New media in old bottles? Barron's contextual first amendment and copyright in the digital age

George Washington Law Review

Volumn 76, Issue 4, 2008, Pages 952-985

  Netanel, Neil Weinstock ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 51849085236     PISSN: 00168076     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (155)

1. Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press - A New First Amendment Right. 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1967) [hereinafter Barron, Access to the Press].
2. Id. at 1641-42.
3. See id. at 1643.
4. Id. at 1656.
5. Id. at 1641.
6. In focusing on copyright, I do not mean to suggest that the issue of open versus proprietary communication networks (what is frequently referred to as the issue of network neutrality) is less significant for First Amendment policies. On network neutrality, see Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23 (2001);
7. Susan P. Crawford, Network Rules, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 51 (2007);
8. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 (2001);
9. Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007).
10. Frederick Schauer has argued, for example, that (1) a government-enforced right of access would abridge the free speech rights of press owners, (2) unorthodox viewpoints can find expression in niche newspapers like the Daily Worker, and (3) putting aside the limited availability of broadcast licenses, media concentration stems from the social fact that most audiences prefer to read mainstream newspapers rather than unorthodox, niche ones. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 126-28 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1982). I think that Schauer's argument gives too little weight to how the law shapes media markets and to the importance for democratic governance of government facilitation of robust debate among a wide variety of antagonistic sources. Indeed, the Supreme Court has rightly identified expressive diversity as a "basic tenet of national communications policy" because "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994) (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27 (1972) (plurality opinion)). My aim in this Article, however, is not to defend Barron's call for a First Amendment right of access per se, but to assess how his general vision of an egalitarian First Amendment might apply in the digital arena.
11. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 3-5 (Random House 1970).
12. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
13. See Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 1653.
14. Id. at 1656.
15. For an illuminating, skeptical account of whether the Internet offers individual speakers more opportunities, with explicit reference to Barron's article, see Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 2008) (manuscript at 3-6, on file with the Cornell Law Review).
16. See Yochai Benkler & Lawrence Lessig, Net Gains: Will Technology Make CBS Unconstitutional?, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14. 1998, at 12. 14 (suggesting that an abundance of open networks and untrammeled peer communication will render broadcast licensing and other media regulation an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech);
17. Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment Theory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 1083, 1129-31 (1999) (arguing that the affordability and democracy of the Internet as an information-gathering and -disseminating tool removes any need for a right of expressive access by private individuals and entities to privately owned information);
18. Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371, 382-83 (2006) (describing views of proponents of media deregulation, in contrast to opponents);
19. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1846-47 (1995) (predicting that the Internet will usher in an era of "cheap speech").
20. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 16, 56-62 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM];
21. Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1391-94 (2004).
22. See infra notes 74-79.
23. See Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359. 372-74 (2007) [hereinafter Crawford, The Internet] (describing telephone and cable companies' efforts to "monetize" their Internet access networks by removing nondiscrimination rules and providing favored transport to the applications and content they provide);
24. Andrew Currah, Hollywood, the Internet and the World: A Geography of Disruptive Innovation, 14 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 359, 360 (2007) (arguing that the major picture studios aim to use digital rights management ("DRM") backed proprietary control over content "to transform the networked environment into a secure, predictable and 'well mannered' marketplace," one that conforms with the studios' traditional business model).
25. YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 2 (Yale Univ. Press 2006).
26. See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 1645-47; see also BENKLER, supra note 17, at 196-211 (reviewing three basic critiques of the media); W. RUSSELL NEUMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE MASS AUDIENCE 28-30 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (summarizing the viewpoint of critical media theorists and other critics that commercial media trivializes political life).
27. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 179-85, 212-33.
28. Id. at 179.
29. See id. at 179-80.
30. See id. at 212-13.
31. See id. at 216-17.
32. Id. at 168-69.
33. See id. at 55-56.
34. See id. at 159-60.
35. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
36. Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 1677-78.
37. Id. at 1678.
38. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 9.
39. See id. at 256.
40. See, e.g., Crawford, The Internet, supra note 16, at 388-89 (discussing the creative potential of online networked communication).
41. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 272.
42. Cf. PIERRE LÉVY, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: MANKIND'S EMERGING WORLD IN CYBERSPACE 61-82 (Robert Bononno trans., Plenum Publ'g 1997) (touting the Internet's potential to engender new forms of community and democratic politics).
43. C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION].
44. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 8-9. 161-69. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (Oxford Univ. Press 1989) (defending an individual "liberty" theory for freedom of speech, as opposed to a "marketplace of ideas" theory).
45. See BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION, supra note 35, at 164.
46. Id. at 186.
47. Id. at 101.
48. See id. at 101-02.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 121-22.
51. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
52. See BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION, supra note 35, at 107-08.
53. Id. at 197; see also Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1180 (1999) (concluding aptly that given the increasing cost of attracting users to one's website, "describing today's World Wide Web as a free and open forum of equal speech is a bit delusional").
54. See BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION, supra note 35, at 197.
55. See id.
56. NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT'S PARADOX 95-99 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
57. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 179-82 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1995) (discussing John Stuart Mills's thesis that a liberal state requires a robust exchange of view);
58. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 186-87 (Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (contending that liberal democracy requires a realm of discursive exchange in which citizens can test their preferences and produce better collective decisions).
59. See Maxwell McCombs et al., Issues in the News and the Public Agenda: The Agenda-Setting Tradition, in PUBLIC OPINION AND THE COMMUNICATION OF CONSENT 281, 292 (Theodore L. Glasser & Charles T. Salmon eds., Guilford Press 1995) (noting that given competition among issues for saliency among the public, "the public agenda typically consists of no more than five to seven issues").
60. See DAVID L. PROTESS ET AL., THE JOURNALISM OF OUTRAGE: INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING AND AGENDA BUILDING IN AMERICA 244-49 (Guilford Press 1991) (noting, on the basis of detailed case studies of investigative reporting, that government officials tend to respond to investigative reporters and media exposés before interest groups or the public at large take up the issues, thus treating the press as if it were the public).
61. In particular, op-ed pages presenting a wide spectrum of opinions penned by regular columnists became an established feature of most newspapers in the years following Barron's call for a right of access to the press. The New York Times seems to have initiated the practice in 1970. ERIC ALTERMAN, SOUND AND FURY: THE MAKING OF THE PUNDITOCRACY 131 (Cornell Univ. Press 1999). The use of op-ed columns might have been further spurred in response to litigation, culminating in the Supreme Court's ruling in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 242-43, 258 (1974). In that widely discussed case, Jerome Barron unsuccessfully defended a political candidate's right to reply to newspaper criticism under state law in the face of the newspaper's argument that the requirement that it publish the reply abridged its freedom of speech.
62. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Media - A Contemporary Appraisal, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 937, 942 (2007) (noting "soul-searching and self-examination" among the press, leading to newspapers' appointments of ombudsmen and "the emergence of op-ed pages in many of the country's leading dailies," following the Supreme Court's decision in Tornillo).
63. See NETANEL, supra note 48, at 98.
64. See Lada Adamic & Natalie Glance, The Political Blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. Elec tion: Divided They Blog 10-11 (2005), available at http://www.blogpulse.com/papers/2005/AdamicGlanceBlogWWW.pdf (studying blog linking patterns during the 2004 election campaign);
65. PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2006: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM, A DAY IN THE LIFE OF THE MEDIA: BLOGS (2006), http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.com/2006/ printable_daymedia_blogs.asp (studying blog content generally).
66. Adamic & Glance, supra note 54, at 8 (finding that only fifteen percent of conservative and liberal bloggers' links are to blogs across the political spectrum). For a discussion of the problem of excessive insularity in the context of the Internet, see ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION, HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 105-11 (PublicAffairs 1999), and SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM, supra note 14, at 54-73.
67. See Daniel W. Drezner & Henry Farrell, The Power and Politics of Blogs 4 (2004). available at http://www.danieldrezner. com/research/blogpaperfinal.pdf.
68. See Lindsey Powell, Note, Getting Around Circumvention: A Proposal for Taking FECA Online. 58 STAN. L. REV. 1499, 1525-29 (2006);
69. Sam McManis, These Days, You Just Can't Trust Some Blogs, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 21, 2006, at E1 (describing "flogs," fake weblogs that purport to chronicle an ordinary consumer's passion for a product but that are actually sponsored by corporate public relations firms);
70. see also PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2007: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (2007), available at http://stateofthemedia.org/2007/execsummary.pdf ("Politicians, interest groups and corporate public relations people tell PEJ they have bloggers now on secret retainer - and they are delighted with the results.").
71. See PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT'L, LEAP OF FAITH: USING THE INTERNET DESPITE THE DANGERS, RESULTS OF A NATIONAL SURVEY OF INTERNET USERS FOR CONSUMER REPORTS WEB WATCH 23, 26 (2005), available at http://www.consumerwebwatch.org/pdfs/princeton.pdf.
72. For a more detailed account of copyright's speech burdens, see NETANEL, supra note 48, at 109-53.
73. See BENKLER, supra note 17, at 10-11, 180.
74. See Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital Age, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1019-40 (2007) (tracing efforts to preserve, catalogue, and provide access to knowledge of Ptolemaic Egypt).
75. See BENJAMIN M. COMPAINE & DOUGLAS GOMERY, WHO OWNS THE MEDIA?: COMPETITION AND CONCENTRATION IN THE MASS MEDIA INDUSTRY 326-27, 375-76, 378-80 (3d ed., Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 2000) (discussing record labels and motion picture studios); Currah, supra note 16, at 365 (noting that motion picture studios resist Internet distribution because it threatens their sunk cost and core competency in the distribution of physical media).
76. See Barron, Access to the Press, supra note 1, at 1641-42, 1647.
77. Google News, http://news.google.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. For further discussion on these biases, see infra Part IV.
81. For example, Google News often cites to blogs and online media such as Slashdot.org, Monsters.com, Critics.com, and Huffingtonpost.com. See Google News, http://news.google.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
82. Top News Sites for January, http://www.cyberjournalist.net/top-news- sites-for-january-4 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (citing Nielsen Online) (as measured by unique audience). Readers might not be familiar with some of the news sites listed. Topix is a news aggregation site backed by Gannett Co., The McClatchy Co., and Tribune Co.
83. See About Topix, http://www.topix.com/topix/about (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
84. Advance Internet is a news aggregation site backed by Advance Publications, owner of The New Yorker, Vanity Fair, The Plain Dealer, and other newspapers.
85. See MediaOwners: Advance Publications, Inc., http://www. mediaowners.com/company/advance.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
86. In addition, Advance Publications is the tenth largest U.S. media owner. Id. IB Websites are a group of network Web sites featuring local TV stations and leading broadcasters such as Hearst-Argyle Television, Post-Newsweek Stations, McGraw-Hill Broadcasting, NBC and Cox Television, and Meredith Broadcasting, InternetBroadcasting, Local Internet Solutions, http://www.ibsys.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2008). WorldNow is a provider of Web services to local TV stations and newspapers.
87. See M. Amigot, Local TV Stations Demand More Flexible Content Managements Tools, IBLNEWS, Feb. 3, 2008, http://iblnews.com/story.php?id= 35505.
88. Newsknife Ranking of "Home Page" News Sites, Year to Date, NEWSKNIFE, Mar. 1, 2008, http://www.newsknife.com/members/ front_relevant_news01.html. This table is taken from rankings that appear in the Newsknife Members' Area and is accessible only by subscription. For general information regarding Newsknife, which rates news sites based on their appearances at Google News, see Newsknife, http://www.newsknife.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
89. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Googlization of Everything and the Future of Copyright, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1211 (2007) (listing commonalities between the peer-to-peer interface Grokster and the Google search engine).
90. See, e.g., BigChampagne Online Media Measurement, Top Swaps, http://www.bigchampagne.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2008) (listing the week's top ten most popular song downloads).
91. NETANEL, supra note 48, at 44-46.
92. See, e.g., Complaint, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 2103 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Complaint, Viacom Int'l]; Complaint, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Myspace, Inc., No. CV06-07361 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2006).
93. See, e.g., Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005).
94. See, e.g., Complaint, Agence France Presse v. Google Inc., No. 1:05cv00546 (D.D.C. Mar. 17, 2005).
95. L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840-MMM, 1999 WL 33644483, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1999), enforced, 2000 WL 1863566, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2000) (entering permanent injunction).
96. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
97. See, e.g., Complaint, MPAA v. ReplayTV, No. 01-09801 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2001).
98. See, e.g., Music Firms Dismiss Napster Deal, BBC NEWS, Feb. 21, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/1182859.stm.
99. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL xi-xiii, xvii (Harvard Bus. Sch. Press 1997);
100. Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 13 & n.21, on file with the Berkley Technology Law Journal) (applying Christensen's analysis of industry conservatism in the face of disruptive innovation to copyright industries).
101. NETANEL, supra note 48, at 148-50; see also Randal C. Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 423-28 (2002) (focusing on music and video digital distribution).
102. See supra notes 74-79.
103. Meg James & Dawn C. Chmielewski, Media Giants to Take on You Tube, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at A1.
104. Id.; see Complaint, Viacom Int'l, supra note 74.
105. See James & Chmielewski, supra note 84.
106. Id. (quoting UBS Warburg media analyst Aryeh Bourkoff).
107. See RUSSELL SANJEK & DAVID SANJEK, AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC BUSINESS IN THE 20TH CENTURY 58-60, 65, 165-66, 208-09. 227-28 (Oxford Univ. Press 1991);
108. Barak Y. Orbach, Antitrust and Pricing in the Motion Picture Industry, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 317, 321 (2004). But short of collusion, current antitrust doctrine places few limits on incumbents' ability to use copyright as a vertical restraint.
109. For analysis and criticism of antitrust law's current leniency toward the use of intellectual property for vertical foreclosure, see Roger G. Noll, The Conflict over Vertical Foreclosure in Competition Policy and Intellectual Property Law, 160 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 79, 87-90 (2004).
110. For a brief summary of compulsory licenses and private copying levies in the U.S. and Europe, see Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 31-35 (2003).
111. See Michael A. Einhorn, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: Music Performing Rights in Broadcasting. 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 349, 356 (2001) (discussing the Rate Court provisions in ASCAP and BMI antitrust consent decrees);
112. Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 310-11 (2004) [hereinafter Wu. Copyright's Communications].
113. See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding a supplier of a peer-to-peer file-sharing service contributorily liable for its users' infringement); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that individuals who distribute copyrighted music files through a peer-to-peer network infringe copyrights and that Napster was contributorily liable for its users' infringement); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding MP3.com liable for enabling its subscribers to access songs on subscriber-owned compact discs via the Internet). The current "MP3.com" and "Napster" are successors in name only to the original businesses.
114. See NETANEL, supra note 48, at 89-93.
115. See BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION, supra note 35, at 28-37.
116. Moreover, Baker convincingly demonstrates that conglomerates are less likely to reinvest profits in high quality journalism than are smaller journalism-dedicated enterprises. See id. at 35-36.
117. Id. at 119.
118. Goodman, supra note 14, at 1439-40.
119. See BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION, supra note 35, at 115; Goodman, supra note 14, at 1442.
120. See BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION, supra note 35, at 116; Goodman, supra note 14, at 1415.
121. BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION, supra note 35, at 119; cf. Crawford, The Internet, supra note 16, at 367-69 (discussing audience migration from television and print media to the Internet).
122. See BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION, supra note 35, at 117.
123. Id. at 118.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
126. PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2007: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM, ONLINE: PUBLIC ATTITUDES (2007). http://stateofthemedia.org/2007/narrative_online_publicattitudes.asp?cat= 7&media=4 (reporting results of Knight Foundation survey).
127. See Google's Motion and Memorandum for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing Count II for Lack of Protectable Subject Matter at 2 n.3, 8 n.11, Agence France Presse v. Google Inc., No. 1:05cv00546 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2006).
128. PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOLIRNALISM, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2007: AN ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN JOURNALISM, OVERVIEW: MAJOR TRENDS (2007). http://stateofthemedia.org/2007/narrative_overview_eight.asp?cat=2&media=1.
129. Miguel Helft & Steve Lohr, 176 Newspapers to Form a Partnership with Yahoo. N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, at C1.
130. Cf. Menell, supra note 61, at 1064-67 (advocating a safe harbor from copyright infringement for creating comprehensive, searchable digital archives on the condition that the search engine/archivist provide a copy of the digital archive to the Library of Congress for public use).
131. See SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 88, at 12. The compulsory mechanical license was codified as Section 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000).
132. See SANJEK & SANJEK, supra note 88, at 12; Wu, Copyright's Communications, supra note 90, at 300.
133. See Eli M. Noam, Fundamental Instability: Why Telecom Is Becoming a Cyclical and Oligopolistic Industry, 18 INFO. ECON. & POL'Y 272, 279 (2006).
134. See id.
135. See id. at 280, 282.
136. Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 12 (manuscript at 34 & n.123).
137. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 94, 96 (1994);
138. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488-90, 551-53 (1998).
139. See Google 'Dominates World Search,' BBC NEWS, Oct. 11, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7039114.stm. As of the end of 2007, Google's share of U.S. Web queries stood at 56.3 percent, while Yahoo's was 17.7 percent and Microsoft's was 13.8 percent.
140. Bloomberg News, Google's Share of Search Market Falls, Nielsen Says, SILICONVALLEY.COM, Jan. 19, 2008, http://www.siliconvalley.com/latestheadlines/ci_8018514.
141. Reuters, YouTube: More Visitors than Rival Sites Combined, USA TODAY, June 28, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2007-06-28- youtube-audience-surge_N.htm.
142. Vauhini Vara, MySpace Has Large Circle of Friends, but Rivals' Cliques Are Growing Too, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2006. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115950109260277754.html.
143. YouTube, Uploading Videos to YouTube, http://www.google.com/support/ youtube/bin/answer.py?answer=57924&topic=10525 (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
144. YouTube, YouTube Community Guidelines, http://www.youtube.eom/t/ community_guidelines (last visited Mar. 30, 2008).
145. Steve Peoples, Elizabeth Gudrais & Scott MacKay, Political Scene: YouTube Dumps Antiwar Videos, PROVIDENCE J., July 2, 2007, at C1.
146. See id.; Edward Wyatt, Now on YouTube: Iraq Videos of U.S. Troops Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A1.
147. See Andy Greenberg, YouTube's Filter Fails to Please, FORBES.COM, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.forbes.com/2007/10/18/google- viacom-video-tech-cx_ag_1018youtube.html.
148. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
149. See Jim Kouri, Internet Providers Censoring Conservative News E-mail, NEWSWITH VIEWS.COM, Apr. 26, 2007, http://www.newswithviews.com/NWVexclusive/exclusive114.htm
150. (citing Noel Sheppard, Is Google Purging Conservative News Sites?, NEWSBUSTERS, May 22, 2006, http://www.newsbusters.org/node/ 5477).
151. Eric Ulken, Non-Traditional Sources Cloud Google News Results, USC ANNENBERG ONLINE JOURNALISM REV., May 19, 2005, http://www.ojr.org/ojr/stories/050519ulken.
152. But see DAN GILLMOR, WE THE MEDIA: GRASSROOTS JOURNALISM BY THE PEOPLE, FOR THE PEOPLE 166 (O'Reilly Media 2006) (contending that a drawback of Google News is that it refuses to acknowledge news content from grassroots journalism, like most blogs).
153. Krishna Bharat, Patterns on the Web, in STRING PROCESSING AND INFORMATION RETRIEVAL: 10TH INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 1, 9 (Mario A. Nascimento et al. eds., Springer 2003).
154. Fostering competition might not be the only means to further First Amendment interests. Intriguingly, Frank Pasquale has cited Google's market dominance and bias in arguing for a right of reply to search engine results. Frank Pasquale, Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search Results, 3 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 61, 62-63 (2008).
155. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).