Is the only form of 'reasonable regulation' self regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on regulating the commons and cultivating citizens

Public Choice

Volumn 143, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 283-291

  Boettke, Peter ^a  

^a GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Collective action; Governing the commons; Political economy; Self regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952426689     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9622-9     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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