A matrix game model for analyzing FTR bidding strategies in deregulated electric power markets

International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems

Volumn 32, Issue 7, 2010, Pages 760-768

  Das, Tapas K ^a   Rocha, Patricio ^a   Babayigit, Cihan ^b  

^a University of South Florida   (United States)

^b Revenue Management Solutions LLC   (United States)

Author keywords

Deregulated electricity markets; Financial transmission rights; FTR settlement; Matrix game

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATION STRATEGY; BIDDING STRATEGY; CONGESTION CHARGES; DEREGULATED ELECTRIC POWER MARKET; DEREGULATED ELECTRICITY MARKET; ELECTRICITY MARKET; FINANCIAL TRANSMISSION RIGHT; GAME-THEORETIC MODEL; LOCATIONAL MARGINAL PRICES; MARKET OUTCOMES; MATRIX GAME; MODELING APPROACH; NETWORK CONTINGENCIES; NETWORK PARAMETERS; OPTIMIZATION MODELS; POWER SUPPLIERS; SYSTEM OPERATOR;

COMMERCE; DEREGULATION; GAME THEORY; TRAFFIC CONGESTION;

ELECTRIC LOAD FORECASTING;

EID: 77955227892     PISSN: 01420615     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijepes.2010.01.012     Document Type: Article

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