Cosmetic neurology: Sliding down the slippery slope?

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 218-229

  Launis, Veikko ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TURKU   (Finland)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AFFECT; ARTICLE; COGNITION; ETHICS; HUMAN; MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY; NEUROPHARMACOLOGY;

AFFECT; BIOMEDICAL ENHANCEMENT; COGNITION; HUMANS; NEUROPHARMACOLOGY; WEDGE ARGUMENT;

EID: 77950598846     PISSN: 09631801     EISSN: 14692147     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S096318010999048X     Document Type: Article

References (52)

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7. See note 3, Williams 1985:126-7; Lamb 1988:1-9; Holtug 1993:402-403
8. See Trianosky GW. Rule-utilitarianism and the slippery slope. The Journal of Philosophy 1978;75: 414-24 at p. 415;
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10. Walton DN. Slippery Slope Arguments. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1992.
11. See note 5, van der Burg 1998:134.
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13. See note 7, Chatterjee 2007:130-1;
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16. See note 8. See also Farah MJ. Neuroethics: The practical and the philosophical. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2005;9:34-40;
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22. In the words of John Harris, "no one . . . actually thinks that there is anything in principle wrong with the enhancement of human beings."Harris and Gazzaniga go as far as to say that in some cases human neuropharmacological enhancement may even be a moral duty. See note 1, Gazzaniga 2005:73;
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28. Jacques Ellul, a well-known advocator of the technological imperative, writes: "Technique is autonomous with respect to economics and politics. . . . Technique elicits and conditions social, political, and economic change. It is the prime mover of all the rest, in spite of any appearance to the contrary and in spite of human pride, which pretends that man's philosophical theories are still determining influences and man's political regimes decisive factors in technical evolution."Cited by Pitt JC. The autonomy of technology. In: Durbin PT, ed. Technology and Responsibility. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company; 1987:99-114 at p. 99.
29. According to Chatterjee: "We are in the midst of a period of unprecedented and ongoing development in neuropharmacology. Reconstructive surgery toppled into cosmetic surgery as if pushed by a technological imperative. Will a similar technological imperative tip the clinical neurosciences into cosmetic neurology?"See note 7, Chatterjee 2007:131.
30. Launis V. Human gene therapy and the slippery slope argument. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 2002;5:169-179
31. See note 7, Chatterjee 2007:129-137
32. See note 7, Chatterjee 2007:132-133
33. See note 7, Chatterjee 2007:133.
34. See note 7, Chatterjee 2007:133-135
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36. Chatterjee considers this condition in some detail but ends up thinking that it is merely the growth of cosmetic surgery that is inevitable, not the direction. See note 7, Chatterjee 2007:131-132
37. Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1989:139.
38. See note 16, Launis 2002:169-179
39. See note 3, Williams 1985:129-133 and van der Burg 1991:44-5;
40. Govier T. What's wrong with slippery slope arguments? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1982;12:303-16 at pp. 307-309
41. See note 1, Gazzaniga 2005:71-72
42. See note 11, Harris 2007:57;
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44. See note 3, Holtug 1993:410.
45. See note 3, Williams 1985:129.
46. For examples of useful conceptual clarifications, see Synofzik M. Ethically justified, clinically applicable criteria for physician decision-making in psychopharmacological enhancement. Neuroethics 2009;2:89-102;
47. Daniels N. Normal functioning and the treatment-enhancement distinction. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2000;9:309-322
48. The already discussed versions of the slippery slope argument all fall under the category of argument properly called a reductio ad absurdum. The idea behind this way of arguing is that a line of reasoning can be invalidated by showing that it leads to absurd conclusions.
49. See note 3, Williams 1985:127. I believe it is possible to appreciate the structure of this argument without appreciating the relevance of the example Williams provides.
50. For an illuminating example of what can happen, see the following debate: Little MO. Cosmetic surgery, suspect norms, and the ethics of complicity. In: Parens E, ed. Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press; 1998:162-77;
51. Ravelingien A, Braeckman J, Crevits L, De Ridder D, Mortier E. "Cosmetic neurology"and the moral complicity argument. Neuroethics 2009;2:151-162
52. See note 3, Williams 1985:137.