Split-award procurement auctions with uncertain scale economies: Theory and data

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 69, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 24-41

  Anton, James J ^a   Brusco, Sandro ^b   Lopomo, Giuseppe ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951645213     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.001     Document Type: Article

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