The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-288

  Matthews, Robert J ^a  

^a Rutgers University English Department   (United States)

Author keywords

Computational cognitive science; Production of behaviour; Production of thought; Propositional attitudes; Sentences

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951582326     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211258.001.0001     Document Type: Book

References (135)

1. Armstrong, D. (1968) A Materialist Theory of Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul).
2. Ascher, N. (1993) Reference to Abstract Objects (Kluwer: Dordrecht).
3. Bach, K. (1997) 'Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78: 215-41.
4. Barton, G., Berwick, R., and Ristad, E. (1987) Computational Complexity and Natural Language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
5. Beckermann, A. (1996) 'Is There a Problem About Intentionality?', Erkenntnis 51: 1-23.
6. Bermudez, J. (2003) Thinking without Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
7. Berwick, R. (1985) The Acquisition of Syntactic Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
8. Berwick, R. and Weinberg, A. (1984) The Grammatical Basis of Linguistic Performance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
9. Block, N. (1978) 'Troubles with Functionalism', in W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 261-35. Reprinted in Block (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. I(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980).
10. Block, N. (1981) Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
11. Bonatti, L. (1998) 'Why It Took So Long to Bake Mental-Logic Cake: Historical Analysis of the Recipe and Its Ingredients', in Braine and O'Brien (1998a), 7-22.
12. Braddon-Mitchell, D. and Jackson, F. (1996) Philosophy of Mind and Cognition (Oxford:Blackwell).
13. Braine, M. (1978) 'On the Relation between the Natural Logic of Reasoning and Standard Logic', Psychological Review 85: 1-21.
14. Braine, M. and O'Brien, D. (1998a) Mental Logic (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).
15. Braine, M. (1998b) 'How to Investigate Mental Logic and the Syntax of Thought', in Braine and O'Brien (1998a), 45-62.
16. Braine, M. (1998c) 'The Theory of Mental-Propositional Logic: Description and Illustration', in Braine and O'Brien (1998a), 79-90.
17. Braine, M., Noveck, I., Samuels, M., Lea, R., Fisch, S., and Yang, Y. (1998) 'Further Evidence for the Theory: Predicting Intermediate and Multiple Conclusions in Propositional Logic Inference Problems', in Braine and O'Brien (1998a), 145-98.
18. Braine, M., Reiser, B., and Rumain, D. (1998) 'Evidence for the Theory: Predicting the Difficulty of Propositional Logic Inference Problems', in Braine and O'Brien (1998a), 91-144.
19. Bresnan, J. and Kaplan, R. (1982) 'Introduction: Grammars as Mental Representations of Language', in Bresnan (ed.), The Mental Representation of Grammatical Relations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. xvii-lii.
20. Campbell, N. (1928) An Account of the Principles of Measurement and Calculation (London: Longmans).
21. Carnap, R. (1947) Meaning and Necessity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
22. Cheng, P. and Holyoak, K. (1985) 'Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas', Cognitive Psychology 17: 391-416.
23. Chomsky, N. (1959) 'Review of Skinner's Verbal Behavior', Language 35: 26-58.
24. Chomsky, N. (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
25. Chomsky, N. (1980a) Rules and Representations (New York: Columbia University Press).
26. Chomsky, N. (1980b) 'Rules and Representations', Behavior and Brain Science 3: 1-61.
27. Chomsky, N. (2000) New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
28. Churchland, P. (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press).
29. Churchland, P. (1981) 'Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes', Journal of Philosophy 67: 67-90.
30. Cosmides, L. (1989) 'The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How Humans Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task', Cognition 31: 187-276.
31. Crimmins, M. (1992) Talk about Belief (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
32. Crimmins, M. and Perry, J. (1989) 'The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs', The Journal of Philosophy 86: 685-711.
33. Cummins, R. (1983) The Nature of Psychological Explanation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
34. Cummins, R. (1989) Meaning and Mental Representation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
35. Davidson, D. (1968) 'On Saying That', Synthese 19: 130-46.
36. Davidson, D. (1989) 'What is Present to the Mind', in J. Brandl and W. Gombocz (eds.), The Mind of Donald Davidson (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi), 3-18.
37. Davies, M. (1987) 'Tacit Knowledge and Semantic Theory: Can a Five Percent Difference Matter?', Mind 96: 441-62.
38. Dennett, D. (1977) 'Critical Notice: The Language of Thought by Jerry Fodor', Mind 86: 265-80. Page references to reprint as 'A Cure for the Common Code', in Brainstorms (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 90-108.
39. Dennett, D. (1987) 'Beyond Belief', in The Intentional Stance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), 116-211.
40. Díez, J. (1997) 'A Hundred Years of Numbers: An Historical Introduction to Measurement Theory 1887-1990', Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 28: 167-85, 237-65.
41. Dretske, F. (1988) Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes (Cambridge, MA:MIT Press).
42. Dummett, M. (1976) 'What is a Theory of Meaning? (II)', in G. Evans and J. McDowell (eds.), Truth and Meaning (London: Oxford University Press), 67-137.
43. Egan, F. (1991) 'Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21: 379-88.
44. Egan, F. (1995) 'Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture', Philosophy of Science 62: 179-96.
45. Egan, F. (2003) 'Naturalistic Inquiry: Where Does Mental Representation Fit In?', in L. Antony and N. Hornstein (eds.), Chomksy and His Critics (London: Blackwell), 89-104.
46. Field, H. (1978) 'Mental Representation', Erkenntnis 9: 13-61. Reprinted in Block (1981), 78-112.
47. Field, H. (1981) Postscript to his 'Mental Representation', in Block (1981), 112-14.
48. Fiengo, R. and May, R. (1996) 'Interpreted Logical Form: A Critique', Rivista di Linguistica 8: 349-73.
49. Fodor, J. (1974) 'Special Sciences', Synthese 28: 121-45. Reprinted in Fodor, Representations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 127-45.
50. Fodor, J. (1975) The Language of Thought (New York: Crowell).
51. Fodor, J. (1978) 'Propositional Attitudes', Monist 61. Page references to reprint in Fodor, Representations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 177-203.
52. Fodor, J. (1979) 'Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes', in R. Cooper and E. Walker (eds.), Sentence Processing (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum). Page references to reprint in Fodor, Representations (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 100-23.
53. Fodor, J. (1981) 'Some Notes on What Linguistics Is About', in Block (1981), 197-207.
54. Fodor, J. (1983) Modularity of Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
55. Fodor, J. (1987) Psychosemantics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
56. Fodor, J. (1990a) 'Review of Stephen Schiffer's Remnants of Meaning', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50. Reprinted in Fodor (1990b), 177-91.
57. Fodor, J. (1990b) A Theory of Content and Other Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
58. Fodor, J., Bever, T., and Garrett, M. (1974) The Psychology of Language (New York:McGraw-Hill).
59. Fodor, J. and McLaughlin, B. (1990) 'Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity', Cognition 35: 183-204.
60. Fodor, J. and Pylyshyn, Z. (1988) 'Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis', Cognition 28: 3-71.
61. Gallistel, C. (1990) The Organization of Learning (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
62. Gallistel, C. (2006) 'The Nature of Learning and the Functional Architecture of the Brain', in Q. Ling, et al. (eds.), Psychological Science Around the World, Vol. 1. Proceedings of the 28th International Congress of Psychology (Hove, East Sussex: Psychology Press), 63-71.
63. Graves, C., Katz, J., Nishiyama, Y., Soames, S., Stecker, R., and Tovey, P. (1973) 'Tacit Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 70: 318-30.
64. Grice, P. (1989) Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
65. Harman, G. (1973) Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
66. Haugeland, J. (1978) 'The Plausibility of Cognitivism', Behavioral and Brain Science 2: 215-60.
67. Helmholtz, H. (1887) 'Zahlen und Messen, erkenntnistheoretisch betrachtet', translated as 'Counting and Measuring from an Epistemological Viewpoint', in his Epistemological Writings (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977), 72-114.
68. Hodges, W. (1993) Model Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press).
69. Hölder, O. (1901) 'Die Axiome der Quantität und die Lehre vom Mass', Berichte über die Verhandlungen der königliche sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig Math.-Phys. Classe 53: 1-64.
70. Holyoak, K. and Cheng, P. (1995) 'Pragmatic Reasoning from Multiple Points of View: A Response', Thinking and Reasoning 1: 373-88.
71. Horgan, T. and Graham, G. (1991) 'In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism', Philosophical Studies 62: 107-34.
72. Hornik, K., Stinchcombe, M., and White, H. (1989) 'Multilayer Feedforward Networks Are Universal Approximators', Neural Networks 2: 359-66.
73. Jackson, F. and Pettit, P. (1990) 'In Defense of Folk Psychology', Philosophical Studies 59: 31-54.
74. Johnson-Laird, P. (1975) 'Models of Deduction', in R. Falmagne (ed.), Reasoning:Representation and Process in Children and Adults (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).
75. Johnson-Laird, P. (1983) Mental Models (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
76. Johnson-Laird, P. and Byrne, R. (1991) Deduction (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates).
77. Johnson-Laird, P. and Byrne, R. (1993) 'Mental Models or Formal Rules?', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16: 368-80.
78. King, J. (2002) 'Designating Propositions', Philosophical Review 111: 341-71.
79. Kirsch, D. (1990) 'When Is Information Explicitly Represented', in P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Content and Meaning (Vancouver: UBC Press), 340-65.
80. Krantz, D., Luce, D., Suppes, P., and Tversky, A. (1971) Foundations of Measurement, Vol. I (New York: Academic Press).
81. Kripke, S. (1979) 'A Puzzle about Belief', in A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use (Dordrecht: Reidel), 239-83.
82. Larson, R. and Ludlow, P. (1993) 'Interpreted Logical Forms', Synthese 95: 305-55.
83. Larson, R. and Segal, G. (1995) Knowledge of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
84. Lepore, E. (1997) 'Conditions on Understanding Language', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 19: 41-60.
85. Lewis, D. (1972) 'Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50: 249-58.
86. Loar, B. (1988) 'Social Content and Psychological Content', in R. Grimm and D. Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought (Tucson: University of Arizona Press).
87. Loewer, B. and Rey, G. (1991) Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics (Oxford:Blackwell).
88. Ludlow, P. (2000) 'Interpreted Logical Forms, Belief Attribution, and the Dynamic Lexicon', in K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports (Oxford:Elsevier Science), 31-42.
89. Lycan, W. (1981) 'Form, Function, and Feel', Journal of Philosophy 78: 24-50.
90. Marcus, M. (1980) A Theory of Syntactic Recognition for Natural Language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
91. Marr, D. (1982) Vision (New York: Freeman).
92. Matthews, R. (1990) 'The Measure of Mind', Report No. 57/1990, Research Group on Mind and Brain, ZiF (Bielefeld).
93. Matthews, R. (1991a) 'Is There Vindication through Representationalism?', in Loewer and Ray (1991), 137-50.
94. Matthews, R. (1991b) 'Psychological Reality of Grammars', in A. Kasher (ed.), The Chomskyan Turn (London: Blackwell), 182-99.
95. Matthews, R. (1994) 'The Measure of Mind', Mind 103: 131-46.
96. Matthews, R. (1997) 'Can Connectionists Explain Systematicity?' Mind & Language 12: 154-77.
97. Matthews, R. (2004) 'Does Linguistic Competence Require Knowledge of Language?', in A. Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 187-213.
98. Matthews, R. (2006) 'Knowledge of Language and Linguistic Competence', Philosophical Issues 16: 200-20.
99. Miller, G. and Chomsky, N. (1963) 'Finitary Models of Language Users', in R. Luce, R. Bush, and E. Galanter (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Psychology (New York: John Wiley), 419-91.
100. Moltmann, F. (2003) 'Propositional Attitudes without Propositions', Synthese 135: 77-118.
101. Mundy, B. (1986) 'On the Theory of Meaningful Representation', Synthese 67: 391-437.
102. Mundy, B. (1987) 'The Metaphysics of Quantity', Philosophical Studies 51: 29-54.
103. Narens, L. (1985) Abstract Measurement Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
104. Newell, A. (1980) 'Physical Symbol Systems', Cognitive Science 4: 135-83.
105. Newell, A. (1981) 'The Knowledge Level', AI Magazine (Summer), 1-20.
106. O'Brien, D. (1998) 'Mental Logic and Irrationality: We Can Put a Man on the Moon, So Why Can't We Solve Those Logical Reasoning Problems?', in Braine and O'Brien (1998a), 23-43.
107. Perry, J. (1979) 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical', Nous 13: 3-21.
108. Pietroski, P. (1996) 'Fregean Innocence', Mind and Language 11: 338-70.
109. Prior, A. (1971) Objects of Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
110. Pylyshyn, Z. (1984) Computation and Cognition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
111. Quine, W. (1960) Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
112. Ramsey, P. (1927) 'Facts and Propositions', in Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics (London: Routledge, 1978).
113. Richard, M. (1990) Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
114. Rips, L. (1983) 'Cognitive Processes in Propositional Reasoning', Psychological Review 90: 38-71.
115. Rips, L. (1994) The Psychology of Proof: Deductive Reasoning in Human Thinking (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
116. Roberts, F. (1979) Measurement Theory (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley).
117. Russell, B. (1913) Theory of Knowledge. The unfinished 1913 manuscript, ed. E. Eames (London: Unwin Hyman Ltd. 1984; repr. Routledge, 1993).
118. Schiffer, S. (1987) Remnants of Meaning (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
119. Schiffer, S. (1992), 'Belief Ascription', Journal of Philosophy 89: 499-521.
120. Schwarzchild, R. and Wilkinson, K. (2002) 'Quantifiers in Comparatives: A Semantics of Degree Based on Intervals', Natural Language Semantics 10: 1-41.
121. Skinner, B. (1985) 'Cognitive Science and Behaviorism', British Journal of Psychology 76: 291-301.
122. Stabler, E. (1983) 'How Are Grammars Represented?', Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6: 185-94.
123. Stalnaker, R. (1984) Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
124. Stalnaker, R. (1991) 'The Problem of Logical Omniscience I', Synthese 89. Reprinted in Context and Content (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 241-54.
125. Sterelny, K. (1990) The Representational Theory of Mind (London: Blackwell).
126. Stevens, S. (1946) 'On the Theory of Scales of Measurement', Science 103: 667-80.
127. Stich, S. (1978) 'Beliefs and Subdoxastic States', Philosophy of Science 45: 499-518.
128. Suppes, P. (1951) 'A Set of Independent Axioms for Extensive Quantities', Portugaliae Mathematica 10: 163-72.
129. Suppes, P. and Zinnes, J. (1963) 'Basic Measurement Theory', in R. Luce, D. Krantz, and E. Galanter (eds.) Handbook of Mathematical Psychology, Vol. I (New York: Wiley and Sons), 1-76.
130. Suppes, P., Krantz, D., Luce, D., and Tversky, A. (1989) Foundations of Measurement, Vol. II (New York: Academic Press).
131. Swoyer, C. (1987) 'The Metaphysics of Measurement', in J. Forge (ed.), Measurement, Realism and Objectivity (Dordrecht: Reidel), 235-90.
132. Swoyer, C. (1991) 'Structural Representation and Surrogative Reasoning', Synthese 87: 449-508.
133. Ullman, S. (1979) The Interpretation of Visual Motion (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
134. Whyte, J. (1990) 'Success Semantics', Analysis 50: 149-57.
135. Whyte, J. (1991) 'The Normal Rewards of Success', Analysis 51: 65-73.