Minimal sense of self, temporality and the brain

Psyche

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 59-74

  Kiverstein, Julian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77953125152     PISSN: None     EISSN: 1039723X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (44)

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