Strategic use of environmental information

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 207-216

  Asheim, Geir B ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

Author keywords

Environmental regulation; Hard information; Moral motivation; Voluntary contributions

Indexed keywords

DECISION MAKING; MOTIVATION;

DECISION MAKERS; ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS; ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY; ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION; HARD INFORMATION; MORAL MOTIVATION; VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS;

ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS;

DECISION MAKING; ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; MORALITY; STATE ROLE; STRATEGIC APPROACH; VOLUNTARY APPROACH;

EID: 77953081630     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9353-x     Document Type: Article

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