Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority

German Law Journal

Volumn 9, Issue 11, 2008, Pages 1865-1908

  Goldmann, Matthias ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW   (Germany)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77952572653     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20718322     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S2071832200000687     Document Type: Article

References (119)

1. 1 I use the term “binding” instrument as a heuristic category, defined as those instruments which can be ascribed to one of the traditional sources of international law stipulated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ. On the difficulties related to the distinction between binding and non-binding norms, see Part E.
2. 2 World Bank loan or financing agreements, see Philipp Dann, Accountability in Development Aid Law: The World Bank, UNDP and Emerging Structures of Transnational Oversight, 44 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 381 (2006).
3. 3 Amendments to CITES Annexes, see Fuchs, in this issue; and to the WCO Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, see Feichtner, in this issue.
4. 4 Listings of terror suspects by the UN Security Council Taliban and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, see Feinäugle, in this issue; Conferral of world heritage status by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, see Zacharias, in this issue; Waivers for WTO members for implementing changes in the Harmonized System, see Feichtner, in this issue; decisions by the Enforcement Branch of the Compliance Committee
5. 5 International trademark registrations, see Kaiser, in this issue.
6. for the Emission Trading System on, e.g., the reduction of emission rights due to past non-compliance, see Láncos, in this issue.
7. 6 The “HS Procedure” for adapting WTO scales of concessions to changes in the WCO Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, see Feichtner, in this issue; the accounting rules for the administration of ETS allowances, see Láncos, in this issue; and the Operational Guidelines of the World Heritage Committee, see Zacharias, in this issue.
8. 7 The term “non-binding legal instrument”, which I use in a strictly heuristic sense, is not an oxymoron. Rather, it is based on a relative concept of law which comprises both binding law and non-binding law, see, infra, Part B.I. On the problems related to a conceptual distinction between binding and non-binding law see, infra, Part E.
9. 8 Refugee Status Determination by UNHCR, see Smrkolj, in this issue; ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, see de Wet, Governance Through Promotion and Persuasion, in this issue; general and country-specific recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, see Farahat, in this issue.
10. 9 Codex Alimentarius, see Pereira, in this issue; FAO Codes of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, see Friedrich, in this issue; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, see Schuler, in this issue.
11. 10 Interpol notices, see Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue.
12. 11 Proceedings before National Contact Points in case of complaints for violations of the OECD Guidelines for MNEs, see Schuler, in this issue; country visits and confidential follow-up reports by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, see Farahat, in this issue; as well as the HS Procedure, see (note 6).
13. 12 Decision letters concerning ICHEIC insurance claims, see Less, in this issue.
14. 14 Risk assessment reports containing scientific information for risk management within the Codex Alimentarius Commission, see Pereira, in this issue; reports assessing eligibility for the Emission Trading System, see Láncos, in this issue.
15. 15 Armin von Bogdandy & Matthias Goldmann, The Exercise of International Public Authority through National Policy Assessment. The OECD’s PISA Policy as a Paradigm for a New International Standard Instrument, 5 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2008).
16. 16 Many examples are mentioned in the thematic studies. See, for example, the review mechanism in the Committee on Trade in Financial Services installed on the basis of China’s Accession Protocol to the WTO, see Windsor, in this issue.
17. 17 In the context of Interpol, see Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue.
18. 18 On the concept of public authority, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.
19. 19 This is what distinguishes this project from research on compliance. See ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS (2008); COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997). For a critical viewpoint, see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
20. 20 See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 421 (2000); Charles Lipson, Why are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 495 (1991).
21. 21 On this agenda, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue, part B.II.
22. 24 By “our approach,” I mean the concept set out in von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue. It goes with out saying that not all aspects of this approach are shared by all participants in the project.
23. 25 “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe blind.” (Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind): IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIK DER REINEN VERNUNFT 75 (2nd ed., 1787).
24. 27 The term “secondary” does not allude to HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (1961), but to the concept of secondary, or delegated, legislation as used in the context of EU law. See also JURIJ ASTON, SEKUNDÄRGESETZGEBUNG INTERNATIONALER ORGANISATIONEN ZWISCHEN MITGLIEDSTAATLICHER SOUVERÄNITÄT UND GEMEINSCHAFTSDISZIPLIN (2005).
25. 28 Changes to CITES appendixes, see Fuchs, in this issue; modifications of the Harmonized System, see Feichtner, in this issue.
26. 30 In this article, “soft law” is used in reference to the bindingness, and not to the degree of textual precision of an instrument.
27. 32 Kerstin Martens & Klaus D. Wolf, Paradoxien der Neuen Staatsräson. Die Internationalisierung der Bildungspolitik in der EU und der OECD, 13 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALE BEZIEHUNGEN 145 (2006); Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 167 (1999-2000).
28. 33 Illustrative is the ECJ Case 322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407.
29. 35 For many others, see Joseph H. H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law - Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT (ZAÖRV) 547 (2004).
30. 36 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, DIE POSTNATIONALE KONSTELLATION (2003).
31. 37 See Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (AJIL) 413 (1983).
32. 38 On the difficulty to distinguish external from internal views, see Klaus Günther, Legal Pluralism or Uniform Concept of Law? 5 NO FOUNDATIONS. JOURNAL OF EXTREME LEGAL POSITIVISM 5 (2008). On the internal perspective of this project, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.
33. 40 On this distinction, see Dinah Shelton, International Law and ‘Relative Normativity’, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 145, 167-8 (Malcolm Evans ed., 2003); Anne Peters & Isabella Pagotto, Soft Law as a New Mode of Governance: A Legal Perspective, New Modes of Governance Project, Paper No. 04/D11, 6 (2006).
34. 43 Jean d’Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials, 19 EJIL (2008), issue 5, on file with the author.
35. 44 Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 787 (1986); Michael Bothe, Legal and Non-legal Norms - A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?, 11 NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 65, 95 (1980); WOLFGANG HEUSEL, "WEICHES" VÖLKERRECHT. EINE VERGLEICHENDE UNTERSUCHUNG TYPISCHER ERSCHEINUNGSFORMEN 47 (1991).
36. 47 Theorists like Austin, Kelsen, Hart, and Luhmann generally follow an absolute approach.
37. 48 See the strictly horizontal view of the international legal order in Weil (note 37), at 417-9. Further, the distinction between legal acts and legal facts is based on a voluntaristic concept of law, see d’Aspremont (note 43), at 4.
38. 50 Insofar I agree with Oscar Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AJIL 296, 301 (1977).
39. 51 Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative Normativity in International Law, 4 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (EJIL) 305, 325 (1993).
40. 53 This is particularly the case of financial regulations which are usually made by developed states.
41. 54 See Part A. For further examples of effective governance through alternative instruments, see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 217 et seq. (2005). For the literature about compliance with alternative instruments, see (note 20).
42. 55 Ravi Afonso Pereira, in this issue; Gefion Schuler, in this issue.
43. 57 In addition, it is difficult to conceptualize the agreement or promise contained in such instruments in other normative orders like politics or morals, see JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (1996).
44. 58 On this purpose of public law, see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.
45. 59 GODEFRIDUS VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983). Those points of recognition comprise abstract statements (declarations etc. which indicate a state’s conviction to be bound), travaux préparatoires, characteristics of the text of an instrument (e.g. language employed, name and preamble of a document), follow-up mechanisms and subsequent practice. Id. at 215-279.
46. 60 Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1823, 1878 et seq. (2002).
47. 61 According to LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-91 (1964), legal norms (as opposed to moral norms) require generality; promulgation; limited retroactivity; clarity; absence of contradictions; not requiring the impossible; constancy through time; and congruence between official action and declared rule.
48. 62 Jutta Brunnée, Reweaving the Fabric of International Law? Patterns of Consent in Environmental Framework Agreements, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 101 Rüdiger Wolfrum &
49. Volker Röben eds., 2005); Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law. Fuller’s Procedural Natural Law, 5 NO FOUNDATIONS. JOURNAL OF EXTREME LEGAL POSITIVISM 84, 91 (2008).
50. 65 On these aims see von Bogdandy, Dann & Goldmann, in this issue.
51. 67 Similar Peters & Pagotto (note 40), at 9; Christian Tietje, Recht ohne Rechtsquellen?, 24 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 27 (2003).
52. 68 KARL POPPER, DIE BEIDEN GRUNDPROBLEME DER ERKENNTNISTHEORIE 368 (2nd ed., Troels Eggers Hansen ed., 1994); HANS ALBERT, TRAKTAT ÜBER KRITISCHE VERNUNFT 35-44 (5th ed., 1991).
53. 69 My main point of disagreement with proponents of absolute concepts like d’Aspremont (note 43) therefore seems to be a different idea of the purpose of the concept of law, which I see not only as a means of coordination, but as constitutive of an international public order.
54. 70 On soft law as a self-contained regime, see Hartmut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EJIL 499 (1999). The concept of self-contained regime should be used mutatis mutandi, as it usually refers to regimes falling under the sources doctrine.
55. 72 For the distinction between external and internal approaches, see HART (note 27), at 88-90.
56. 75 GUNTHER TEUBNER & ANDREAS FISCHER-LESCANO, REGIME-KOLLISIONEN 43 (2006).
57. 76 Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, in 82 RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 162 et seq. (1953); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 181 (1996).
58. 78 The rule of identification is constituted by formal criteria only and designed for an internal standpoint. I therefore refrain from using the term rule of recognition, which Hart uses for the analysis of the law from an external perspective.
59. 79 On the concept of a pluriverse of internal constitutional principles see von Bogdandy, General Principles, in this issue.
60. 80 On Germany and Italy, see von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 15).
61. 81 Jürgen Bast, Legal Instruments, in PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 373 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2006).
62. 82 Comprehensively HENRY SCHERMERS & NIELS BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW, sec. 1196 et seq. (4th ed., 2003).
63. 83 René Jean Dupuy, Declaratory Law and Programmatory Law: From Revolutionary Custom to "Soft Law", in DECLARATIONS ON PRINCIPLES 247 (Robert Akkerman, Peter van Krieken und Charles Pannenborg eds., 1977). Similarly, see Hiram E. Chodosh, Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law, 26 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 87 (1991). However, both authors include external and internal parameters in the proposed rules of identification.
64. 85 Hellen Keller, Codes of Conduct and their Implementation: The Question of Legitiamcy, in LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2008).
65. 87 Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law. Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN Document A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, 100.
66. 88 See von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 15), at part IV.A.3.
67. 90 This is the position of positivist mainstream in an Austinian or Kelsenian tradition, but also that of non-constructivist rational choice accounts such as GOLDSMITH & POSNER (note 19).
68. 91 This is the main argument in rationalist-constructivist accounts, see GUZMAN (note 19); George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AJIL 541 (2005); George Downs, David Rocke & Peter Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 379 (1996).
69. 92 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995). On the different impacts of normative vs. hortatory, general vs. specific instruments, see Dinah Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of “Soft Law”, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE 1, 3 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Peter Haas, Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from International Relations and Comparative Politics, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE 43, 52 et seq. (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
70. 93 This includes the New Haven School, see McDougal (note 76); and Transnational Legal Process, see Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE LAW JOURNAL 2599 (1997); THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990).
71. 95 See JÜRGEN BAST, GRUNDBEGRIFFE DER HANDLUNGSFORMEN DER EU 20, 101 et seq. (2006).
72. 96 Note that in the law of the European Union, the applicable procedure largely depends on the competence, not on the instrument used, id. at 351.
73. 97 The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, see Schuler, in this issue.
74. 98 The Export Credits Arrangement, which used to be confidential. Also, the Basel group developed confidential rules. Likewise, the Security Council’s reasoning behind putting someone on or removing him from the list of terrorists remains secretive, see Feinäugle, in this issue.
75. 99 Official Commentary on the OECD Model Convention on Double Taxation, see Reimer, Transnationales Steuerrecht, in INTERNATIONALES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 181 (Christoph Möllers, Andreas Voßkuhle & Christian Walter eds., 2007).
76. 100 BAST (note 95), at 146; FLORIAN VON ALEMANN, DIE HANDLUNGSFORM DER INTERINSTITUTIONELLEN VEREINBARUNG 44 (2006).
77. 101 In most of the thematic studies of this project, instruments are addressed to states. However, some instruments are addressed directly to individuals. See Less, in this issue; Kaiser, in this issue; Smrkolj, in this issue; Schuler, in this issue.
78. 102 Smrkolj, in this issue; Kaiser, in this issue (on individuals). Láncos, in this issue (on states).
79. 103 On indirect legal effects, see PETER KRAUSE, RECHTSFORMEN DES VERWALTUNGSHANDELNS 25 (1974). This largely corresponds to the distinction between acte juridique and fait juridique, see d’Aspremont (note 43).
80. 106 See Matthias Goldmann, The Accountability of Private vs. Public Governance “by Information”. A Comparison of the Assessment Activities of the OECD and the IEA in the Field of Education, 58 RIVISTA TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO 41 (2008).
81. 108 The most prominent example are certainly the Security Council anti-terrorism lists, see Feinäugle, in this issue.
82. 110 See, most notably, Feinäugle, in this issue; Smrkolj, in this issue.
83. 111 Anne van Aaken, Making International Human Rights Protection More Effective: A Rational Choice Approach to the Effectiveness of Provisions of Ius Standi, 23 CONFERENCES ON NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY 29 (2006).
84. 113 For example, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries owes much of its effectiveness to monitoring and implementation by regional fisheries organizations, see Friedrich, in this issue.
85. 114 For negative examples, see de Wet (note 8); for positive examples, see Farahat, in this issue.
86. 116 Friedrich, in this issue; Schöndorf-Haubold, in this issue.
87. 117 Minutes or official reports of meetings and conferences, see Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 15).
88. 119 See de Wet (note 8): Technically, the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles only corroborates preexisting conventional obligations, although it exceeds their significance; Schuler, in this issue.
89. 120 Gunther Teubner, Neo-Spontanes Recht und duale Sozialverfassung in der Weltgesellschaft?, in ZUR AUTONOMIE DES INDIVIDUUMS 437, 446 et seq. (Dieter Simon & Manfred Weiss eds., 2000).
90. 122 Farahat, in this issue (referring to “central instruments”).
91. 123 See Feinäugle, in this issue; Smrkolj, in this issue; Kaiser, in this issue.
92. 130 Jochen von Bernstorff, in this issue (calling them “operational decisions”).
93. 137 Decisions by the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization.
94. 140 See Fuchs, in this issue (“de facto lawmaking”); Smrkolj, in this issue (“internal soft law”); Zacharias, in this issue (“binding secondary law”).
95. 141 Zacharias, in this issue; Láncos, in this issue; Kaiser, in this issue.
96. 146 CITES is an exception. However, the secondary law that the resolutions prepare is specific with regard to the animal concerned.
97. 147 See Schuler, in this issue; Pereira, in this issue; de Wet (note 8); Friedrich, in this issue.
98. 148 The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. See Schuler, in this issue.
99. 155 For an earlier definition, see von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 15).
100. 158 On structural principles, see von Bogdandy, General Principles, in this issue.
101. 159 von Bogdandy, General Principles, in this issue; von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 15).
102. 160 Stefan Kadelbach & Thomas Kleinlein, International Law - A Constitution for Mankind? An Attempt at a Re-appraisal with an Analysis of Constitutional Principles, 50 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (2007).
103. 161 von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 15).
104. 162 von Bernstorff, in this issue; von Bogdandy & Dann, in this issue; de Wet, Holding International Institutions Accountable, in this issue; Röben, in this issue.
105. 164 Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 263 (2005).
106. 165 Jan Klabbers, The Changing Image of International Organizations, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 221 (Jean-Marc Coicaud & Veijo Heiskanen eds., 2001).
107. 166 von Bernstorff, in this issue; Venzke, in this issue.
108. 167 See the examples in Farahat, in this issue; Feichtner, in this issue; Windsor, in this issue.
109. 168 For the example of PISA, see von Bogdandy & Goldmann (note 15).
110. 169 Some exceptions confirm the rule. See ECJ, Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council (Tobacco Advertising), 2000 E.C.R. I-8419; Bundesverfassungsgericht, Case 2 BvF 1/01 (Altenpflegegesetz), 106 BVerfGE 62.
111. 173 Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz, Art. 20 (Rechtsstaat), in GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR, margin number 113 (Horst Dreier ed., 2nd ed., 2006).
112. 174 CITES recommendations; rules within the Emission Trading System of the Kyoto Protocol; the HS procedures of the WTO.
113. 175 The Enforcement Branch of the Kyoto Compliance Committee.
114. 177 The World Heritage Committee Operational Guidelines.
115. 178 Láncos, in this issue; Zacharias, in this issue; Farahat, in this issue; Fuchs, in this issue; von Bernstorff, in this issue.
116. 179 Láncos, in this issue; Zacharias, in this issue.
117. 183 In this sense, see Baxter (note 42), at 549; Hanspeter Neuhold, The Inadequacy of Law-Making by International Treaties: “Soft Law” as an Alternative?, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 39, 48 et seq. (Rüdiger Wolfrum & Volker Röben eds., 2005); Roger Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 675 (2003). On the elusiveness of referrals to the intention to be bound, see KLABBERS (note 57), at 65 et seq.
118. 184 For an impressive deconstruction of intent see KLABBERS (note 57), at 65 et seq.
119. 185 d’Aspremont (note 43), at 10 (accepting reference to these instruments as “soft law”).