The reflective epistemic renegade

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Volumn 81, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 419-463

  Frances, Bryan ^a  

^a FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77957911426     PISSN: 00318205     EISSN: 19331592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00372.x     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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3. Elga, Adam. 2007. "Reflection and Disagreement." Noû s 41: 478-502.
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5. Feldman, Richard. 2006. "Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement." In Epistemology Futures, edited by Stephen Hetherington. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
6. Frances, Bryan. Forthcoming. "Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors" International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
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11. Frances, Bryan. 2005b. "When a Skeptical Hypothesis is Live." Noû s 39: 559-95.
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13. Kelly, Thomas. 2006. "The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement." In Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1, edited by John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler Szabo. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
14. Lackey, Jennifer. Forthcoming A. "A Justificationist View of Disagreement's Epistemic Significance," in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15. Lackey, Jennifer. Forthcoming B. "What Should We Do When We Disagree?" in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology, v. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16. Rosen, Gideon and Dorr, Cian. 2002. "Composition as Fiction." In The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, edited by Richard M. Gale. Oxford: Blackwell.
17. Sider, Theodore and Braun, David. 2007. "Vague, So Untrue." Noûs 41: 133-156.
18. van Inwagen, Peter. 1996. "Is It Wrong, Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe Anything on Insufficient Evidence?" In Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, edited by Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
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