On the feasibility of a liberal welfare state: Agency and exit costs in income security clubs

Constitutional Political Economy

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 145-159

  Congleton, Roger D ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agency Problems; Averse Selection; Constitutional Economics; Exit; Liberalism; Public Choice; Social Insurance; Social Security; Welfare State

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547839594     PISSN: 10434062     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10602-007-9018-0     Document Type: Article

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