Mechanisms for multi-unit auctions

Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research

Volumn 37, Issue , 2010, Pages 85-98

  Dobzinski, Shahar ^a   Nisan, Noam ^b  

^a School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION SCHEME; BLACK BOXES; MULTI-UNIT AUCTION; NP-HARD; POLYNOMIAL TIME APPROXIMATION SCHEMES; POLYNOMIAL-TIME;

COMMERCE;

POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

EID: 77952689827     PISSN: None     EISSN: 10769757     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1613/jair.2950     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Blumrosen, L., & Dobzinski, S. (2007). Welfare maximization in congestion games. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 25 (6), 1224-1236.
2. Briest, P., Krysta, P., & Vocking, B. (2005). Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. In STOC, pp. 39-48.
3. Dobzinski, S., & Nisan, N. (2007). Limitations of vcg-based mechanisms. In STOC, pp. 338-344.
4. Dobzinski, S., Nisan, N., & Schapira, M. (2005). Approximation algorithms for combinato- rial auctions with complement-free bidders. In STOC, pp. 610-618.
5. Holzman, R., Kfir-Dahav, N., Monderer, D., & Tennenholtz, M. (2004). Bundling equilib- rium in combinatrial auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 47, 104-123.
6. Kothari, A., Parkes, D. C., & Suri, S. (2005). Approximately- strategyproof and tractable multi-unit auctions. Decision Support Systems, 39, 105-121. Special issue dedicated to the Fourth ACMConference on Electronic Commerce.
7. Lavi, R., Mu'alem, A., & Nisan, N. (2003). Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions. In The 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS).
8. Lavi, R., & Swamy, C. (2005). Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming. In FOCS, pp. 595-604.
9. Mu'alem, A., & Nisan, N. (2002). Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. In AAAI-02.
10. Nisan, N. (2006). In P. Cramton and Y. Shoham and R. Steinberg (Editors), Combinatorial Auctions. Chapter 1. Bidding Languages. MIT Press.
11. Nisan, N., & Ronen, A. (2007). Computationally feasible vcg mechanisms. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR), 29, 19-47.
12. Nisan, N., & Segal, I. (2006). The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices.. Journal of Economic Theory.
13. Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. Journal of Finance, 8-37.