1981) (upholding a statute requiring that broadcasters sell time to candidates for federal office). Indeed, the Court has noted that "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection. "
294. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U. S. 726, 748 (1978);
295. accord Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U. S. 622, 637 (1994) ("It is true that our cases have permitted more intrusive regulation of broadcast speakers than of speakers in other media.").
296. NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190 (1943).
297. For the classic statement of this principle, see Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357, 377 (1927) ("If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies... the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.").
298. NBC, 319 U. S. at 213.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 212.
301. Id. at 213, 216.
302. Id. at 226.
303. Id. at 227.
304. Id. at 215, 217.
305. Id. at 216.
306. Id.
307. Id. (quoting FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 475 (1940)).
308. Yoo, supra note 17, at 260-66.
309. Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367 (1969).
310. Id. at 373.
311. Id. at 375-77, 388.
312. Id. at 388.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 389.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. accord id. at 390-91 ("Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of licensees... the Government could surely have decreed that each frequency should be shared among all or some of those who wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast day or the broadcast week.... As we have said, the First Amendment confers no right on licensees to prevent others from broadcasting on 'their' frequencies and no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government has denied others the right to use.").
319. Id. at 390.
320. Id. at 392.
321. Id. at 390;
322. accord id. at 394 ("Congress need not stand idly by and permit those with licenses to ignore the problems which beset the people or to exclude from the airways anything but their own views of fundamental questions.").
323. CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. 94, 117 (1973);
324. see also id. at 104 (noting that broadcaster regulation posed the "major dilemma" of "how to strike a proper balance between private and public control").
325. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 380 (1984) (recognizing that the "freedom to advocate one's own positions without also presenting opposing viewpoints" must be balanced against the governmental interest in "ensuring adequate and balanced coverage of public issues");
326. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367, 396 (1981) (recognizing that broadcast regulation implicates "[t]he First Amendment interests of candidates and voters, as well as broadcasters" and that the Court "has never approved a general right of access to the media" and would at most uphold "a limited right to 'reasonable' access" (first emphasis added)).
327. The Court has clearly indicated that the standard is less than strict scrutiny, but it has struggled to determine precisely what standard should apply. For example, League of Women Voters employed language reminiscent of intermediate scrutiny when it held that restrictions on broadcasters' editorial discretion must be "narrowly tailored to further a substantial government interest." League of Women Voters, 468 U. S. at 380. In another case, the Court used language more reminiscent of the rational basis standard.
328. See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U. S. 775, 802, 803 (1978) (upholding regulations as a "reasonable means of promoting the public interest" and as "a rational weighing of competing policies");
329. id. at 805, 808 n. 29, 814, 815 (concluding that the FCC did not act irrationally).
330. Red Lion, 395 U. S. at 396-400.
331. Id. at 400-01.
332. CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. at 102 (plurality opinion).
333. Id. at 158 n. 8
334. (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
335. League of Women Voters, 468 U. S. at 377
336. (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241 (1974)).
337. Id. (quoting Red Lion, 395 U. S. at 386).
338. Id. (quoting Red Lion, 395 U. S. at 389).
339. Id. at 380.
340. Id. at 376 n. 11
341. (citing Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 207, 221-26 (1982)).
342. Id. at 377 n. 11. The FCC arguably provided just such a signal when it repealed the Fairness Doctrine in 1987.
343. See Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH Syracuse, New York, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F. C. C. R. 5043 (1987)
344. aff'd, 867 F.2d 654
345. (D. C. Cir. 1989). Despite this fact, the Court nonetheless reaffirmed the scarcity doctrine when it next had the chance to review it
346. see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U. S. 547, 566-67 (1990), an outcome best explained by the manner in which the Court's broadcast jurisprudence became tied up in the judicial politics surrounding affirmative action
347. see Yoo, supra note at 286-88.
348. See Yoo, supra note 17, at 267-69.
349. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1820-22 (2009)
350. (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling for the scarcity doctrine to be overruled);
351. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U. S. 622, 638 (1994) (noting the critique of the scarcity doctrine with respect to broadcasting).
352. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U. S. 844, 870 (1997).
353. Id.
354. Id. Some scholars have attempted to reconstruct this rationale, shifting the focus from the scarcity of spectrum to the scarcity of attention. Drawing on Herbert Simon's insight that "a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention, " Herbert Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, Speech at the Johns Hopkins University and Brookings Institution Symposium, in COMPUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40 (Martin Greenberger ed., 1971), these scholars argue that information overload becomes a justification for limiting search engines' abilities to intermediate speech
355. see Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1158;
356. Chandler, supra note 7, at 1104;
357. Elkin-Koren, supra note 7, at 183-84. This argument is curious for a number of reasons. As an initial matter, in attempting to recast abundance as scarcity, it turns scarcity on its head. Moreover, a world of abundance increases, not decreases, the need for strong exercises of editorial discretion. Lastly, since attention is inherently limited, if accepted, such a rationale would admit of no limiting principle and would lead to endemic regulation of every aspect of an individual's online interactions.
358. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U. S. 726 (1978).
359. Id. at 748
360. (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 258 (1974)).
361. Id. (citing Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 377-78 (1969)).
362. Id. (citing Rowan v. U. S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U. S. 728, 736-37 (1970)).
363. Id. at 749.
364. See id. at 748.
365. Yoo, supra note 17, at 292-303.
366. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009) (remanding to the court of appeals a challenge to the FCC's decision to abandon its "fleeting expletives" policy, while noting that the constitutionality of the indecency restrictions of the type upheld by Pacifica "will be determined soon enough, perhaps in this very case");
367. id. at 1819-22
368. (Thomas, J., concurring) (calling for Pacifica to be overruled).
369. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U. S. 844, 869 (1997)
370. (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E. D. Pa. 1996)).
371. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115 (1989).
372. Reno, 521 U. S. at 869
373. (citing Sable, 492 U. S. at 126).
374. Id. at 870
375. Id. at 870 (quoting Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28).
376. See id. at 879, 882 (holding that the restrictions imposed by the Communications Decency Act of 1996 failed to pass constitutional muster because they were not narrowly tailored).
377. Id. at 877;
378. accord Sable, 492 U. S. at 130-31 (noting that because the technological restrictions on dial-a-porn messages were adequate to prevent most young children from hearing them, an outright ban on obscene phone messages was not narrowly tailored).
379. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U. S. 656, 666 (2004) (concluding that a regulation on Internet speech could stand only if it constitutes "the least restrictive means available");
380. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U. S. 564, 580 (2002) (holding that Internet speech regulations must be "sufficiently narrowed" to survive First Amendment scrutiny).
381. For a contrary argument, see Mark S. Nadel, Editorial Freedom: Editors, Retailers, and Access to the Mass Media, 9 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 213 (1987).
382. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U. S. 622, 656-57 (1994).
383. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U. S. 689 (1979).
384. Id. at 708-09.
385. Id. at 706-08.
386. Id. at 702-04
387. (citing CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. 94, 105-09 (1973)).
388. Id. at 708.
389. Id. at 707.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 707 n. 17.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 709 n. 19.
394. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U. S. 488 (1986).
395. Id. at 491-92.
396. Id. at 492.
397. Id. at 494.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. (quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U. S. 689, 707 (1979)).
401. Id. at 494-95.
402. Id. at 494.
403. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U. S. 439, 444 (1991).
404. Id.
405. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U. S. 622, 636 (1994).
406. Id. (citing Leathers, 499 U. S. at 444).
407. Id. (quoting Preferred Commc'ns, 476 U. S. at 494).
408. Id. at 637.
409. Id. at 638.
410. Id. at 639.
411. Id.
412. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. 727 (1996).
413. Id. at 733-34 (plurality opinion).
414. Id. at 737-38
415. (citing Turner I, 512 U. S. at 636).
416. Id. at 747.
417. Id. at 792
418. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
419. Id. at 793, 796.
420. Id. at 814-15
421. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
422. (citing City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc'ns, Inc., 476 U. S. 488, 494 (1986);
423. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U. S. 439, 444 (1991)).
424. Id. at 813-14.
425. Id. at 815;
426. accord id. at 816 (noting that Turner I "adopt[ed] much of the print paradigm" and "reject[ed] Red Lion" for cable).
427. Id. at 816.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. at 816-17.
431. Id. at 817.
432. Id. at 824.
433. Id. at 822.
434. See supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text.
435. The first reason was that the restrictions at issue "are not activated by any particular message spoken by cable operators and thus exact no content-based penalty." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U. S. 622, 655 (1994). The second reason was that the Court did not think that the regulation would "force cable operators to alter their own messages to respond to the broadcast programming they are required to carry." Id.
436. Id. at 656.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. (emphasis added).
441. Id. at 656.
442. Id. at 657.
443. See Christopher S. Yoo, Architectural Censorship and the FCC, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 669, 722 (2005) (discussing how the functional similarity between cable and direct-broadcast satellite ("DBS") is undercutting the rationale for technology-based distinctions under the First Amendment);
444. Yoo, supra note 12, at 207-08, 228-29 (describing the growing competition between cable and DBS).
445. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 Yale L. J. 1757, 1765 (1995) ("Turner is quite different from imaginable future cases involving new information technologies, including the Internet, which includes no bottleneck problem.").
446. See Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking Broadband Internet Access, 22 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 1, 7-9 (2008).
447. Vishesh Kumar, Cable Prepares an Answer to FiOS, Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 2008, at B3.
448. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, High-Speed Services for Internet Access: Status as of December 31, 2008, at 10 tbl.2 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ Daily-Releases/Daily-Business/2010/db0212/DOC-296239Al.df.
449. Id. at 9 tbl.l.
450. Saul Hansell, Sprint Banks on WiMax to Win Back Market Share, N. Y. Times, Sept. 28, 2009, at B1.
451. Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685 (S. D. Fla. 2000).
452. Id. at 696.
453. Id. (citing Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report, 14 F. C. C. R. 2398, 2423 ¶ 48 (1999)).
454. U. S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D. C. Or. 2002).
455. Id. at 428-29.
456. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 F. C. C. R. 14, 853, 14, 883-87 ¶¶ 55-64 (2005)
457. petition for review denied sub nom. Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 507 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2007).
458. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009).
459. Id. at 1118 n. 2.
460. Some commentators have argued that search engines have sufficient " 'control of a critical pathway of communication'" to justify bringing them within the ambit of the exception recognized by Turner I. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1191 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner T), 512 U. S. 622, 657 (1994));
461. Chandler, supra note 7, at 1126-27 (same). This contention ignores Turner Γs explicit rejection of the argument that a dominant market share, by itself, justified upholding a restriction on cable operators' editorial discretion. Instead, the Court's decision turned on cable operators' controls over exclusive physical connections. Because search engines do not own any of the physical infrastructure connecting end users to the Internet, unlike cable operators, they cannot block any end user from accessing any particular content. Indeed, any end user unhappy with the services provided by a particular search engine can easily switch to another search engine with just a few keystrokes and clicks of a mouse.
462. Denver Area Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. 727 (1996).
463. Id. at 732-33.
464. Id. at 742 (plurality opinion);
465. accord id. at 768 (Stevens, J., concurring);
466. id. at 775-77 (Souter, J., concurring);
467. Id. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
468. See Id. at 780-87 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part);
469. Id. at 813, 817-18 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
470. See Id. at 744-45 (plurality opinion);
471. Id. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
472. Id. at 761 (plurality opinion);
473. see also id. at 793, 800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
474. See id. at 761-64 (plurality opinion).
475. Courts have long recognized that technological differences (particularly cable's ability to block unwanted channels on a household-by-household basis) render Paciflca inapplicable to cable. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 815 (2000);
476. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1448 n. 31 (D. C. Cir. 1985);
477. Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th Cir. 1985);
478. Cmty. Television of Utah, Inc. v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164, 1167-68 (D. Utah 1982). In addition, allowing previous regulation that had long deprived cable operators of editorial discretion and the presence of an "access channel manager" who can exercise editorial discretion to justify limitations on a cable operator's free speech rights is tantamount to allowing past regulation to serve as a constitutional justification for more regulation.
479. Yoo, supra note 17, at 270-71.
480. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803 (2000). Playboy appeared to do away with all of the various lower levels of First Amendment scrutiny put forward by the Denver plurality and instead subjected the regulation in question to strict scrutiny.
481. Id. at 813-15. The most telling sign is the fact that Justice Breyer's dissent agreed that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard.
482. Id. at 836 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Breyer seemed to chide the majority for suggesting that he might have thought otherwise.
483. Id. at 836. In the aftermath of a decision unanimously recognizing that restrictions of indecency on cable television are subject to strict scrutiny, it is hard to see how any of the justifications articulated by the Denver plurality for subjecting cable television to a lesser First Amendment standard remain good law.
484. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text.
485. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U. S. 844, 868-69 (1997) (noting that the Internet has never been subject to intrusive regulation).
486. Denver, 518 U. S. at 743 (plurality opinion).
487. See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 102-06 (1983);
488. Susan Dente Ross, First Amendment Trump?: The Uncertain Constitutionality of Structural Regulation Separating Telephone and Video, 50 FED. COMM. L. J. 281, 299 (1998).
489. See Denver, 518 U. S. at 739 (plurality opinion);
490. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 378 (1984). For example, the Supreme Court offered the tangential observation in League of Women Voters that, "[u] nlike common carriers, broadcasters are entitled under the First Amendment to exercise the widest journalistic freedom possible consistent with their public [duties]."
491. League of Women Voters, 468 U. S. t 378
492. (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367, 395 (1981)). Although this brief statement clearly implies that common carriers' First Amendment rights to editorial discretion are narrower than those of broadcasters, this statement simply makes a relative comparison that offers no clear statement about the First Amendment standard to be applied to common carriers. Similarly, in rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a provision of the consent decree that broke up AT&T, which prevented the newly formed local telephone companies from entering into electronic publishing, the court asserted that "common carriers are quite properly treated differently for First Amendment purposes than traditional news media."
493. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 n. 273 (D. D. C. 1987). The court made this assertion without analysis.
494. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 14. 6.1, at 1279 (2d ed. 1999);
495. POOL, supra note 312, at 2;
496. LAURENCE H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-25, at 1003-04 (2d ed. 1988);
497. ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 19, § 2.3 (A) (iii), at 185-89.
498. See Baker, supra note 19, at 42 n. 144;
499. Jerome A. Barron, The Telco, the Common Carrier Model and the First Amendment-The "Dial-a-Porn" Precedent, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 371, 382 (1993);
500. Ross, supra note 312, at 295;
501. see also Denver, 518 U. S. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (concluding that, to the extent that the cable operator is not exercising its own discretion, "the cable operator's rights [do not] inform this analysis").
502. See infra Part II. D.1-2.
503. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 314, § 14.6, at 1275-76 (discussing an 1883 Ohio case upholding a local telephone company's right to refuse to serve a customer who had used profanity).
504. See Carlin Commc'ns, Inc. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1294 (9th Cir. 1987).
505. Sable Commc'ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115 (1989).
506. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U. S. 726, 748 (1978).
507. Sable, 492 U. S. at 126-28.
508. Id. at 133 (Scalia, J., concurring).
509. See Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1293-95;
510. Carlin Commc'n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1361 (11th Cir. 1986);
511. Network Commc'ns v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 703 F. Supp. 1267, 1275 (E. D. Mich. 1989);
512. see also Info. Providers' Coal, for Def. of First Amendment v. FCC, 928 F.2d 866, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that "a carrier is free under the Constitution to terminate service to dial-a-porn operators altogether").
513. See Info. Providers' Coal., 928 F.2d at 877;
514. Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1297;
515. S. Bell, 802 F.2d at 1357-62;
516. Network Commc'ns, 703 F. Supp. at 1274-77.
517. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. 727, 825 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Common carriers are private entities and may, consistent with the First Amendment, exercise editorial discretion in the absence of a statutory prohibition. ").
518. Allen S. Hammond, Regulating the Multi-Media Chimera: Electronic Speech Rights in the United States, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 1, 11 (1995).
519. See Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1294;
520. see also Network Commc'ns, 703 F. Supp. at 1276 (relying on the telephone company's exercise of business judgment to hold that its refusal to carry dial-a-porn did not constitute state action).
521. Barron, supra note 315, at 386.
522. This restriction was first instituted by FCC rule. See Application of Telephone Cos. for Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, Final Report and Order, 21 F. C. C.2d 307, 325 ¶ 49 (1970)
523. affd sub nom. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971).
524. It was later codified by Congress. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 2, 98 Stat. 2779, 2785 (previously codified at 47 U. S. C. § 533 (b) (1994)).
525. See US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1994)
526. vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 516 U. S. 1155 (1996);
527. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 190 (4th Cir. 1994)
528. vacated and remanded for consideration ofmootness, 516 U. S. 415 (1996);
529. S. New England Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211, 217 (D. Conn. 1995);
530. *2 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994);
531. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721, 728 (N. D. 111. 1994);
532. BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335, 1339 (N. D. Ala. 1994);
533. US West, Inc. v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184, 1190 (W. D. Wash. 1994).
534. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
535. Id. at 196.
536. Id.
537. See supra notes 135, 137, 141, 232-36, 240 and accompanying text.
538. Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 692 (S. D. Fla. 2000).
539. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 7, at 1190-92 (search engines);
540. Herman, supra note 13, at 112-13 (last-mile broadband providers).
541. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Those who remain skeptical should bear in mind that movies and entertainment programming were once seen as falling outside the ambit of the First Amendment. See Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n, 236 U. S. 230, 243-44 (1915) (movies);
542. Decision of Aug. 29, 1928, 2 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 159, 161 (1928) (entertainment programming). These cases are part of a long tradition in which new technologies are born in First Amendment captivity.
543. See ZUCKMAN ET AL., supra note 19, § 2.2, at 165-73.
544. See HUBER ET AL., supra note 314, § 14.6.7, at 1308;
545. see also Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union of Am. v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U. S. 525, 526-27, 535 (1959) (holding a broadcaster immune from defamation liability for political advertisement that the broadcaster was obligated to carry and over which the broadcaster was prohibited from exercising editorial discretion).
546. See, e.g., Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 94-031063, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (concluding that the ISP's "conscious choice to gain the benefits of editorial control... opened itself up to greater liability, " thus allowing the ISP to be potentially liable for defamation).
547. 47 U. S. C. § 230 (c) (1) (2006).
548. H. R. REP. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)
549. reprinted in 1996 U. S. C. C. A. N. 10, 207-08.
550. 47 U. S. C. § 230 (c) (2).
551. See Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003);
552. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630-31 (D. Del. 2007).
553. See supra Parts II. B and C.
554. See TUrner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U. S. 180, 226-27 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part).
555. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 380 (1984).
556. See supra notes 130-54 and accompanying text.
557. Howard A. Shelanski, The Bending Line Between Conventional "Broadcast" and Wireless "Carriage, " 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1048, 1052-53 (1997).
558. Id. at 1053 (citing 1 ERIK BARNOUW, A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES: A TOWER IN BABEL 34, 177-78 (1966));
559. see also HUBER ET AL., supra note 314, § 1.2.4, at 11;
560. Pool, supra note 312, at 35, 136-38.
561. Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 32, 32 (1929)
562. affd, 37 F.2d 993 (D. C. Cir. 1930).
563. Id. at 32-33.
564. Id. at 33.
565. Shelanski, supra note 348, at 1055.
566. See Adelaide Lillian Carrell, Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of the Commission, 7 F. C. C. 219, 221-22 ¶ 10 (1939) (proposed findings of fact and conclusions).
567. 47 C. F. R. § 73. 3555 note 2 (j) (2007). For the history of time-brokerage regulation
568. see Michael E. Lewyn, When Is Time Brokerage a Transfer of Control? The FCC's Regulation of Local Marketing Agreements and the Need for Rulemaking, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1, 9-45 (1995);
569. Stephen F. Sewell, The Federal Communications Commission and Time Brokerage: A Regulatory Change of Course, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 89, 90-98 (1995).
570. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., Opinion and Order on Petition to Reconsider and Grant Without Hearing, 8 F. C. C. 195, 195-96 (1940).
571. Metro. Broad. Corp., Findings of Fact and Conclusions, 8 F. C. C. 558 (1941).
572. Id. at 563 ¶¶ 20-21, 575.
573. Revocation of License and Subsidiary Communications Authorization of Carol Music, Inc., for FM Broadcast Station WCLJ, Preliminary Statement, 37 F. C. C. 385, 389-91 ¶¶ 10-13, 400-01 (1963).
574. WGOK, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F. C. C.2d 245, 246 ¶¶ 6-9 (1965);
575. United Broad. Co., of N. Y., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 40 F. C. C. 224, 229 ¶¶ 21-23 (1965).
576. Cosmopolitan Broad. Corp., Decision, 59 F. C. C.2d 558 (1976)
577. remanded on other grounds, 581 F.2d 917 (D. C. Cir. 1978).
578. Id. at 560 ¶ 5, 561 ¶ 7. The D. C. Circuit characterized the scope of the time-brokerage agreement somewhat differently, noting that over seventy-five percent of the station's time was sold to time brokers, with approximately twenty percent of the remaining time sold or given to others for religious broadcasts.
579. Cosmopolitan Broad., 581 F.2d at 919.
580. See Cosmopolitan Broad., 59 F. C. C.2d at 560-61 ¶ 6;
581. see also Welcome Radio, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 20 F. C. C.2d 582, 583 ¶ 4 (1969).
582. Financial Ownership and Other Reports of Broadcast Licensees, 10 Fed. Reg. 9718, 9718-19 (Aug. 7, 1945) (requiring submission of contracts for "bulk time sales" of two hours or more).
583. Re-regulation of Radio and Television Broadcasting, 25 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1719, 1722 ¶ 5 (g) (Nov. 2, 1972).
584. See Eller Telecasting Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F. C. C.2d 913, 913-14 ¶ 4 (1969) (applying the time-brokerage regulations to a ten-minute weekly newscast targeted at Hispanic audiences);
585. WGOK, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F. C. C.2d 245, 245 ¶ 2 (1965) (applying the time-brokerage requirements to fifteen-minute Sunday programs sold to amateur singers).
586. See Rand Broad. Co., 22 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 155, 155-56 (June 9, 1971).
587. Clarifying Paragraph (c) of Section 1.613, Concerning the Filing of Agreements Involving the Sale of Broadcast Time for Resale, Order, 33 F. C. C.2d 653, 1654 11 4-7 (1972).
588. Id. at 653-54 ¶ 3.
589. Petition for Issuance of Policy Statement or Notice Inquiry on Part-Time Programming, Policy Statement, 82 F. C. C.2d 107, 107-09 ¶¶ 1-4 & n. 8, 120 ¶ 31 (1980).
590. Id. at 120 1 31.
591. Id. at 114 ¶ 17.
592. Id. at 109 ¶ 5, 113 ¶ 15.
593. Id. at 112-13 ¶¶ 13-14, 114 ¶ 17.
594. Id. at 114 ¶ 17.
595. Id. at 114 ¶ 18.
596. Id. at 118-19 ¶¶ 28-29.
597. Lewyn, supra note 355, at 11-12.
598. Reexamination of the Commission's Cross-Interest Policy, Policy Statement, 4 F. C. C. R. 2208, 2214 ¶¶ 37-39 (1989).
599. Roy R. Russo, Esq., Letter, 5 F. C. C. R. 7586, 7587 (1990).
600. See Lewyn, supra note 355, at 4 & n. 12;
601. Sewell, supra note 355, at 98.
602. Revision of Radio Rules & Policies, Report and Order, 7 F. C. C. R. 2755, 2787 ¶ 63 (1992)
603. reconsidered, 7 F. C. C. R. 6387 (1992) (First Reconsideration Order)
604. reconsidered, 9 F. C. C. R. 7183 (1994) (Second Reconsideration Order). The rules did prohibit stations operating in the same market from using time brokerage to duplicate more than twenty-five percent of their programming.
605. Id. at 2789 ¶ 66. Time brokerage of more than fifteen percent of the tune of another station would constitute co-ownership for purposes of the local and national ownership rules.
606. Id. at 2788-89 ¶ 65.
607. Revision of Radio Rules & Policies, 7 F. C. C. R. at 2787 ¶ 63;
608. accord First Reconsideration Order, 7 F. C. C. R. at 6401 ¶ 63 ("[W]e emphasize that the licensee is ultimately responsible for all programming aired on its station, regardless of its source.").
609. See Lewyn, supra note 355, at 5-6 n. 13.
610. Second Reconsideration Order, 9 F. C. C. R. at 7192 ¶ 54;
611. First Reconsideration Order, 7 F. C. C. R. at 6401 ¶ 63;
612. see also Revision of Radio Rules & Policies, 7 F. C. C. R. at 2789 ¶ 67 (opting for overseeing time-brokerage contracts through a complaint-and-compliance process rather than advance rules).
613. Sewell, supra note 355, at 99-100.
614. Lewyn, supra note 355, at 45-48, 56-57;
615. see also Brooke Commc'ns, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Forfeiture Order, 14 F. C. C. R. 6247, 6249 ¶ 7 (1999).
616. See Second Reconsideration Order, 9 F. C. C. R. at 7192 ¶ 54.
617. The discussion that follows draws heavily on the excellent critique of the Fairness Doctrine by Thomas Krattenmaker and Lucas Powe. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 61-65, 237-75.
618. C. A. Cummins, 2 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 159, 160 (Aug. 29, 1928).
619. Id.
620. Chi. Fed'n of Labor v. FRC, 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 36, 36 (1929).
621. Michael T. Rafferty, 2 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 154, 155 (Aug. 22, 1928);
622. see also C. A. Cummins, 2 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. at 160 ("Wherever the evidence is shown that a particular station is serving as a mouthpiece for a substantial religious or political minority, no matter how much the individual members of the commission may disagree with the views of that minority, the commission has taken action favorable to the station. ").
623. Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929)
624. aff'd, 37 F.2d 993 (D. C. Cir. 1930).
625. Id. at 34.
626. Id.
627. Id.
628. Id. at 35.
629. Chi. Fed'n of Labor v. FRC, 3 F. R. C. Ann. Rep. 36, 36 (1929).
630. See Charley Orbison, "Fighting Bob" Shuler: Early Radio Crusader, 21 J. BROADCASTING 459, 463-64 (1977);
631. see also KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 24-25, 27-28.
632. Orbison, supra note 400, at 463-64, 466.
633. Id. at 466;
634. see also Trinity Methodist Church, S. v. FRC, 62 F.2d 850, 851 (D. C. Cir. 1932)
635. cert, denied, 288 U. S. 599 (1933).
636. Trinity Methodist Church, 62 F.2d at 854.
637. Mayflower Broad. Corp., Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions, 8 F. C. C. 333 (1940).
638. Id. at 339-41.
639. Id. at 340.
640. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, Report of the Commission, 13 F. C. C. 1246, 1249-50 ¶¶ 6-7 (1949).
641. Id. at 1250 ¶ 7.
642. See Jerome A. Barron, The Federal Communications Commission's Fairness Doctrine: An Evaluation, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 9 (1961).
643. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 62-63.
644. The first instance appears to be Complaint Under "Fairness Doctrine" Requirements, 40 F. C. C. 508 (1962). For the FCC's rationale for the change in policy
645. see "Fairness Doctrine" Implementation, 40 F. C. C. 582, 583-85 (1963).
646. Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 400-01 (1969).
647. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, sec. 1229, § 399, 95 Stat. 357, 730.
648. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 402 (1984).
649. Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council Against Television Station WTVH Syracuse, New York, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 2 F. C. C. R. 5043, 5043 ¶ 2 (1987)
650. petition for review denied, 867 F.2d 654 (D. C. Cir. 1989) (upholding the Commission's decision based on a public interest rationale, without reaching the constitutional issue).
651. See Krattenmaker & Powe, supra note 28, at 261-70 (characterizing the Fairness Doctrine as "an incoherent legal principle");
652. FORD ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS 51 (1984) (noting that "[c]onfusion abounds" on the subject);
653. Barron, supra note 409, at 18 (citing "the absence of any system of criteria" for resolving fairness complaints).
654. Responsibility Under the Fairness Doctrine, 40 F. C. C. 576 (1963).
655. Complaint Directed to Station WCBS-TV, New York, N. Y., Concerning Fairness Doctrine, 8 F. C. C.2d 381, 382
656. reconsideration granted in part, 9 F. C. C.2d 921 (1967)
657. clarified sub nom. Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 10 F. C. C.2d 16 (1967), aff'd sub nom.
658. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D. C. Cir. 1968).
659. Television Station WCBS-TV, New York, N. Y., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F. C. C.2d 921, 942-13 ¶ 44 (1967).
660. See Complaint by Friends of the Earth Concerning Fairness Doctrine Re Station WBNB-TV, New York, NY, 24 F. C. C.2d 743, 750 (1970) (concluding that "the broadcaster does have an obligation to inform the public... on [the] important issue[]" of air pollution caused by automobiles)
661. remanded sub nom. Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D. C. Cir. 1971).
662. Complaint by Wilderness Society and Friends of the Earth Concerning Fairness Doctrine Re National Broadcasting Co., 30 F. C. C.2d 643, 646
663. reconsidered, 31 F. C. C.2d 729 (1971).
664. Complaint by John S. MacInnis, Consumers Arise Now, San Francisco, Cal. Concerning Fairness Doctrine Re Station KGO-TV, 32 F. C. C.2d 837, 838 (1971).
665. Complaint by National Health Federation, Delaware, Ohio, Concerning Fairness Doctrine, 58 F. C. C.2d 314, 316 (1976).
666. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F. C. C.2d 142, 175-78 ¶¶ 48-52 (1985) (1985 Fairness Report).
667. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D. C. Cir. 1968).
668. Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Fairness Report, 48 F. C. C.2d 1, 24-26 ¶¶ 66-70 (1974) (1974 Fairness Report).
669. Complaint by Peter C. Herbst et al. Concerning Fairness Doctrine Re Station WMTW-TV, 40 F. C. C.2d 115, 118 (1973) (rejecting Fairness Doctrine claim based on snowmobile advertisements)
670. affd sub nom. Pub. Interest Research Group v. FCC, 522 F.2d 1060 (1st Cir. 1975).
671. 1974 Fairness Report, 48 F. C. C.2d at 10 ¶ 25.
672. Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 89 F. C. C.2d 916, 925 ¶ 23 (1982).
673. Complaint of Brent Buell, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 97 F. C. C.2d 55, 57 ¶ 8 (1984).
674. Am. Sec. Council Educ. Found, v. FCC, 607 F.2d 438, 444 n. 16 (D. C. Or. 1979).
675. This case arose when a Representative of Congress from Hawaii, who was the principal sponsor of legislation to limit strip raining, asked a West Virginia radio station to air an elevenminute tape advocating her position during the time the legislation was being considered by Congress and presented to the President for his signature. Complaint of Representative Patsy Mink et al. Against Radio Station WHAR, Clarksburg, W. Va., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 59 F. C. C.2d 987, 987 ¶ 2 (1976). When the station refused, the Representative successfully brought her Fairness Doctrine complaint
676. Id. at 997 ¶ 30. Somewhat curiously, one of the principal bases for granting her claim was the fact that the local newspaper had covered the story on its front page on nine days during the key eleven-day period when the legislation was being debated and subjected to a presidential veto.
677. Id. at 995 ¶ 24. As Thomas Krattenmaker and Lucas Powe point out, this rationale has the somewhat puzzling effect of allowing the fact that an issue is already being covered extensively in other media to oblige broadcasters to provide duplicate coverage.
678. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 247.
679. See Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F. C. C.2d 142, 188-90 ¶¶ 69-71 (7955 Fairness Report);
680. see also CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. 94, 187-88 (1973)
681. (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters generally tend to permit only established-or at least moderated-views to enter the broadcast world's 'marketplace of ideas.'");
682. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 78 (D. C. Cir. 1972)
683. (Bazelon, C. J., dissenting) ("[Controversial viewpoints] [are] being screened out in favor of the dreary blandness of a more acceptable opinion. ");
684. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 28, at 248;
685. Barron, supra note 409, at 14 ("On those issues which are unquestionably controversial, however, it is obvious that little or no editorializing is done.").
686. See 1985 Fairness Report, 102 F. C. C.2d at 189-90 ¶ 71 & nn. 168-69.
687. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U. S. 241, 257 (1974) ("Faced with the penalties [of the challenged statute]... editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore,... political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced.").
688. Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 393 (1969);
689. see also FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U. S. 364, 378 n. 12 (1984) (noting that "were it to be shown by the Commission that the fairness doctrine '[has] the net effect of reducing rather than enhancing' speech, we would then be forced to reconsider the constitutional basis of our decision in [Red Lion]").
690. 1985 Fairness Report, 102 F. C. C.2d at 164-88 ¶¶ 34-68.
691. See, e.g., Irving E. Fang & John W. Whelan, Jr., Survey of Television Editorials and Ombudsman Segments, 17 J. BROADCASTING 363, 363-70 (1973);
692. see also Barron, supra note 409, at 12 ("Although the Mayflower ban was removed more than a decade ago, editorializing by broadcast licensees has by no means become a prevalent practice." (footnote omitted)).
693. Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a "Chilling Effect"? Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 290-301 (1997).
694. See Yoo, supra note 17, at 336-37
695. (citing L. A. Powe, Jr., Scholarship and Markets, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 172, 183 (1987)).
696. See id. at 321
697. (quoting Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting, Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L. J. 373, 385 (1993)).
698. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 109-10 (1987).
699. See FRED W. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREE SPEECH VS. FAIRNESS IN BROADCASTING 33-42 (1975).
700. Id. at 39.
701. See Thomas W. Haziett & David W. Sosa, "Chilling" the Internet? Lessons from FCC Regulation of Radio Broadcasting, 4 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 35, 47-50 (1998).
702. CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. 94, 154 (1973)
703. (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
704. See generally Yoo, supra note 284, at 675-713 (analyzing the problematic effects that structural FCC regulations may have on media content).
705. Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, Report, 102 F. C. C.2d 142, 192-94 ¶¶ 74-76 (1985) (1985 Fairness Report);
706. accord Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 78 n. 62 (D. C. Cir. 1972)
707. (Bazelon, C. J., dissenting) ("[T]he potential to subject the 'fairness' theory to political abuse is inherent in the operation of the doctrine.").
708. See Kreimer, supra note 10, at 27-33.
709. See id. at 46-79.
710. See Yoo, supra note 284, at 713-25.
711. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
712. See Yoo, supra note 51, at 25.
713. CBS v. DNC, 412 U. S. 94, 105 (1973).
714. LESSIO, supra note 15, at 6.
715. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.