The Hazards of Claiming to Have Solved the Hard Problem of Free Will

Are We Free?: Psychology and Free Will

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Shariff, Azim F ^a   Schooler, Jonathan ^b   Vohs, Kathleen D ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheating; Consciousness; Determinism; Morality; Morally lax

Indexed keywords

EID: 77955231248     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195189636.003.0009     Document Type: Chapter

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