Determinants of the decision to appeal against motor bodily injury judgements made by Spanish trial courts

International Review of Law and Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 37-45

  Santolino, Miguel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Legislative compensation system; Litigation; Multinomial logit; Traffic accidents

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953683457     PISSN: 01448188     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2009.09.002     Document Type: Article

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