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2
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0003292160
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Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory
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W. Sinnott-Armstrong and M. Timmons, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press
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Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, 'Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory,' in Moral Knowledge? W. Sinnott-Armstrong and M. Timmons, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996)
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(1996)
Moral Knowledge?
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Sayre-Mccord, G.1
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3
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0242270485
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Boulder, CO: Westview
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and Stephen Darwall, Philosophical Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview 1998) - although none of Darwall, Sayre-McCord, or McGinn endorses the argument
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(1998)
Philosophical Ethics
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Darwall, S.1
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4
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79953594490
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Nicholas Wolterstorff's recent treatment of Reid in Nicholas Wolterstorff
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I borrow the terminology from Nicholas Wolterstorff's recent treatment of Reid in Nicholas Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001), chs. 5 and 6
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(2001)
Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology
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7
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85038680904
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See, also, EIP II.v: 96
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, vol.96
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Eip, I.I.1
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8
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85038754457
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Reid himself appears to operate with a similar distinction. Some instances of what Reid calls having a 'relative' conception of a thing overlap with what Wolterstorff calls 'conceptual apprehension'; and some instances of what Reid calls having a 'direct' conception of a thing overlap with what Wolterstorff calls 'acquaintance.' See EAP Li: 5-10
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Li, E.A.P.1
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9
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79953567025
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Ethical Naturalism and the Explanatory Power of Moral Concepts
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Oxford: Oxford University Press
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See Robert Audi, 'Ethical Naturalism and the Explanatory Power of Moral Concepts,' in his Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), 120-2
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(1997)
Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character
, pp. 120-122
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Audi, R.1
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10
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0004206765
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Oxford: Blackwell
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Jonathan Dancy, Moral Reasons (Oxford: Blackwell 1993), 115
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(1993)
Moral Reasons
, pp. 115
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Dancy, J.1
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12
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85038752369
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also, I.iii.viii: 258
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See, also, EAP III.iii.viii: 258
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Eap, I.I.1
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13
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42449165050
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I myself defend a more nearly Humean view in Terence Cuneo, 'Reconciling Realism with Humeanism,' Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2002) 465-86
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Australasian Journal of Philosophy
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14
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0004312818
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See David McNaughton, Moral Vision (Oxford: Blackwell 1988), chs. 3 and 7. One apparent difference between Reid's view and McNaughton's is that the latter appears to claim that there is a necessary conceptual connection between moral belief and motivation. Reid's considered view, however, seems to be that the connection is one effected by the proper functioning of our constitution. If this is right, Reid's view is only weakly internalist (or weakly externalist, depending on the typology used)
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(1988)
Moral Vision
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McNaughton, D.1
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15
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84927973054
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Reid's Moral Philosophy
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For a defense of this interpretation of Reid, see Terence Cuneo, 'Reid's Moral Philosophy,' in The Cambridge Companion to Reid, T. Cuneo and R. van Woudenberg, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2004)
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(2004)
The Cambridge Companion to Reid
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Cuneo, T.1
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