The twist of long terms: Judicial elections, role fidelity, and American Tort law

Georgetown Law Journal

Volumn 98, Issue 5, 2010, Pages 1349-1413

  Shugerman, Jed Handelsman ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 77954865960     PISSN: 00168092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (378)

1. Running for Judge: The Rising Politcal, Financial, and Legal Stakes of Judicial Elections 7 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007)
2. Nine states that select judges by gubernatorial appointment are Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont. New York's lower-court judges are elected, but not the judges on its highest court, the Court of Appeals. South Carolina and Virginia use legislative appointment. See, e.g., American Judicature Society: Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.judicialselection.us (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
3. Even though Americans have exported constitutions and other legal institutions to much of the world, no one else has been importing judicial elections. The only other nations that elect even a tiny number of judges are Switzerland and Japan, and even those countries narrowly limit the scope of those elections. In Japan, the cabinet initially appoints high-court judges, and they run once for election unopposed. The emperor selects the chief judge. In Switzerland, some lay judges of canton courts are elected. Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. Cm. L. REV. 689, 691 n.3 (1995).
4. In modern France, some lower court judges are elected. See Amalia D. Kessler, Marginalization and Myth: The Corporatist Roots of France's Forgotten Elective Judiciary (Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper No. 1470271, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1470271.
5. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265 (2008).
6. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
7. See, e.g., DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY 130 (1995) (observing that appointed judges are more likely than elected judges to adopt less popular criminal procedure rules)
8. Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1992)
9. Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial Selection Make?, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 25 (1979)
10. Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. Sa. 107-38 (2007)
11. F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 205 (1999)
12. Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157, 186-87 (1999) (finding damage awards higher in elected courts, particularly against out-of-state businesses, and highest in partisan-election states, and concluding that judges, not juries, were die cause)
13. Gerald F. Uelmen, Elected Judiciary, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 170, 171 (Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst & John G. West, Jr. eds., Supp. 1 1992) (showing meaningful differences in death penalty affirmance rates between judges selected by executive appointment compared with judges selected by election or legislative appointment)
14. But see John Blume & Theodore Eisenberg, Judicial Politics, Death Penalty Appeals, and Case Selection, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 465 (1999) (showing no significant effect of selection methods on capital case outcomes).
15. Adam Liptak, Looking Anew at Campaign Cash and Elected Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at A14
16. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court's Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,2006, at A1.
17. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006, at 15-27 (2006), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/ NewPoliticsofJudicialElections2006-D2A2449B77CDA.pdf
18. DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL, THE NEW Pouncs OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2004, at 19 (2004), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/NewPoliticsReport2004- 83BBFBD7C43A3.pdf.
19. SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 8, at 18.
20. See, e.g., Paul Brace et al., Judicial Choice and the Politics of Abortion: Institutions, Context, and the Autonomy of Courts, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1265, 1291 (1999) (finding that, as judges' term lengths increase, they are more likely to hear a challenge to an abortion statute under the court's discretionary powers)
21. Richard R.W. Brooks & Steven Raphael, Life Terms or Death Sentences: The Uneasy Relationship Between Judicial Elections and Capital Punishment, 92 J. CRM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 637 (2003) (finding mat Chicago judges were more likely to sentence defendants to death when they faced election that year)
22. Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Muting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427, 438-39 (1992) (finding that state supreme court judges are less likely to vote against the death penalty as they approach the end of die judicial term)
23. Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 497-98 (1995) (same)
24. Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. So. 247 (2004) (finding that judges give longer sentences when they get closer to re-election)
25. see also Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5, 22-24 (1995) (finding mat partisan electoral competition correlates positively with upholding death sentences in state supreme courts).
26. Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J., April 1987, at 58.
27. Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,1583 n.361 (1990).
28. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Watershed Moment: Reversals of Tort Theory in the Nineteenth Century, 2 J. TORT L. (2008) [hereinafter Shugerman, A Watershed Moment]
29. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Note, The Floodgates of Strict Liability: Bursting Reservoirs and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333 (2000) [hereinafter Shugerman, Floodgates]. These articles discuss how I have defined the "adoption" of Rylands: a state supreme court relying on Rylands's strict liability language or recognizing a rule that applies strict liability to unnatural activities or a very similar category of artificial or hazardous activities, and there is no subsequent decision casting doubt on Rylands or its rule. In an earlier article, I offered four categories: adopting Rylands, leaning towards Rylands (i.e., adopting a similar rule, or generally adopting Rylands despite one less enthusiastic decision), wavering, and rejecting. Shugerman, Floodgates, supra, at 334-35 & n.9. See infra app. A for a table of all states categorized by selection method, term length, and position on Rylands and strict liability for unnatural or hazardous activities. In this Article, I often use the term "adopting" when referring to both adopting and leaning states.
30. This finding confirms Peter Karsten's suggestion that judicial elections may have led state courts to favor plaintiffs in tort suits in the late nineteenth century. PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD: JUDGE-MADE LAW IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 288-91 (1997).
31. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein and Timor Kuran, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999)
32. Aaron Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 207 (1973).
33. See infra section OLE. See generally B.J. Biddle, Recent Development in Role Theory, 12 ANN. REV. SOC. 67, 82-84 (1986) (describing role conflict as "the concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the behavior of a person"); John T. Gullahorn & Jeanne E. Gullahom, Role Conflict and Its Resolution, 4 Soc. Q. 32 (1963) (discussing role conflict in relation to social role and status and methods for its resolution).
34. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061 (2010) (explaining the rise of judicial elections in the 1840s and 1850s as a means of increasing judicial independence, judicial review, and judicial power).
35. A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs: The Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209,239 n.117 (1984).
36. Fletcher v. Rylands, (1865) 159 Eng. Rep. 737,740-41 (Exch.).
37. Simpson, supra note 18, at 241-42.
38. Kenneth S. Abraham, Rylands v. Fletcher: Tort Law's Conscience, in TORTS STORIES 207, 211 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003).
39. Rylands, 159 Eng. Rep. at 743-47. At the time of the accident, the doctrine of respondeat superior did not make an employer legally responsible for independent contractors.
40. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 70, at 480 (3d ed. 1964).
41. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 265,279 (Exch. Ch.).
42. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) 3 L.R.E. & I. App. 330,342 (H.L.).
43. Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582, 583-84 (1868)
44. Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324, 334-37, 344-46 (1872).
45. Shipley v. Fifty Assocs., 101 Mass. 251, 252-53 (1869) (extending Rylands to defendants who constructed a roof that collected snow and ice but did not prevent it from falling on people traveling on a nearby sidewalk), aff'd, 106 Mass. 194 (1870)
46. Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296 - (1895)
47. Hannem v. Pence, 40 Minn. 127 (1889)
48. Knapheide v. Eastman, 20 Minn. 478 (1874).
49. Davis v. Rich, 62 N.E. 375 (Mass. 1902) (upholding jury instructions that required finding liability if a spout was maintained as to cause water to enter a sidewalk, without requiring further proof of negligence).
50. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476,486-87 (1873).
51. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442,446,450-51 (1873).
52. Marshall v. Welwood, 38 NJ.L. 339, 341 (1876), overruled by State Dept. of Envtl. Prot v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150,157 (N.J. 1983).
53. Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453 (Pa. 1886)
54. See Shugerman, A Watershed Moment, supra note 13, for more discussion of Sanderson and other related cases.
55. See Shugerman, Floodgates, supra note 13, at 340-41, for a discussion of these treatises.
56. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-27 (1973)
57. MORTON J. Horwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 85-108 (1977)
58. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 55-59 (1974)
59. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 3-19 (1980)
60. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 515-17 (1961)
61. Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1422, 1425-1443 (1966)
62. Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359, 365, 370, 382 (1951)
63. cf. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) (examining the era of fault and arguing that fault prevailed as the most economically efficient doctrine).
64. Contra Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 927 (1981)
65. Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717,1720 (1981).
66. See Gregory, supra note 37, at 381-88
67. William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1706-11 (1992)
68. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 257-60 (1987)
69. Rabin, supra note 37, at 961.
70. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 139-43 (9th ed. 2008).
71. See id at 345-46. See infra app. A for a list of cases.
72. See infra app. A. "Leaning" means that the state had adopted a very similar rule without relying on Rylands, or that they had relied on Rylands, but with some recognition that it was controversial.
73. In the mid-1880s, the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Iowa adopted or leaned towards Rylands. See infra app. A. This trend, towards Rylands before the Johnstown Flood may be attributable to what was discussed in Shugerman, Floodgates, supra note 13, as a background factor urban growth and residential expansion near industrial activity. Chicago and other areas of the Midwest were experiencing rapid urban and industrial growth in the 1880s. See JOHN T. CUMBLER, NORTHEAST AND MIDWEST UNITED STATES: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 138-41 (2005).
74. See Colton v. Onderdonk, 10 P. 395, 397-98 (Cal. 1886). Severe floods struck California periodically through the nineteenth century, particularly in 1861-62, 1871, and 1890, leading to a number of deaths.
75. WILLIAM B. SECREST, JR. & WILUAM B. SECREST, SR., CALIFORNIA DISASTERS, 1812-1899, at 93-97,129-31,187-91 (2006).
76. See DISASTER, DISASTER, DISASTER 17-18 (Dougles Newton ed., 1961).
77. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD 41-42 (1968).
78. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 49, at 264.
79. see also WILLIS FLETCHER JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE JOHNSTOWN FLOOD 266-80 (1889) (noting donations from twenty-five states, and from London, Germany, Belfast, and Turkey). The donations totaled almost $4 million in cash, in addition to food and other necessities.
80. JOHNSTOWN TRIB., July 8, 1889
81. see also Report of the Committee on the Cause of the Failure of the South Fork Dam, 24 TRANSACTIONS AM. SOC. CIV. ENGINEERS 431, 456-57 (1891).
82. see also That Fatal Dam: An Expert Engineer Says It Was in Every Respect of Very Inferior Construction, PITTSBURGH COM. GAZETTE, June 8, 1889, at 1, 7
83. The Club Is Guilty, N.Y. WORLD, June 7, 1889
84. Note, The Law of Bursting Reservoirs, 23 AM. L. REV. 643 (1889). The American Law Review was a bimonthly publication regarded as "probably the most influential legal periodical of the nineteenth century."
85. THOMAS A. WOXLAND & PATH J. OGDEN, LANDMARKS IN AMERICAN LEGAL PUBLISHING 48 (1989). Its notes were not student pieces, but were legal comments written by perhaps the most "distinguished⋯ group of working editors" in the history of legal publishing.
86. ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBUSHING 192 (1990)
87. In the Review's early years, its editorial staff resembled an all-star team of legal scholars and practitioners, including Oliver Wendell Holmes, Arthur Sedgwick, John C. Ropes, and John C. Gray. American Law Periodicals, 2 ALB. L.J. 445, 449 (1870).
88. For a discussion of the significance of these editors, see SURRENCY, supra, at 192.
89. Another publication described this group as "illustrious." WOXLAND & OODEN, supra, at 48.
90. The American Law Review "earned⋯ a large measure of influence, and its value to lawyers as an organ worthy to represent them, can hardly be over-estimated." American Law Periodicals, supra, at 449.
91. Note, The Law of Bursting Reservoirs, supra note 58, at 646.
92. Against South Fork Club, JOHNSTOWN WKLY. DEMOCRAT, July 24, 1891, at 6.
93. Nathan Daniel Shappee, A History of Johnstown and the Great Flood of 1889: A Study of Disaster and Rehabilitation 412 (1940) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh), available at http://www.accesspadr.org/ u?/acacc-jtf,394.
94. A Flood Damage Suit, JOHNSTOWN TRTB., May 9,1894, at 1
95. Against the Fishing Club, JOHNSTOWN TRIB., NOV. 1,1893, at 1
96. see Shappee, supra note 63, at 413.
97. South Fork Club Suits, JOHNSTOWN WKLY. DEMOCRAT, May 18, 1894, at 3
98. The South Fork Cases, JOHNSTOWN TRB., Feb. 24, 1892, at 1
99. The South Fork Fishing & Hunting Club in Court, supra note 65, at 1
100. 22 A. 649 (Pa. 1891).
101. Robb v. Carnegie Bros., 145 Pa. 324, 336 (1891).
102. Robb, 22 A. at 650-51. The reversing judges were Clark, Green, and Paxson.
103. See SMULL'S LEGISLATIVE HAND BOOK OF PENNSYLVANIA 351 (Thomas B. Cochran ed., Harrisburg, E.K. Meyers 1887).
104. Robb, 22 A. at 650-51.
105. 23 A. 219 (Pa. 1892).
106. Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe-Line Co., 26 A. 644,645 (Pa. 1893)
107. see also Gavigan v. Atl. Ref. Co., 40 A. 834, 83S (Pa. 1898) (holding defendant strictly liable for damage caused by his oil and gasoline storage tanks).
108. Hauck, 26 A. at 645-46.
109. See Mulchanock v. Whitehall Cement Mfg., 98 A. 554,554 (Pa. 1916) (stone blasting)
110. Welsh v. Kerr Coal Co., 82 A. 495, 495 (Pa. 1912) (coal mining)
111. Vautier v. Atl. Ref. Co., 79 A. 814, 815 (Pa. 1911) (oil refining)
112. Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 57 A. 1065, 1068-69 (Pa. 1904) (steel manufacturing)
113. Keppel v. Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co., 50 A. 302, 302 (Pa. 1901) (coal mining)
114. Gavigan, 40 A. at 834-36
115. Commonwealth v. Russell, 33 A. 709,710 (Pa. 1896) (oil wells)
116. Robertson v. Youghiogheny River Coal Co., 33 A. 706, 706 (Pa. 1896) (coal mining)
117. Hindson v. Markle, 33 A. 74, 75-76 (Pa. 1895) (coal mining)
118. Good v. City of Altoona, 29 A. 741, 741-42 (Pa. 1894) (city sewage)
119. Evans v. Reading Chem. Fertilizing Co., 28 A. 702, 711 (Pa. 1894) (per curiam) (fertilizer manufacturing)
120. Green v. Sun Co., 32 Pa. Super. 521, 525 (1907) (oil refining)
121. Campbell v. Bessemer Coke Co., 23 Pa. Super. 374,380 (1903) (coke manufacturing).
122. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485-87 (1873).
123. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 444-51 (1873).
124. Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J.L. 339, 341 (1876), overruled by State Dept of Envtl.
125. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 157 (N.J. 1983).
126. Ball v. Nye, 99 Mass. 582 (1868).
127. These states are Illinois, Iowa, California, and Wisconsin. See infra app. A.
128. CAL. CONST, of 1879, art. VI, § 3.
129. G., B. & L. Ry. v. Eagles, 13 P. 696, 697-98 (Colo. 1887)
130. see Sylvester v. Jerome, 34 P. 760, 762 (Colo. 1893)
131. Larimer County Ditch Co. v. Zimmerman, 34 P. 1111,1112 (Colo. Ct. App. 1893).
132. Boynton v. Longley, 6 P. 437,439 (Nev. 1885).
133. See the graph at the end of this Article for the patterns of adoption. "Leaning" means that the state had adopted a very similar rule without relying on Rylands, or that it had relied on Rylands, but with some recognition that the case was controversial. Specifically, this Article categorizes Michigan, Nevada, Colorado, Alabama, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Utah as leaning towards Rylands in this era.
134. See infra app. A.
135. See infra app. A (graph of adoptions)
136. see also app. A (list of states).
137. See supra note 38.
138. I defined "leaning" as adopting a rule similar to Rylands (finding strict liability for an activity because it is "non-natural," "artificial," or a similar explanation) or generally approving of Rylands, despite a case or two rejecting it. States that vacillated between accepting and rejecting Rylands for a significant part of the relevant time period are categorized as wavering, but states that wavered by adopting Rylands after the Johnstown Flood are counted as "adopting" for the purposes of this historical study. Shugerman, Floodgates, supra note 13, at 334 n.9. If a state did not adopt Rylands or a similar rule, and if it did not reject Rylands, I categorized it as "silent" and counted it among the rejecting states-primarily because if the state had not adopted Rylands or a similar rule, it adhered to the negligence requirement, with perhaps the traditional, cabined exceptions for strict liability in cases of blasting, nuisance, respondeat superior, keeping wild animals, etc.
139. See Shugerman, supra note 17
140. A few states split on the validity of Rylands in the 1870s, but a wave of states from the mid-1880s to the early 1910s adopted Rylands: fifteen states and the District of Columbia solidly accepted Rylands; nine more leaned toward Rylands or its rule; five states wavered; and only three states consistently rejected it. See infra app. A.
141. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 52 (2000)
142. WHITE, supra note 37, at 51-52.
143. I searched for "tort" or "negligence" in these databases through the 1890s.
144. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 485-87 (1873).
145. Losee, 51 N.Y. at 485-87
146. Brown, 53 N.H. at 444-51.
147. Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453,460-65 (Pa. 1886).
148. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 1,18-19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
149. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED 177-78 (1975).
150. EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 101-35 (1944).
151. This list does not include Louisiana, which appointed its judges, but Louisiana's French-based civil law system makes it a unique case and outside the orbit of English common law. Louisiana had adopted a rule similar to Rylands in 1860, before the English courts decided Rylands itself. Hooper v. Wilkinson. 15 La. Ann. 497 (1860).
152. Gilson v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 26 A. 70,72 (Vt. 1892)
153. Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 20 S.E. 280,283 (S.C. 1894).
154. See infra note 338.
155. Gilson, 26 A. at 72.
156. Frosr, 20S.E. at 283.
157. See infra note 338.
158. King v. Hartung, 96 S.E. 202,203-04 (Va. 1918)
159. Worth v. Dunn, 118 A. 467, 470 (Conn. 1922).
160. Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Wellman, 70 S.W. 49, 50 (Ky. 1902)
161. Langer v. Goode, 131 N.W. 258, 259 (N.D. 1911)
162. Klepsch v. Donald, 30 P. 991,993 (Wash. 1892).
163. See infra note 329.
164. California, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania. See infra notes 307-10 and accompanying text. West Virginia was silent through 1900, and had adopted Rylands as of 1914. See infra note 336 and accompanying text.
165. Wisconsin, Missouri, Michigan, Dlihois, Colorado, Wyoming and Tennessee adopted. Kentucky rejected Rylands, and Arkansas and North Carolina were silent on Rylands; each of these three had eight-year terms, the shortest terms within this group. See infra app. A.
166. The Rylands adopters were: Minnesota, Nevada, Iowa, Alabama, Ohio, Oregon, Kansas, Utah (before 1900), plus Montana and Indiana by 1914. Washington, Texas, and North Dakota rejected, and Nebraska, South Dakota and Idaho were silent through 1914. See infra app. A.
167. Wisconsin, California, Maryland, New York, Pennsylvania, and Missouri. West 'Virginia was silent through 1900, and had adopted Rylands as of 1914. See infra app. A.
168. Wyoming, Michigan, Illinois, Colorado, and Tennessee adopted Rylands. Kentucky rejected it, and Arkansas and North Carolina were silent; each of these three had eight-year terms, the shortest terms within this group. See infra app. A.
169. See supra note 130.
170. Vermont, South Carolina, and New Jersey adopted. See infra app. A.
171. Massachusetts adopted. See infra note 339.
172. Interestingly, the tiny set of states with appointments to long terms (Massachusetts adopting and New Hampshire rejecting) was slightly more pro-Rylands than those states with short-term appointed judges, but this is a very small sample size.
173. See infra notes 208,226-37 and accompanying text.
174. 1 THE PHILADELPHIA PRESS ALMANAC FOR 1897, at 34 (Philadelphia, Press Co., Ltd., Publishers Philadelphia Press 1897).
175. WILLIAM W.H. DAVIS, 3 HISTORY OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 156-57 (Warren S. Ely & John W. Jordan eds., 2d ed. 1905), available at http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/pabucks/BIOS-DAVIS/edwardmpaxson.html.
176. Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 18 N.W. 764, 775 (Wis. 1884). See www.politicalgraveyard.com/geo/WI/ofc/spju.html for Taylor's term.
177. 10 P. 395,397-98 (Cal. 1886).
178. See ALDEN CHESTER, 3 COURTS AND LAWYERS OF NEW YORK A HISTORY, 1609-1925, at 1264 (1925).
179. Judge O'Brien had nine years left. Judge Bartlett had thirteen years left, and Judge Haight had just arrived on the Court of Appeals. Of the two dissenters. Judge Finch was retiring from the court that year and Judge Gray had eight years remaining. See THE JUDGES OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS: A BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY 205,241,247,263,269 (Albert M. Rosenblatt ed., 2007).
180. Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900, 901 (Md. 1890)
181. James McSherry, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Maryland State Bar Association: The Former Chief Judges of the Court of Appeals (1905) (transcript available at Maryland State Law Library), available at http:// marylandlegalhistory.net/megafile/msa/speccol/sc2900/sc2908/html/appeals.html.
182. Mathews v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 24 S.W. 591,598 (Mo. 1893)
183. see HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF MISSOURI 477 (A.J.D. Stewart ed., 1898).
184. In Minnesota, Judge Christopher G. Ripley, elected in 1869, had three years remaining on his term. See Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324, 334-37, 344-46 (1872)
185. Proceedings in Memory of Chief Justice Ripley, 67 Minn, xxiii (1881), available at http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/judges/memorials/Mem67Ripley.pdf. In Nevada, Thomas Porter Hawley had been reelected in 1884 and had five years remaining.
186. Nevada Dept of Cultural Affairs, State Library and Archives: The Nevada Supreme Court, http://nsla.nevadaculture.org/index.php?option=com- content&task=view&id=945&Itemid=418 (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). In Iowa, Judge William H. Seevers had two years remaining
187. See Phillips v. Waterhouse, 28 N.W. 539, 540 (Iowa 1886)
188. Iowa Judicial Branch, Iowa Courts History, http://www.iowacourts.gov/ wfdata/frame1773-1463/pressre121.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). In Alabama, Henderson Somerville had three years remaining.
189. See City of Eufaula v. Simmons, 6 So. 47, 48 (Ala. 1889)
190. Terence Finnegan, Lynching and Political Power in Mississippi and South Carolina, in UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 189, 215 n.5 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997)
191. J. Ed Livingston et al., A History of the Alabama Judicial System 3 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Alabama Unified Judicial System), available at http://judicial.alabama.gov/docs/judicial-history.pdf. In Ohio, William T. Spear had two years remaining.
192. See Columbus & Hocking Coal & Iron Co. v. Tucker, 26 N.E. 630,633 (Ohio 1891)
193. F.E. SCOBEY & B.L. MCELROY, THE BIOGRAPHICAL ANNALS OF OHIO, 1902-1903, at 645 (1903). In Oregon, Frank A. Moore had five years remaining.
194. See Esson v. Wattier, 34 P. 756, 757 (Or. 1893)
195. Oregon Blue Book: Supreme Court Justices of Oregon, http://bluebook. state.or.us/state/elections/elections27.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). In Kansas, Frank Doster had just been reelected, and had six years remaining on his term.
196. See Reinhart v. Sutton, 51 R 221, 222 (Kan. 1897)
197. Kansas Judicial Branch: History of the Kansas Supreme Court Justices, http://www.kscourts.org/kansas-courts/general-information/justice-listing.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). In Utah, Charles S. Zane had four years remaining.
198. See N. Point Consol. Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Co., 52 P. 168, 173 (Utah 1898)
199. Utah History To Go: Justice Charles S. Zane and the Antipolygamy "Crusade," http://historytogo.utah.gov/utah-chapters/statehood-and- the-Progressive-era/justicezaneandantipolygamy.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). In Montana, William L. Holloway had five years remaining.
200. See Longtin v. Persell 76 P. 699, 700 (Mont 1904)
201. 1989 JUDICIAL REPORT: MONTANA COURTS 50-51 (1990), available at http://courts.mt.gov/content/annual-reports/1989rpt.pdf. In Indiana, Douglas J. Morris had four years remaining.
202. See Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle, 98 N.E. 60, 62 (Ind. 1912)
203. Indiana Supreme Court Justice Biographies: Justice Douglas J. Morris, http://www.in.gov/judiciary/citc/justice-bios/morris.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010)
204. In Washington State, Theodore Stiles had two years left in his term. See Klepsch v. Donald, 30 P. 991, 993 (Wash. 1892)
205. EDMOND STEPHEN MEANY, HISTORY OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 366 (1910). In Texas, Frank Alvan Williams had five years remaining.
206. See Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Oakes, 58 S.W. 999, 1000-01 (Tex. 1900)
207. Tarlton Law Library, Justices of Texas 1836-1986-Frank Alvan Williams, http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/justices/spct/williams.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). In Kentucky, John Hobson had four years remaining.
208. See Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Wellman, 70 S.W. 49, 50 (Ky. 1902)
209. E. POLK JOHNSON, 2 A HISTORY OF KENTUCKY AND KENTUCHANS 718-19 (1912). In North Dakota, Alexander Burr was at the very end of his term.
210. See Langer v. Goode, 131 N.W. 258,259 (N.D. 1911)
211. North Dakota Supreme Court Justices: Alexander Burr, http://ndcourts.org/ court/bios/burr.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
212. In Michigan, James Campbell had six years remaining. See Boyd v. Conklin, 20 N.W. 595, 598 (Mich. 1884)
213. Michigan Supreme Court Historical Society: Biographies: James Campbell, http://www.micourthistory.org/bios.php?id=32 (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). In Illinois, Simeon Peter Shope had seven years remaining.
214. See Seacord v. People, 13 N.E. 194, 200 (HI. 1887)
215. The Third Branch-A Chronicle of the Illinois Supreme Court, http://www.state.il.us/court/supremecourt/justicearchive/Bio-Shope.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2010). In Colorado, Joseph Church Helm had five years remaining.
216. See G., B. & L. Ry. v. Eagles, 13 P. 696, 697-98 (Colo. 1887)
217. 3 HISTORY OF COLORADO 46-47 (1918). In Wyoming, Asbury B. Conaway had four-and-a-half years remaining.
218. See Clear Creek Land & Ditch Co. V. Kilkenny, 36 P. 819, 820 (Wyo. 1894)
219. Death List of the Day, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1897, at 7, available at. http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?-r=l&ores= 9501EEDA1039E433A2575AC0A9649D94669ED7CF. In Tennessee, John Summerfield Wilkes had two years remaining.
220. See Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Barnes, 60 S.W. 593, 600-4)1 (Tenn. 1900)
221. Tennessee Supreme Court Historical Society: Justices, http://planadmin.us/tschs/?q=node/11 (last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
222. Digging further into the Pennsylvania story is a challenge. Frank' Eastman's Courts and Lawyers of Pennsylvania records very slim paragraph summaries of the lives of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court justices, with little on the pre-judicial careers of the relevant justices. See 4 FRANK M. EASTMAN, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF PENNSYLVANIA (1922). The judges in the Pennsylvania cases have few remaining archival records, and whereas some state reporters printed memorials for deceased judges, I have not been able to locate memorials for these judges in the Pennsylvania Reports. I have not yet found obituaries for the judges or articles about these judges in the state's daily newspapers.
223. For a comprehensive table of adoptions, see HAYNES, supra note 117, at 99-135.
224. Between 1846 and 1860, twenty-one states revised their constitutions and nineteen adopted an elective judiciary. Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elective Judiciary, 1846-1860, 46 HISTORIAN 337, 337 (1983)
225. see also Shugennan, supra note 17.
226. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37, at 323
227. Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 190 (1993).
228. Renée Lettow Lemer, From Popular Control to Independence: Reform of the Elected Judiciary in Boss Tweed's New York, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 109, 116-18 (2007).
229. 3 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATB OF NEW YORK 2365 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1868).
230. Id.
231. Lerner, supra note 156, at 138.
232. 4 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA 486 (Harrisburg, Benjamin Singerly 1873).
233. See Mahlon H. Hellerich, The Origin of the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1873, 34 PENN. HIST. 158 (1967).
234. See 3 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION TO AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 174, at 637-779 (recording days eighty-seven through eighty-nine)
235. Along these lines, one delegate asserted that "if it was safe to elect judges in 18S0, when our elections were free and pure, it is not safe to elect them now, when, by common consent, popular elections have ceased to be
236. SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE'S COURTS: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (forthcoming).
237. Kermit L. Hall, Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 9 AM. BAR FOUND. RES. J. 345, 354-55 (1984).
238. Id. at 357. Turnout in off-year nonpresidential elections has been about 40% in recent years. See United States Elections Project: 2006 General Election Turnout Rates, http://elections.gniu.edu/Turnout-2006G.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2010)
239. United States Elections Project: 2002 General Election Turnout Rates, http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout-2002G.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
240. SMULL'S LEGISLATIVE HAND BOOK AND MANUAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA (1882-1902) (archived at Harvard University, Yale University, the University of Pennsylvania and the State Library of Pennsylvania in Harrisburg).
241. SMULL'S LEGISLATIVE HAND BOOK AND MANUAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 554 (Thos. B. Cochran ed., Harrisburg, Clarence M. Busch 1894)
242. SMULL'S LEGISLATIVE HAND BOOK AND MANUAL OF THE STATB OF PENNSYLVANIA 618-19 (Thos. B. Cochran ed., Harrisburg, Wm. Stanley Ray 1900).
243. Those five were the elections of 1880, 1887, 1888, 1892 and 1901. See SMULL'S LEGISLATIVE HAND BOOK AND MANUAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 271-72 (William P. Smull ed., Harrisburg, Lane S. Hart 1881) [hereinafter SMULL'S 1881]
244. "Switch in time" is a reference to the U.S. Supreme Court's reversals on the New Deal in 1937, as President Franklin Roosevelt threatened to "pack the court" with new appointments. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURO, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 132-44,177-79 (1995)
245. see also infra notes 226-37 and accompanying text
246. SMULL'S 1881, supra note 206, at 271-72.
247. SMULL'S 1883, supra note 207, at 693-94.
248. See infra notes 221-25 and accompanying text.
249. Proceedings of the Convention: Balloting for Supreme Judge, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 23, 1877, atl.
250. Wheels Within Wheels: Complicated Local Politics, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 22,1882, at 2.
251. The Convention, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 11,1882, at 1.
252. A Few of the Republican Leaders Discussing the Political Situation, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 1, 1882, at 2
253. Getting Interesting: A Ticklish Political Outlook, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 29, 1882, at 2
254. In Philadelphia: How the Nominations were Received-Expressions of Opinion, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 11,1882, at 1
255. The Independents: Their Approaching Convention, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 18,1882, at 2
256. The Work of the Convention, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 11, 1882, at 4
257. Young Republicans Indorsing the Regular Ticket, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 28, 1882, at 2.
258. The Political Field: Workers Active and Hopeful-A Greenback Labor Boom, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 17,1882, at 2.
259. Independent Judges: The Uprising of the People for a Free Bench, BALT. Sun, Oct 19, 1882, at 1.
260. SMULL'SLHHSLATIVB HAND BOOK AND MANUAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA (Lane S. Hart 1882).
261. JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 157, 281 n.22 (2004) (quoting First Round for Warner, N.Y. HERALD, June 12,1894).
262. Disgraceful Scene, ROCHESTER UNION & ADVERTISER, June 12,1894.
263. WITT, supra note 223, at 158,281 n.23 (quoting Seventh Judicial District, N.Y. TIMES, Sept 15,1894).
264. Unfortunately the Clark House has no records, letters, or other papers of Justice Qark. The Historical and Genealogical Society of Indiana County, Pennsylvania, About the Qark House, http://wwwjootsweb.ancestry.com/ ̃paicgs/clarkhouse.shtml (last visited Mar. 20,2010).
265. Id.
266. see also 2 FRANK EASTMAN, COURT AND LAWYERS OF PENNSYLVANIA 515 (1922).
267. EASTMAN, supra note 227, at 515.
268. Letter from Edward M. Paxson, Assoc. Justice on the Pa. Supreme Court, to James T. Mitchell, Assoc. Law Judge of the First Dist. (Oct. 17, 1887) (on file with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Collection of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania).
269. See SMULL'S 1888, supra note 206, at 401-02.
270. Letter from Edward M. Paxson, Assoc. Justice on the Pa. Supreme Court, to James T. Mitchell, Assoc. Law Judge of the First Dist (Apr. 25, 1888) (on file with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Collection of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania).
271. see also Davis, supra note 140, at 156-157.
272. See HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF PA., 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONTEMPORARY BIOGRAPHY OF PENNSYLVANIA (Bethlehem, Historical Society of Pa. 1868), available at http://search.ancestry.com/cgi-bin/sse.dll?db=pabio&recid=421.
273. Edward Paxson, Chief Justice of the Pa. Supreme Court, retired, Address Delivered Before die New Jersey Bar Association in Atlantic City (June 16,1900) (transcript available in die Edward Paxson file of die Pennsylvania Supreme Court collection of die Historical Society of Pennsylvania).
274. See, e.g., A Strong Ticket for Republicans, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 21, 1892, at 1-2
275. Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, J.L. ECON. & ORG. (advance access publication, Nov. 8,2008), available at http://jleo.oxfordjouroals.org/cgi/reprint/ewn023vl.
276. See Kermit L. Hall, Constitutional Machinery and Judicial Professionalism: The Careers of Midwestern State Appellate Court Judges, 1861-1899, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS 29, 42 (Gerald W. Gawalted., 1984).
277. Kermit L. Hall, The "Route to Hell" Retraced: The Impact of Popular Election on the Southern Appellate Judiciary, 1832-1920, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 229 (David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984).
278. See generally CHESTER, supra note 143
279. See EDWARD QUINTON KEASBEY, 2 THE COURTS AND LAWYERS OF NEW JERSEY, 1661-1912 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1912). Henry Woodhull Green had been elected town recorder of Trenton. Id at 710. Edward W. Whelpley had been elected to the state assembly. Id at 722. Oliver Halsted was elected a state assemblyman, Newark city recorder, mayor, and state constitutional convention delegage. Id. at 727. Benjamin Williamson had not held elected office. Id at 731-36. Abraham O. Zabriskie was elected to state senate. Id. at 738. Mercer Beasley was elected city solicitor and president of city council, and later ran for mayor and assembly but lost Id. at 746. Theodore Runyan was elected mayor of Newark, then ran for governor but lost Id. at 759. Alexander T. McGill was elected to assembly. Id. at 763. William Magie was elected to the state senate. Id. at 767.
280. Election of Judges, 8 AM. L.J. 481,485-86 (1849).
281. SAMUEL MEDARY, THE NEW CONSTITUTION 225,236,238,316 (Columbus, S. Medary 1849).
282. JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 353-54 (1906).
283. See SIMEON E. BALDWIN, THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 101 (1905).
284. COVER, supra note 116, at 229-32.
285. see also Lawrence Lessig, What Everybody Knows and What Too Few Accept, 123 HARV. L. REV. 104,113 (2009) (judging requires "fidelity to role").
286. REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 1846, at 651 (Albany, Office of the Evening Atlas 1846) (statement of Mr. W.B. Wright)
287. see also 1 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1850-51, at 585-638 (Columbus, Medary 1851).
288. 2 CONSTITUTIONAL SERIES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, at 461-62 (Arthur Charles Cole ed., 1919) (statement of Mr. Davis).
289. 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO, 1850-51, supra note 260, at 217 (statement of Mr. Taylor).
290. 2 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVENTION, ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, To REVISE AND AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 700 (Boston, White & Potter 1853). Conventions in New York, 'Virginia, Maryland, Illinois, and Indiana offered similar arguments. See Shugerman, supra note 17.
291. See supra section III.A.
292. See Biddle, supra note 16, at 68.
293. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 60-61, 122-23 (1960) (describing situation-sense and how the felt duty of judges works through the-facts of a given case).
294. See generally GROSS ET AL., EXPLORATIONS IN ROLE ANALYSIS (1958)
295. Gullahorn & Gullahom, supra note 16 (discussing types of role conflict in terms of social status and social role and presenting methods of conflict resolution)
296. Jackson Toby, Some Variables in Role Conflict Analysis, 30 Soc. FORCES 323 (1951-52) (describing institutionalized mechanisms, including hierarchies of role obligations, that serve to limit the disruption of role conflicts).
297. Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 238.
298. See supra section III.B.
299. See supra section I.B.
300. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 1 cmt. (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/libraty/codeOfConduct/Code-Effective-July-01-09.pdf.
301. See William J. Nancarrow, Vox Populi: Democracy and the Progressive Era Judiciary, 1890-1916 (Jan. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College).
302. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Sunstein & Kuran, supra note 15
304. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 15.
305. See LAWS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA (Harrisburg, Edwin K. Meyers 1891).
306. PA. CONST, of 1874, art. II, § 3.
307. 22 A. 649 (Pa. 1891)
308. see supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
309. supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
310. See Eric Helland & Alex Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 341, 368 (2002).
311. See generally WITT, supra note 223 (examining developments in tort law spurred by post-Civil War industrialism).
312. See 1 THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE §§ 106-08 (6th ed. 1913) (listing thirty-nine states in which the burden of proof is on the defendant, as against eight states where the burden of proof is on the plaintiff).
313. See KARSTEN, supra note 14, at 108-27 (describing the application of assumption of the risk in America and the exceptions and relaxations of the rule that courts employed).
314. See generally DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR: THE WORKPLACE, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN LABOR ACTIVISM, 1865-1925 (1987) (providing a history of labor organization and activism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries)
315. ELIZABETH SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1877-1917 (1999) (describing the agrarian movement and the political power of fanners and workers in the half century prior to World War I).
316. Ernest F. Hollings, Stop the Money Chase, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2006, at B7.
317. See David Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism (Feb. 23, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
318. See Pozen, supra note 4
319. see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 770, 788 (2002) (holding unconstitutional the announce clause in Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibited judicial candidates from "announcing] ⋯ views on disputed legal or political issues")
320. See, e.g., DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL, supra note 8
321. RUNNING FOR JUDGE, supra note 1
322. Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Tilting the Scales: The Ohio Experience
323. Campaign Cash Mirrors High Court Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 1,2006
324. Dorothy Samuels, Justice for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006.
325. 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
326. Brief of Justice at Stake, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (No. 08-22).
327. Press Release, Justice at Stake, 2008 Supreme Court Elections: More Money, More Nastiness (Nov. 8, 2008), available at http://wwwjusticeatstake.org/ newsroom/press-release.cfm/2008-supreme-court-elections-more-money-more- nastiness?show=news&newsID=5680.
328. See F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431,439-40,452 (2004).
329. This paper is part of a dissertation that examines the rise of judicial elections in America, and concludes that some form of life tenure or long terms is crucial for restoring judicial independence in state courts. In A Six-Three Rule, I argued that the Supreme Court should adopt a consensus rule- specifically a two-thirds supermajority rule-in order to overturn federal legislation. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV. 893 (2003). This rule would serve to check judicial independence gone wild. There is no inconsistency between these two positions. Each individual judge should be protected from political pressure and the appearance of political pressure, but in order to balance that unique degree of power, judges should also be constrained by specific voting rules and norms of consensus and deference when checking the democratic process.
330. Atkinson v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 18 N.W. 764, 775 (Wis. 1884).
331. Colton v. Onderdonk, 10 P. 395, 397-98 (Cal. 1886).
332. Baltimore Breweries' Co. v. Ranstead, 28 A. 273, 274 (Md. 1894)
333. Susquehanna Fertilizer Co. v. Malone, 20 A. 900, 900-01 (Md. 1890).
334. Deigleman v. N.Y, L. & W. Ry. Co. 12 N.Y.S. 83 (Sup. Ct 1890)
335. Schmeer v. Gaslight Co. of Syracuse, 42 N.E. 202, 205 (N.Y. 1895)
336. Davis v. Niagara Falls Tower Co., 64 N.E. 4, 5 (N.Y. 1902)
337. Duerr v. Consol. Gas Co. of N.Y, 83 N.Y.S. 714, 717-18 (App. Div. 1903).
338. Hauck v. Tide Water Pipe-Line Co., 26 A. 644, 645 (Pa. 1893)
339. Lentz v. Carnegie Bros., 23 A. 219,220 (Pa. 1892)
340. Robb v. Carnegie Bros., 22 A. 649,650-51 (Pa. 1891).
341. Mathews v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 24 S.W. 591, 598-99 (Mo. 1893)
342. see also French v. Ctr. Creek Powder Mfg., 158 S.W. 723,725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1913).
343. Weaver Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond, 70 S.E. 126,128-29 (W. Va. 1911) (adopting Rylands and noting its adoption by Minnesota and Massachusetts).
344. Contra Vieth v. Hope Salt & Coal Co., 41 S.E. 187, 188-90 (W.Va. 1902).
345. Seacord v. People, 13 N.E. 194,200 (111. 1887)
346. Chi. & N.W. Ry. v. Hunerberg, 16 m. App. 387, 390-91 (1885).
347. G., B. & L. Ry. v. Eagles, 13 P. 696, 697-98 (Colo. 1887)
348. see Sylvester v. Jerome, 34 P. 760, 762 (Colo. 1893)
349. Larimer County Ditch Co. v. Zimmerman, 34 P. 1111,1112 (Colo. Ct. App. 1893).
350. Drake v. Lady Ensley Coal Co., 14 So. 749,751 (Ala. 1894)
351. City of Eufaula v. Simmons, 6 So. 47,48 (Ala. 1889).
352. Defiance Water Co. v. Olinger, 44 N.E. 238, 239-40 (Ohio 1896)
353. Columbus & Hocking Coal & Iron Co. v. Tucker, 26 N.E. 630,633 (Ohio 1891).
354. Esson v. Wattier, 34 P. 756,757 (Or. 1893).
355. Clear Creek Land & Ditch Co. v. Kilkenny, 36 P. 819,820 (Wyo. 1894).
356. N. Point Consol. Irrigation Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co., 52 P. 168,173 (Utah 1898).
357. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658,664 (Tenn. 1904)
358. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Barnes, 60 S.W. 593,600-01 (Tenn. 1900).
359. Longtin v. Persell, 76 P. 699, 700-01 (Mont. 1904).
360. Niagara Oil Co. v. Ogle, 98 N.E. 60,62 (Ind. 1912)
361. Niagara Oil Co. v. Jackson, 91 N.E. 825, 826-27 (Ind. App. 1910). Contra Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Chi., Lake Shore & S. Bend Ry., 97 N.E. 20, 21 (Ind. App. 1912) (recognizing that American law holds unnatural users liable only for negligence)
362. Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Chi., Lake Shore & S. Bend Ry., 92 N.E. 989, 991-92 (Ind. App. 1910) (same). The Indiana Supreme Court resolved this controversy in 1912 by adopting strict liability in Ogle. 98 N.E. at 62.
363. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. v. Oakes, 58 S.W. 999, 1000-01 (Tex. 1900)
364. Barnes v. Zettle-moyer, 62 S.W. Ill, 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901). For pto-Rylands decisions by lower courts
365. see Texas & Pacific Railway v. O'Mahoney, 50 S.W. 1049, 1052 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899)
366. Texas & Pacific Railway v. O'Mahoney, 60 S.W. 902, 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900)
367. and Texas & Pacific Railway v. Frazer, 182 S.W. 1161,1161-62 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916).
368. Triple-State Natural Gas & Oil Co. v. Wellman, 70 S.W. 49,50 (Ky. 1902).
369. Nebraska adopted Rylands in 1919. Barnum v. Handschiegel. 173 N.W. 593,594 (Neb. 1919).
370. Burt v. Farmers' Co-operative Irrigation Co., 168 P. 1078,1082-83 (Idaho 1917).
371. Virginia adopted Rylands in 1918, after the relevant time period of the study of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era (1876-1914).
372. Gilson v. Del. & Hudson Canal Co., 26 A. 70,72 (Vt. 1892).
373. Frost v. Berkeley Phosphate Co., 20 S.E. 280,283 (S.C. 1894).
374. Grey v. Mayor of Paterson, 42 A. 749,752 (N.I. Ch. 1899)
375. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co., 41 A. 1117,1117 (NJ. 1896)
376. Beach v. Sterling Iron & Zinc Co., 33 A. 286,289-90 (NJ. Ch. 1895).
377. 47 Ga. 260,266 (1872).
378. Holman v. Athens Empire Laundry Co., 100 S.E. 207,210 (Ga. 1919).