Between identity quest and risk aversion: Lessons from the Chen Shui-bian presidency for maintaining cross-strait stability

Journal of Contemporary China

Volumn 19, Issue 66, 2010, Pages 693-717

  Hsu, S Philip ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DENVER   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM; INDEPENDENCE; LEADERSHIP; MILITARY INTERVENTION; NATIONAL IDENTITY; POLITICAL CONFLICT; POLITICAL SYSTEM; SECURITY THREAT; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

BEIJING [CHINA]; CHINA; TAIWAN;

EID: 77955027731     PISSN: 10670564     EISSN: 14699400     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2010.485405     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. The definition of 'status quo' in cross-strait relations became increasingly controversial during Chen Shui- bian's second term. Disagreements over a host of aspects underlying the notion abounded among Washington, Taipei, and Beijing, such as the latter two sides' relative sovereignty status, whether the status quo is static or dynamic, and even whether a trilateral consensus is a precondition for defining it. Not intended to get involved in this debate, this article uses the term as it is understood by the bulk of citizens in Taiwan, since they are the prime focus of this article through which the choice between identity quest and risk aversion makes sense. In the ROC Mainland Affairs Council's public opinion surveys since 1989, a leading source of data reflective of the ROC citizens' stances on cross- strait relations, the preference over status quo as an alternative other than unification or independence can be reasonably comprehended as leaving intact the de facto separation between the two governments in Taipei and Beijing of which eachproclaimsto be representativeof a sovereigncountry,withoutsolving their differencein Beijing'sdenial of Taipei's sovereignty claim and without bilateral military confrontation that could be attempted to solve it.
2. Four days after Taiwan's presidential election, Chinese President Hu Jintao indicated in a phone dialogue to US President George Bush that 'the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of "the 1992 consensus", which sees both sides recognize there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition (italics added by the author)'. See 'Chinese, US presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet', Xinhua News Agency, (26 March 2008), available at: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t418675.htm (accessed 2 April 2008).
3. Hu's recognition of Taipei's and Beijing's varying definitions of 'one China' was the first time that Beijing had done so in any of China's official statements about the 'one China principle' or 'the 1992 consensus'. Beijing's prior refusal to acknowledge that Taipei had reserved its own definition, different from Beijing's, in reaching the 1992 consensus was also cited by President Chen Shui-bian in 2000 as one of the key rationales for denying the existence of the 1992 consensus at all. Hu's remark above was thus seen by many as a positive gesture to restore the common ground with the forthcoming Ma Ying-jeou Administration. See, for instance, the comment by Su Chi, a key advisor to Ma on cross-strait relations, in Ying-ju Yau, 'Su Qi Hu Chu Jiuergongshi Wai Yeti Yizhong Gebiao' ['Su Chi points out that Hu speaks of 1992 consensus as well as one China with its different interpretations across the Taiwan Strait'], China Times, (28 March 2008), p. A17; for President Bush's encouragement of Hu to engage Taipei through such a message,
4. Charles Snyder, 'Bush urges Hu to reach uut to Taipei', Taipei Times, (28 March 2008), p. 1.
5. To countervail the Chen Administration's UN entry issue, KMT pushed through the insertion into the referendum the issue that Taiwan ought to apply for a 're-entry' into the UN in the name of ROC, the legal identity of Taiwan when it withdrew from the UN in 1971. The actual turnout for the UN entry and UN re-entry referenda on 22 March 2008, were 35.82% and 35.74%, respectively.
6. For the US actions in expressing its objection, see Alan D. Romberg, 'Election 2008 and the future of cross strait relations', China Leadership Monitor 21, (June 2007);
7. Alan D. Romberg, 'Applying to the UN "in the name of Taiwan"', China Leadership Monitor 22, (September 2007).
8. US defense officials were quoted as suggesting explicitly that the carrier would be able to 'respond if there's a provocative situation'. Bruce Einhorn, 'US carrier near Taiwan as election nears', Businessweek, (20 March 2008), available at: http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/blog/eyeonasia/archives/2008/03/for_a_ship_that.html (accessed 2 April 2008).
9. Glenn Kessler and Mike Allen, 'Taiwan warned by US: island asked not to provoke China', Washington Post, (9 December 2003), p. A01.
10. Locked into the preceding cross-strait conflictual spiral on the sovereignty dimension, Chen's successive moves had been driven not only by domestic political interest, but also by the need to respond to pressures from Beijing. His tinkering with the NUC/NUG issue, for instance, was widely seen as reacting to Beijing's enactment of the Anti-Secession Law one year earlier.
11. Robert S. Ross, 'Taiwan's fading independence movement', Foreign Affairs 85(2), (March/April 2006), pp. 141-149;
12. Robert S. Ross, 'Explaining Taiwan's revisionist diplomacy', Journal of Contemporary China 15(48), (August 2006), pp. 443-458.
13. T. Y. Wang and I-Chou Liu, 'Contending identities in Taiwan: implications for cross-strait relations', Asian Survey 44(4), (July/August 2004), pp. 576-578.
14. Yu-Shan Wu, 'Taiwanese nationalism and its implications: testing the worst-case scenario', Asian Survey 44(4), (July/August 2004), pp. 618-620.
15. Ibid., pp. 578-586;
16. Emerson M. S. Niou, 'Understanding Taiwan independence and its policy implications', Asian Survey 44(4), (July/August 2004), pp. 556-558.
17. Niou, 'Understanding Taiwan independence and its policy implications', pp. 561-566.
18. Wu, 'Taiwanese nationalism and its implications', pp. 621-622.
19. Ibid., pp. 622-624.
20. All the survey results can be found at: http://www.rdec.gov.tw/np.asp?ctNode1/410775&mp=130.
21. See http://www.rdec.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=12419&ctNode=3536 (accessed 24 June 2007).
22. See http://www.rdec.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=12413&ctNode=3536 (accessed 25 June 2007).
23. For all the statistics on the 2004 legislative election, see '2004 Liwei Xuanju' ['The 2004 election for Legislative Yuan members'], United Daily News, available at: http://mag.udn.com/mag/vote2004/#.
24. For those on the 2005 county magistrate election, see'2005 Sanheyi Xuanju Jieguo' ['The results of the "three in one" election in 2005'], United Daily News, available at: http://mag.udn.com/mag/vote2005/#.
25. This result is calculated from data in those periodic public opinion polls adopted by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council. See http://www.mac.gov.tw (accessed 22 April 2007).
26. Andrew Peterson, 'Dangerous games across the Taiwan Strait', Washington Quarterly 27(2), (Spring 2004), pp. 31-32.
27. Mily Ming-Tzu Kao, 'The referendum phenomenon in Taiwan: solidification of Taiwan consciousness?', Asian Survey 44(4), (July/August 2004), pp. 591-613.
28. Ko Shuling, 'Taiwan already independent, Cabinet says', Taipei Times, (1 July 2003), p. 2.
29. 'Referenda are inevitable, Chen said', Taiwan News Online, (26 July 2003), available at: http://taiwansecurity.org/TN/2003/TN-072603.htm (accessed 27 April 2007).
30. Rick Chu and Lin Chiehyu, 'President defends nation's right to hold referenda', Taipei Times, (15 August 2003), p. 2.
31. See http://www.rdec.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=12419&ctNode=3536 (accessed 26 April 2007).
32. See http://www.rdec.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=12413&ctNode=3536 (accessed 27 April 2007).
33. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decisions (New York: Longman, 1999), pp. 166-167.
34. 'Reports: US warns Taiwan not to hold referendum', Agence France Presse, (21 June 2003), available at: http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/2003/AFP-062103.htm, (accessed 2 May 2007).
35. 'Lien trumpets KMT constitutional plan', Taipei Times, (16 November 2003), p. 2.
36. See http://www.rdec.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=12177&ctNode=3536 (accessed 27 April 2007).
37. See http://www.rdec.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=12064&ctNode=3535 (accessed 28 April 2007).
38. Interestingly, aware of this coexistence, Steven Yates, a leading US supporter of Taiwan's referenda even after he left his office in the Bush Administration, called for Washington to tone down its opposition to the 2008 referenda by stressing that they were Taiwan's domestic political matters and that the UN entry issues decided on by the referenda had been always controversial in Taiwan and thus 'doomed to fail'. Both reasons rendered Washington's staunch opposition to seem somewhat overly anxious and unnecessary.
39. Charles Snyder, 'US overreacting to UN referendum', Taipei Times, (17 January 2008), p. 3.
40. Dennis Engbarth, 'Chenapplies fors eat in UN under "Taiwan"', Taiwan News, (21 July 2007), availableat: http://72.14.235.104/search?q=cache:M6hnzXM6bdQJ:taiwansecurity.org/TN/2007/TN-210707.htm+Chen+Applies+ for+Seat+in+U.N.+under+%27Taiwan%27&hl=zh-TW&ct=clnk&cd=1 (accessed 2 April 2008).
41. 'UN rejects Taiwan application for entry', Associated Press, (24 July 2007), available at: http://www.iht.com/ articles/2007/07/24/news/taiwan.php (accessed 2 April 2008).
42. Flora Wang, '"Normal country" draft unveiled', Taipei Times, (2 August 2007), p. 3.
43. Ong Hwee Hwee, 'Ruling DPP rejects radical name change for Taiwan', Straits Times, (1 October 2007), p. 6.
44. 'Kuomintang referendum plan "far different" than Democratic Progressive Party', China Post (Taipei), (29 August 2007), p. 1.
45. Flora Wang and Mo Yanchih, 'DPP, KMT rally for referenda', Taipei Times, (16 September 2007), p. 1.
46. Jane Rickards, 'Lee launches push for new constitution', China Post, (2 July 2004), p. 5.
47. Ziyou Shibao [Liberty Times] (Taipei), (14 September 2004), p. 3.
48. 'President Chen on the revision of the National Emblem Law in case of pan green's majority', Ziyou Xinwenwang [Liberty Times News Network], (22 November 2004), available at: http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/ 2004/new/nov/22/today-t1.htm (accessed 3 May 2007).
49. 'Correcting the name for Taiwan's representative offices abroad', ET Today, (6 December 2004), available at: http://www.ettv.com.tw/2004/12/06/11292-1723515.htm (accessed 3 May 2007).
50. Stephen Blank, 'US: China has credible Taiwan attack options', Asia Times Online, (2 March 2004), available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FC02Ad01.html (accessed 9 February 2008).
51. Sofia Wu, 'MND plays down China-France navel exercise', Global Security, (16 March 2004), available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2004/taiwan-040316-cna06.htm (accessed 25 March 2008). France's participation in a military exercise around that particular time did not appear to be merely for bilateral military exchanges and for China'sterritorialclaimonTaiwanperse, butultimately tobeassociatedwithFrance'sefforttoliftthe European Union's embargo on arms exports to China, which would vastly enhance the chance of French arms sales to China. France might have sought to counterbalance the US domination in regional and global affairs by erecting a closer tie with China.
52. See Jean Pierre Cabestan, 'Taiwan's challenge to China and the world-part I', Yale Global Online, (30 March 2008), available at: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=3504 (accessed 31 March 2008).
53. Associated Press, 'China threatens Taiwan over constitution', Taiwan Security Research, (30 July 2004), available at: http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/2004/AP-300704.htm (accessed 6 January 2008).
54. Charles Snyder, 'US lauds axed war games', Taipei Times, (September 2004), p. 2.
55. That Beijing has learned its lessons and managed to adapt its behavior as mentioned here is widely recognized in analyses of cross-strait relations. In characterizing Beijing's reaction to Chen's referendum initiative during 2007-2008, for instance, Alan Romberg points out that Beijing had made the judgment that Chen sought to use the referenda to 'spark a harsh PRC reaction, both benefiting the DPP domestically and driving a wedge between the PRC and the United States'. Romberg, 'Applying to the UN "in the name of Taiwan"', p. 15.
56. In 2005, the year of the visits by leaders of Taiwan opposition parties to Beijing and of China's enactment of the Anti-Secession Law, China undertook no such exercise covered by Taiwan's media. In 2006, there was the 'Queshan 2006 Exercise', taking place in the northern Chinese province of Henan and reported in Taiwan, of which part was described as aimed at Taiwan. That exercise occurred, though, in mid-October 2006, when the soonest forthcoming election was still two months away.
57. See 'Zhonggong Jinqi Duitai Junshi Weihe Ziliao' ['Information on PRC's recent military intimidation toward Taiwan'], Mainland Affairs Council Briefing Room, (March 2007), available at: http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/mlpolicy/cn9603a.htm (accessed 3 April 2008). In 2007, the only military exercise highlighted in Taiwan was the one taking place also in Queshan, Henan, during the first week of November, that reportedly resembled what had happened a year earlier in terms of its intended utility for future attack on Taiwan.
58. See Delin Zheng, 'Zhonggog "Tiequan 2007" Junyan Moni Duitai Zuozhan' ['China's "iron fist 2007" military exercise aimed at combating operations toward Taiwan'], Junshi Xinwen [Military News] (Taiwan), available at: http://news.gpwb.gov.tw/news.php?css=2&nid=29065&rtype=1 (accessed 21 February 2008).
59. 'The US demanded Chen's explanation on new constitution through referendum in 2006', ET Today, (30 November 2004), available at: http://www.ettoday.com/2004/11/30/11183-1720624.htm (accessed 3 May 2007).
60. Reuters, 'Powell comments may irk Taiwan', Taiwan Security Research, (26 October 2004), available at: http://taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-261004.htm (accessed 7 May 2007).
61. The US State Department immediately made a clarification on Powell's comment in the interview with CNN International that he had meant to say 'resolution' instead of 'reunification'. See Laurence Eyton, 'Taiwan reels from Powell's anti-sovereignty "goof"', Asia Times Online, (30 October 2004), available at: http://www.atimes.com/ atimes/China/FJ30Ad03.html (accessed 18 August 2009). This retraction, however, was not covered by the mainstream media in Taiwan. Furthermore, no correction was made to Powell's statement reported by the Phoenix TV. The uncertainty produced by Powell's remarks and perceived by the Taiwan people, therefore, was unlikely to be much warded off by the State Department's remedy.
62. Reuters, 'Taiwan plays down China-US "land mine" remark', Taiwan Security Research, (23 December 2004), available at: http://www.taiwansecurity.org/Reu/2004/Reuters-231204.htm (accessed 24 April 2007).
63. 'US urges Taiwan's Chen to drop UN bid', Strait Times, (20 June 2007), p. 2.
64. Lu Chia-ying and Dennis Engbarth, 'President meets AIT head during Alaska stopover', Taiwan News, (30 August 2007).
65. Charles Snyder and Ko Shuling, 'Referendum a mistake, US official says', Taipei Times, (29 August 2007), p. 1.
66. 'Press briefing on the President's trip to Australia and the APEC Summit by senior administration officials', Office of the Press Secretary, White House, (30 August 2007).
67. Thomas J. Christensen, 'A strong and moderate Taiwan', speech in the Defense Industry Conference held by US-Taiwan Business Council on 11 September 2007, US Department of State, available at: http://www.state.gov/p/ eap/rls/rm/2007/91979.htm (accessed 3 March 2008).
68. 'Lianhebao Mindiao Rulian Gongtou 42% Minzhong Fandui Yinggan' ['United Daily News poll shows 42 percent of respondents in opposition to forcing through the UN entry referendum'], United Daily News Net, (14 September 2007), available at: http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NATS3/4013114.shtml (accessed 5 February 2008).