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Volumn 33, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 229-258

Reidian moral perception

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EID: 60949396072     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2003.10716542     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (23)

References (15)
  • 2
    • 0003292160 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory
    • W. Sinnott-Armstrong and M. Timmons, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press
    • Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, 'Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory,' in Moral Knowledge? W. Sinnott-Armstrong and M. Timmons, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996)
    • (1996) Moral Knowledge?
    • Sayre-Mccord, G.1
  • 3
    • 0242270485 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Boulder, CO: Westview
    • and Stephen Darwall, Philosophical Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview 1998) - although none of Darwall, Sayre-McCord, or McGinn endorses the argument
    • (1998) Philosophical Ethics
    • Darwall, S.1
  • 4
    • 79953594490 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Nicholas Wolterstorff's recent treatment of Reid in Nicholas Wolterstorff
    • I borrow the terminology from Nicholas Wolterstorff's recent treatment of Reid in Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), chs. 5 and 6
    • (2001) Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology
  • 7
    • 85038680904 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • See, also, EIP II.v: 96
    • , vol.96
    • Eip, I.I.1
  • 8
    • 85038754457 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reid himself appears to operate with a similar distinction. Some instances of what Reid calls having a 'relative' conception of a thing overlap with what Wolterstorff calls 'conceptual apprehension'; and some instances of what Reid calls having a 'direct' conception of a thing overlap with what Wolterstorff calls 'acquaintance.' See EAP Li: 5-10
    • Li, E.A.P.1
  • 9
    • 79953567025 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Ethical Naturalism and the Explanatory Power of Moral Concepts
    • Oxford: Oxford University Press
    • See Robert Audi, 'Ethical Naturalism and the Explanatory Power of Moral Concepts,' in his Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), 120-2
    • (1997) Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character , pp. 120-122
    • Audi, R.1
  • 10
    • 0004206765 scopus 로고
    • Oxford: Blackwell
    • Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell 1993), 115
    • (1993) Moral Reasons , pp. 115
    • Dancy, J.1
  • 12
    • 85038752369 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • also, I.iii.viii: 258
    • See, also, EAP III.iii.viii: 258
    • Eap, I.I.1
  • 13
    • 42449165050 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • I myself defend a more nearly Humean view in Terence Cuneo, 'Reconciling Realism with Humeanism,' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002) 465-86
    • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
  • 14
    • 0004312818 scopus 로고
    • See David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell 1988), chs. 3 and 7. One apparent difference between Reid's view and McNaughton's is that the latter appears to claim that there is a necessary conceptual connection between moral belief and motivation. Reid's considered view, however, seems to be that the connection is one effected by the proper functioning of our constitution. If this is right, Reid's view is only weakly internalist (or weakly externalist, depending on the typology used)
    • (1988) Moral Vision
    • McNaughton, D.1
  • 15
    • 84927973054 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reid's Moral Philosophy
    • For a defense of this interpretation of Reid, see Terence Cuneo, 'Reid's Moral Philosophy,' in The Cambridge Companion to Reid, T. Cuneo and R. van Woudenberg, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004)
    • (2004) The Cambridge Companion to Reid
    • Cuneo, T.1


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