Hide and seek in Arizona

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 273-293

  Rosenthal, Robert W ^a   Shachat, Jason ^b   Walker, Mark ^c  

^a Boston University   (United States)

^b NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE   (Singapore)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiment; Minimax; Mixed strategy

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346937575     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820300159     Document Type: Article

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