Backward stealing and forward manipulation in the WTO

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 82, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 49-62

  Bagwell, Kyle ^a,b   Staiger, Robert W ^a,b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

GATT; Trade negotiations; WTO

Indexed keywords

GATT; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; TRADE AGREEMENT; WORLD SYSTEM; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION;

EID: 77955096242     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2010.04.005     Document Type: Article

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