Contracting with qualified suppliers

International Economic Review

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 115-128

  Riordan, Michael H ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040834518     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2527249     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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