Securitization and distressed loan renegotiation: Evidence from the subprime mortgage crisis

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 97, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 369-397

  Piskorski, Tomasz ^a   Seru, Amit ^b   Vig, Vikrant ^c  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^c LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Crisis; Defaults; G01; G21; G32; Incentives; Renegotiation; Securitization

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953808357     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.04.003     Document Type: Article

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