A limited defense of moral perception

Philosophical Studies

Volumn 149, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 305-320

  McBrayer, Justin P ^a  

^a FORT LEWIS COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Moral knowledge; Moral perception; Moral realism; Representation

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953711467     PISSN: 00318116     EISSN: 15730883     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-009-9363-0     Document Type: Article

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